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ABSTRACT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY: 
EFFECTS ON STATES AS INFORMATION TRANSFER INCREASED FROM THE 
SPEED OF OXCART TO THE SPEED OF LIGHT
James H. Radford 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Steve A.Yetiv
Sovereignty —  the absolute and unlimited power of the state —  provides 
independence of action. Information about actions or intentions of competitors, enemies, 
or even friends, arriving after extended periods of time, resulted in responses to fa it 
accompli. When information travels nearly instantaneously, states must consider 
potentially rapid international reactions before the fact. This suggests that since a state’s 
freedom of action has been abridged, the nature of their sovereignty has altered.
This study pursues the research question: In what ways does telecommunications 
technology affect state sovereignty? The evolution of sovereignty is compared to 
development o f telecommunications technology over four distinct eras, each 
characterized by a dominant means of telecommunications.
The first era (1648 to 1844), serving a control function, covers the period from 
Westphalia to introduction of the electromagnetic telegraph. Information moved at the 
speed humans could carry it and the concept of sovereignty manifested in the guise of an 
international system of sovereign European states.
The second era (1845 to 1917) began with introduction of the telegraph and 
concluded when the Zimmerman Telegram was plucked from the electromagnetic ether
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and became an element in the entry of the US into World War I. At the same time, 
sovereignty extended far beyond its original “closed club” of European states.
Radio, telephone, telegraph, and television dominated information transfer during the 
third era (1917 to 1964). Sovereignty extended throughout the world while information 
transfer became widespread and nearly instantaneous.
The final era (1965 to present) began with the launch of the first telephone relay 
satellite and telecommunications approached ubiquitous. The international system of 
states grew to nearly 200 sovereign entities and took on the status of the “norm” 
throughout the world and “nations” of all types demanded their share of sovereignty.
Each era compares the development of information transfer on sovereignty by 
examining the dominant mass media, telecommunications systems, state territorial 
control, cultural cross-pollenation, and international finance. The sovereignty and the 
international system of sovereign states of Westphalia in 1648 differs from the 
sovereignty o f the early twenty-first century but the sovereign state remains an organizing 
factor in the international system.
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Relationships between widely diverse causes and apparently unrelated effects often 
appear incomprehensible to initial observation. This study pursues a similar enigma and 
describes a search for, and analysis of, a covariant relationship between 
telecommunications technology and national sovereignty. Superficially, connections 
between telecommunications and sovereignty might seem as remote as an association 
between a small patch of warm water in the Pacific Ocean and the number and intensity 
of hurricanes in the Atlantic. Superficial observation, however, does not always indicate 
an obvious association, or causality, among variables. As revealed by intense study of 
weather patterns, periodic appearance of el Nino —  a relatively small Pacific region 
where water temperature increases by only a few degrees — results in changed weather 
patterns in North America and the Atlantic.1 Detecting causality between Pacific water 
temperatures and Atlantic weather patterns requires navigating through an extensive 
labyrinth of intervening variables. Similarly, an appropriately focused examination of 
telecommunications development reveals the likely existence of an interesting 
relationship to state sovereignty through the addition of an intervening variable — 
information.
This paper follows the format requirements o f  The Chicago Manual o f  Style 15th Edition.
'Stanley A. Changnon, “Impacts o f  El Nifio’s Weather, ” in El Nino, 1997-1998: The Climate Event o f  
the Century, ed. Stanley A. Changnon, 136-166 (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 145.
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Throughout humanity’s history, information traveled at the speed human beings could 
carry it — nominally, and somewhat metaphorically —  the speed o f  oxcart. In primitive 
times, data traveled only via “word of mouth.” In later eras, the information might be 
written on parchment, paper, or some other substrate, or perhaps, committed to memory 
but the speed of human travel still limited the rapidity of transfer until the nineteenth 
century advent of the electronic telegraph. By the twenty-first century, information 
traversed the world in a multitude of formats at velocities up to and including the speed of 
light. The volume of information transferred, the distances traversed, and the depths of 
society reached all depended upon telecommunications technology, but more specifically, 
it is the information element which holds the primary potential for influence on states 
exercising their sovereignty; the underlying technology makes it possible.
Sovereignty is manifested in the international system of sovereign states which 
reached fruition during the seventeenth century when telecommunications did not exist. 
Information transfer changed little during the ensuing two centuries. Often, depending on 
distance, by the time potentially influential “news” reached a distant state, it had passed 
through its natural metamorphosis to become “history.” By contrast, in contemporary 
society, the entire world often learns of, and follows, breaking news in “real time” 
because of telecommunications technology which allows immediate transfer and 
concurrent wide dissemination of information. Telecommunications systems — ranging 
from the telegraph at its simplest to twenty-first century interconnected computer 
networks at a current zenith — have the ability to carry information of all types over vast 
distances and across sovereign territorial borders with little, if any, state supervision or 
control. Therefore, information — the rapid exchange of which is made possible by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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modem advances in telecommunications — emerges as an intervening variable 
suggesting the possibility of association or causality between sovereignty and 
telecommunications deserving further study.
Some effect on state sovereignty appears intuitively obvious. How can a notional 
state possess and pursue the same degree of sovereignty as previous centuries? Prior to 
the telegraph, states learned of the actions of other states only as people traveled between 
locales. In the “wired” world, with instantaneous and worldwide information transfer, 
state actions become known throughout the world, as they occur.
The state’s sovereignty-based pursuit of security and its place in the international 
system of states receives stimuli to change or evolve from many directions as a result of 
telecommunications technology. Information, as an intervening variable, and the 
increased speed of its transfer receives much of the attention and analysis in following 
chapters. However, the ability to transfer information in massive quantities, rapidly, with 
little if  any regard to distance also has secondary and tertiary effects. Developing 
international economy, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, moved 
toward a new system based on service, all types of technology, and information. The new 
economic order relied on telecommunications technology to survive and prosper — an 
essential element of the new system was constant, immediate communications among 
participants. As it developed, the importance of territorial control exercised by states 
decreased.
Various organizations took on elements of importance by which they claimed a place 
as players, if  not actors, along side states, in the international system. The intermingled 
relationship of multinational corporations (MNCs), all types of international
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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organizations, and a new financial order required reliable, and constant communications 
provided by telecommunications. The impacts on sovereignty from telecommunications 
technology-reliant players in the international system also figure in this study and its 
analysis.
Research Question and Hypotheses
As a first step, the specific areas for study must be identified in the form of a research 
question on which to base core hypotheses and provide for more complex exploration. 
Therefore, a parsimonious interrogative sentence establishing the basis of all that is to 
follow emerges as: In what ways does telecommunications technology affect state 
sovereignty?
From the research question, then, basic hypotheses come forth to provide a focus for 
investigation around which more complex explanations might be explored. At the core, 
this study explores the following hypotheses:
The more telecommunications technology developed, the less states could:
a. Control the passage of information across their borders.
b. Influence the inflow and outflow of funds.
c. Limit cultural penetration through foreign influence from MNCs, international
financial institutions, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non­
governmental organizations (NGOs).
Of course, a null hypothesis must also be considered in order to establish 
falsifiability: State sovereignty is unaffected by telecommunications technology.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Definitions
Evaluating changes in sovereignty over time and how telecommunications technology 
contributed to those changes necessitates the use of a variety of terms which share 
vernacular, technical, and discipline-specific meanings. The most used words on which 
the investigation depends, therefore, require specific definitions to clarify their use 
throughout this dissertation.
As the central theme, sovereignty requires special clarification. It is a term often used 
in mass media vernacular as well as a dominant theme in international relations. It is a 
social science term and takes on numerous theoretical nuances and practical 
interpretations as well. As a theoretical concept describing and explaining state behavior, 
it comprises the primary element in any debate concerning the international system and its 
actors.2 It also has more substantial elements. Later discussion (Chapter II) will 
establish a more inclusive theoretical basis and interpretation of the concept, but for the 
purpose of introducing the study’s subject and scope, a simple, introductory political 
science definition provides a starting point: “The absolute and unlimited power of the 
state.”3 The context implies “within the borders of the state.” It provides a convenient 
framework within which to study the state as the primary actor in the international 
system, and by which to analyze state behavior. However, many sovereign state actions 
remain tacit and unacknowledged in such a simplistic definition. Further study requires a 
definition which acknowledges the scope of sovereignty while maintaining succinct and
2Sohail H. Hashmi, “Introduction,” in State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International 
Relations, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi, 1-14 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 4.
3Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction (London: St. Martin’s, 1999), 90.
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parsimonious limits; it must acknowledge both the nature of sovereignty and the 
sovereign state to which it refers.
Sovereignty divides into two categories, both of which must be included in any 
definition. Internal sovereignty is the absolute and unlimited power o f the state within its 
territorial boundaries. External sovereignty is the state’s place in the international 
system.4 The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States defined a 
sovereign state under the context of international law as containing four essential 
elements: Defined geographical territory; a population identified with the state; a 
functioning, sovereign government recognized by other sovereign governments within the 
international system; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.5
Therefore, a working definition must include both internal and external elements of 
sovereignty. Internally, it is the state’s ability to control activities that are nominally or 
juridically subject to authoritative decisions,6 with that realm of control defined by 
territory wherein a stable government exercises final authority.7 External sovereignty 
requires recognition by other actors in the international system. A working definition of
“Ibid., 92-97.
5Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation o f  Conflicting 
Rights (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 16.
6Janice E. Thomson and Stephen K. Krasner, “Global Transactions and the Consolidation o f  
Sovereignty,” in G lobal Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics fo r  the 1990s, 
ed. Emst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, 195-219 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 195- 
196.
’Ibid., 197.
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sovereignty then emerges as: “Recognition by internal and external actors that the state 
has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”8
In conjunction with sovereignty, several other terms appear throughout the ensuing 
discussion. As a foundation for discussion, the following definitions apply, unless 
otherwise expanded or elaborated upon.
Reference to the state, always implies sovereign state. Political science definitions of 
the state generally require it to be composed of three elements: a functioning sovereign 
government, a population, and territorial limits.9 Often, a fourth element is added to a 
state’s minimum requirements —  the acceptance of sovereign status by other states which 
includes the ability to enter into international agreements (treaties). This appears inherent 
to the sovereign government rather than a separate element o f the definition. The state 
and sovereignty are, therefore, inextricably linked but not necessarily synonymous. Since 
the sovereign government forms an essential element of the state, anything that affects the 
government’s pursuit of its absolute and unlimited power may be said to have an impact 
on sovereignty. Constitutions exist to limit the government’s use and abuse of power and 
prevent any individual or institution from gaining total control; this effect on sovereignty 
is internal to the state and exceeds the scope of the study at hand. It is the external 
influences on the government’s pursuit and exercise of sovereignty that are of concern 
and interest.
8Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory 
and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 219.
9Joshua. S. Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Longman, 1999), 11.
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Specific differentiation between the government and the state requires some 
additional refinement for the purpose of discussion and analysis. Various elements of 
power provide a framework by which to explain the state as it is used throughout the 
following chapters. The political entity defined by territory, population, and government, 
taken as a whole is often referred to in vernacular as the land, the nation, or the country.
It represents a synergistic amalgamation of natural resources, the population and its 
collective individual assets, along with a combination of “hard” and “soft” power. Hard 
power consists o f economic and military might which holds the potential to coerce, 
threaten, or induce cooperation by the resident population or other participants within the 
international system. Soft power, on the other hand, uses culture, values, and ideas 
convince others of the validity of or need for cooperation.10
Policies and responses to threats, both foreign and domestic, are developed and 
executed not by the geographically-defined political element as a whole, but by the 
government. As an actor in the international system the specific state, and the state power 
it exercises, represent that portion of the total power which can be extracted by decision 
makers and used to achieve their ends. State intentions are shaped by capabilities, but 
state structure limits the amount of power available to decision makers." The exercise of 
domestic sovereignty, as a result, has internal limits determined by domestic structures, 
constitutions, and institutions. This study focuses on the exercise of sovereignty as 
manifested in the employment of state power.
10 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the W orld’s Only Superpower C an’t Go It 
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9-10.
"Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins o f  Am erica's World Role (Princeton, 
NJ: University Press, 1998), 9.
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The term nation often appears in popular vernacular as synonymous with state or 
country. However, when used herein, the term refers only to a grouping of people with 
shared characteristics such as language, culture, or historical heritage.12
A dictionary definition adequately describes telecommunications technology, a rather 
straight forward technical term: The science and technology o f transmitting information, 
as words, sounds, or images, over great distances, in the form of electromagnetic signals, 
as by telegraph, telephone, radio, or television.13 [Italic emphasis added.]
Telecommunications technology allows the electromagnetic “connection” of 
geographically diverse points. That, in itself, results in little impact on any body politic. 
However, establishing such connections allows nearly instantaneous exchange of 
information, which also requires a working definition. In this case, information is 
simply: a collection o f facts, data, numbers, and symbols that have meaning.14 When 
considering the movement of information, two elements must be considered. First, the 
transfer of information from one place to another constitutes nothing more than people or 
institutions “learning” or becoming aware of information which originated some distance 
away. Distribution, on the other hand, represents the depth or breadth of the population 
becoming aware of information, akin to publication or broadcast, by way of examples.
For the purpose of investigating the validity of hypotheses, information may be 
viewed in its modern sense as an abstract commodity, traveling at nearly instantaneous
12Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1967), 97.
13 Random House Webster's Electronic Dictionary and Thesaurus, College Edition, 1999, s.v. 
“Telecommunications.”
14Information Age Dictionary. (Overland Park, KS: Intertec Publishing, 1992), s.v. “Information.”
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speeds, and over which the state often may exercise little control or supervision. As a 
result, state actions often become known throughout the international system instantly. 
Purely domestic decisions must be made with consideration for international 
ramifications, begging the question: Does increasing the speed, breadth, and depth of 
information transfer cause states to alter their behavior? If so, it could be said that states’ 
pursuit of sovereignty has been attenuated since they find themselves obligated to 
consider the international system when dealing with domestic situations where sovereign 
power would be, theoretically, absolute.
Purpose of Research and Importance of the Question
The foregoing discussion of sovereignty, information, and telecommunications 
indicates the likelihood of an interesting association between telecommunications 
technology and state sovereignty. Pursuit of answers to the research question, “In what 
ways does telecommunications technology affect state sovereignty?” promises a positive 
contribution to political science’s common body of knowledge.
The sovereign state continues to play a significant role in the international system, but 
manifestation of the theory —  the sovereign state —  appears to be in transition. States 
still exist, but the sovereignty under which they operate in the international system is not 
identical to the concept as it emerged in 1648. Virtually all theories o f international 
relations start with the foundation of the sovereign state as the primary element of the 
international system. Realism, the basis of comparison from which other theories 
establish their explanations of the international system, focuses on states’ pursuit of 
power and regards states as the dominant, if not the only actors in the international
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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system.15 Neo-realism concentrates on the structures and distribution of power but 
maintains the primary importance of sovereign states in the international system.16 
Various other theoretical approaches regard the state with less dominance or primacy, but 
still acknowledge its importance as an organizing element in the international system. 
Liberalism, in general, extends the focus of the international system beyond the state, 
through organizations and institutions, on to the level of individuals.17
Therefore, the future of sovereignty is of primary importance to the common body of 
knowledge —  both theoretical and practical. Telecommunications technology, enabling 
the massive and instantaneous exchange of information, has evolved so rapidly that it is 
often referred to as a “revolution.”18 The potential interaction of these two subject areas, 
which might seem diverse and unconnected, deserves serious inquiry to examine in what 
ways telecommunications technology affects state sovereignty.
Methodology
Concerted and scholarly analysis of sovereignty presents significant challenges to the 
researcher. Ideally, and wherever possible, the research effort would rely on statistical or 
experimental methods.19 Sovereignty, as an abstract concept, does not lend itself to
l5Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 25.
l6Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 95.
l7Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, “Introduction: The End o f  the Cold War, the Classical 
Tradition, and International Change,” in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael W. 
Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 1-19 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 12.
l8Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f  American Power (New York: Basic, 
1991), 8.
l9Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science 
Review  65, no. 3 (1971): 685.
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empirical operationalization; there are no “units of sovereignty.” As a result, comparative 
and case study methods offer more promising potential for analysis.
Statistical methods apply when the subject of investigation involves many cases.
Case studies apply analysis to a single case with multiple embedded variables, where the 
comparative method involves relatively few, but at least two, cases.20 This study’s 
research question —  In what ways does telecommunications technology affect state 
sovereignty? —  suggests sovereignty and telecommunications as variables and 
incorporates many inferences to the passage of time. Further investigation, therefore, 
indicates a comparative method
An objective look at the history of sovereignty and the sovereign state provide several 
significant points o f reference by which to separate different eras under study starting 
with sovereignty’s “origins.” Sovereignty did not materialize by means of spontaneous 
incarnation. It was the manifestation of a long process of social evolution by which 
feudal society gave way to sovereign states as the international system’s primary 
organizing factor. Tied to the 1648 treaties of Osnabruck and Munster, the Peace of 
Westphalia marked the cessation of hostilities in the Thirty Years War and an 
acknowledgment among Europe’s states that they were free to operate independently and 
without interference from each other, or more specifically, from the Roman Catholic 
Church.21 The year 1648, therefore, marks a convenient point at which to specify the 
commencement of sovereignty and its associated system of sovereign states.
20Ibid., 691.
21 Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History,” Journal o f  International Affairs 
48, no. 2 (1995): 358.
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Sovereignty has provided the primary organizing element to the international system 
for more than 350 years. Throughout much of that time, information moved at the speed 
humans could carry it. The telegraph emerged in 1845 and since then, a worldwide 
network developed to a level inconceivable even to the most fertile imaginations of 
previous centuries. Beginning with the telegraph, various technological advancements 
frequently and rapidly emerged and then receded into obsolescence when replaced by 
another, faster, more efficient means of information transfer. A concerted examination 
into the effects of telecommunications technology on sovereignty would appear 
particularly apropos for case study. However, the effects of various technological 
innovations on sovereignty over more than three centuries exceeds the appropriate time 
parameters o f a single case study.
Systematic examination of historical data has long established foundations for 
theories of political science, but lessons of history often lack consistency.22 Comparison 
of changes in states’ practice of sovereignty necessitates an investigation with particular 
attention to differences over time. John Stewart Mill provides a starting point by which 
to frame the study with his presentation of comparative method of difference.23 History 
can not be altered in order to study international society with and without the influence of
“ Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method o f  Structured, Focused 
Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, 43- 
68 (New York: Free Press, 1979), 44.
“ John Stuart Mill, Philosophy o f  Scientific M ethod (1881; repr., New York: Hafner Publishing, 1950),
214.
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telecommunications. Therefore, some improvisation becomes necessary to maintain valid 
methodology through diachronic application.24
Application of history to political theory — especially a broad theory such as 
telecommunications technology’s effect on state sovereignty —  requires multiple 
historical cases in order to account for inconsistencies and anomalies. Introduction of 
multifarious cases necessitates a single, structured, analytical framework by which to 
identify conditions and variables affecting historical outcomes.
Providing structure to the research agenda requires organizing the study into distinct 
cases which can then be compared across time. Conscientious adherence to good research 
techniques further requires that each case, as a unit of observation, must be identically 
defined and logically connected with the research question.25
By separating the period under investigation into multiple eras, the dominant means 
of telecommunications technology provides logical definition to the structure. The 
comparative method allows for an analysis of the impacts on state sovereignty during 
each era, in direct concert with the research question.
“Structured, focused comparison,” proposed by Alexander George, furnishes a 
framework by which to explore the research question. The procedure resembles 
statistical methods except for the number of cases; the population (number of case
“ Steve A. Yetiv, America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics 
(Westport, CN: Praeger, 1995), 160.
“ Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, and Jan Kliennijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science: An 
Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics (London: Sage, 1999), 10.
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studies), n, is too small to allow correlations, but permits control for anomalies incurred 
when analyzing both historical and contemporary examples o f state behavior.26
The use of structured, focused, comparison requires development of “classes of 
events” —  periods in history identifiable by coherent characteristics —  in which to study 
the independent variables (available telecommunications technology). Then, effects on 
the dependent variable (sovereignty) may be evaluated under a degree of control.27 In this 
study, four periods of history emerge, each logically defined by a significant, dominant 
telecommunications technology.
As a starting point, a “control” era allows evaluation of sovereignty at a time when 
telecommunications technology was nonexistent. Transfer of information was 
accomplished via the physical transport of the written word, on parchment, vellum, paper 
or other similar substrate at the speed of human travel. Subsequent eras each center on a 
dominant means of telecommunications.
In succinct terms, this study examines the impact of telecommunications 
technology on sovereignty. It does so by comparing the dominant means of 
telecommunications technology with state sovereignty across four different chronological 
eras. A principal means of telecommunications technology dominates and defines each 
era, except the first which is a “control group” during which no technological advance in 
telecommunications was at play. Within each era, dominant mass media, primary means 
of telecommunications technology, the states’ control of territory, cultural cross­
pollination, and international finance are examined in concert with the effects of
26George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” 49-50.
27Ibid., 50.
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telecommunications technology thereon. This allows an exploration of the impact of such 
technological advances within one era and over time. The following four 
“Telecommunications Technology Eras” are used in this study:
T0, “The Age of [News] Paper,” 1648 - 1844, establishes a baseline for the study of 
sovereignty. The period defines an era predating electronic telecommunications 
when information transfer required physical conveyance at the speed humans 
could carry it. Information distribution, on the other hand, was exploiting the 
benefits of movable type printing manifest in the growth of newspapers. This 
epoch, which commences with the emergence of the concept o f Westphalian 
states and associated sovereignty, is a “control group.”
T„ “The Age of Telegraph,” 1845 - 1916 is defined by the nineteenth century
technological environment in which the telegraph and fledgling telephone systems 
provided telecommunications service. During this era, the sovereign nation-state 
concept reached its apogee reenforcing the Concert of Europe. The era ended 
with the entry of radio telegraph to the telecommunications environment.
T2, “The Age of Radio and Cable,” 1917 - 1964 including half of the twentieth 
century, saw the combined capabilities of cable synergistically uniting with 
“wireless” radio technology to supply increasingly flexible and nearly 
instantaneous transfer of information. The time frame encompasses post-World 
War I telecommunications advances coincident with a new outlook toward 
sovereignty by states. It continues through the post-World War II and Cold War 
environments where the concepts underlying sovereignty reflected significant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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changes in response to expansion of the number of states participating in the 
international system.
T3, “The Age of Ubiquitous Communications” 1965 - the present, illustrates the 
technological situation when satellite communications introduced a vertical 
element to telecommunications and sovereignty. Connectivity among electronic 
devices approached universality. This period brings new expectations to the 
concept of sovereignty with growing influence of international organizations.
The complete study centers not on any particular state, geographic region, or issue 
area, although sovereignty emerged in Europe with an initial international structure which 
eventually evolved into the worldwide system of sovereign states. Rather, the goal is to 
obtain a sense of the general impact of telecommunications on state sovereignty over 
time. While single case studies might prove useful, this approach, with its broad time 
horizon, will help in the examination and explanation of broader trends. Further, the end 
product will provide new insight to the impact of postmodern telecommunications on the 
future of state sovereignty.
Literature Review
A survey of literature related to the research question yields a vast assortment of 
related writings across multiple disciplines, most notably political science, technology, 
and history. A rich and mature body of literature surrounds the concept of sovereignty, 
the dependent variable. Telecommunications technology, the independent variable, was 
well documented throughout its development as a scientific discipline. Effects on society 
as a result of telecommunications enabled information, the intervening variable, have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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received some scholarly attention as well, but specific attention to possible covariance 
between sovereignty and telecommunications technology remains inconclusive. The 
following sections show that much evaluation has been accomplished on both sovereignty 
and telecommunications technology, but very little, if  any, book length work has been 
done on the causal link between the two.
Sovereignty
The theory, history, and implementation of sovereignty, as the dependent variable, all 
apply directly to the research question and testing of hypotheses. Various theories of 
international relations concentrating on the sovereign state were thoroughly addressed as 
early as Thucydides.28 Hugo Grotius expanded the concept in the seventeenth century.29 
Hans J. Morgenthau anchored sovereignty to the twentieth century in Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace.30 Kenneth Waltz and the 1979 publication 
of the Theory o f  International Politics31 further expanded the importance of sovereign 
states to the international system. Ken Booth suggested the necessity of a firm theoretical 
foundation based on actual states rather than textbook notions.32 Steven Krasner’s 1999
28Thucydides, The History o f  the Peloponnesian War, ed. and trans. Richard Crawley (New York: 
Dutton, 1950).
29Hedley Bull, “The Importance o f  Grotius in the Study o f  International Relations,” in Hugo Grotius 
and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, 1-65 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1990), 42.
30Morgenthau, Politics among Nations.
31 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics.
32Ken Booth, “Dare Not to Know: International Relations Theory Versus the Future,” in International 
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 328-350 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1995), 335.
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Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, continued the revision and discussion of applicability 
of the sovereign state to contemporary society by exploring the divergence between the 
theory and practice of sovereignty.33
The literature dedicated to sovereignty is extensive and represents a mature element of 
the discipline. Various authors challenge the concept’s basis and continued utility, others 
insist it is either dead or about to expire. Of particular interest, however, is the debate on 
the future of sovereignty and the erosion, changes, or perhaps metamorphosis of the 
concept from the classic Westphalian model to its present transitional state. Reasons 
which might underpin reductions in sovereignty pertain to the research question even if 
general in nature. Jens Bartelson argued in A Genealogy o f  Sovereignty that the idea is 
not a solid concept rooted in cohesive theoretical doctrine. Rather, sovereignty is 
dependent on interpretations of cultural, political, and historical data for the specific era 
under consideration.34 Bartelson’s interpretation was particularly valuable as 
telecommunications’ influence enters the discourse. Dramatic developments in 
technology have far reaching impacts on society, and sovereignty receives its share of 
repercussions.
C. E. Merriam, Jr., in History o f  the Theory o f  Sovereignty Since Rousseau, looked at 
ideas of “concurrent sovereignty” peculiar to federal societies. He made specific use of
“ Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1999), 237-
238.
34Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy o f  Sovereignty (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), 38.
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the US model as an essential element and guiding principle for IGOs which develop 
supranational identities such as the European Union (EU).35
John Hoffman, in Beyond the State, attempted to define the sovereign state with 
regard to its development and look toward an evolutionary end point.36 Later, in 
Sovereignty, he challenged the generally accepted inextricability of the link between 
sovereignty and the state. He suggested that severing the link would allow the concept of 
sovereignty to be defined “properly” and reformulated.37
Hedley Bull, examined at the anarchical system of sovereign states in The 
Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics, and concluded that the concept 
system was fundamental to world order and in no danger of decline.38 Hideaki Shinoda, 
in a later, similar examination, Re-Examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the 
Global Age, deconstructed sovereignty’s structure and emphasized culture as the focus for 
study rather than direct ties to the state.39 Gidion Gottlieb, also investigated culture, 
specifically ethnicity, but as a possible cause for sovereignty’s decline in Nation Against 
State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline o f  Sovereignty.40
35Merriam, C. E. Jr., History o f  the Theory o f  Sovereignty Since Rousseau (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1900), 185.
36John Hoffinan, Beyond the State: An Introductory Critique (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995).
37John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1998).
38Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 17.
39Hideaki Shinoda, Re-Examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the G lobal Age (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), 153.
40Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline o f  
Sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
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A cornerstone o f the international system of sovereign states establishes the equality 
of actors in the system as opposed to great power primacy. Robert A. Klein, in Sovereign 
Equality Among States: The History o f  an Idea, examines the transition from great 
power primacy to a point where he envisions states to be endowed with human-like 
personality. Similar to legal personality in theories of law, this (ideally) would result in a 
true equality of states, whether great or small.41 The idea of equality” can extend to the 
availability of telecommunications assets driving similar conclusions.
Sovereignty’s demise —  imminent or eventual — occupied a significant position in 
the scholarly literature during the second half of the twentieth century. Francis H. 
Hinsley’s, Sovereignty, took on a reexamination of the concept and predicted continued 
value and utility of the concept to the international system.42 His idea was further 
developed by Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f  International Society. He 
supports the idea that sovereignty has been an organizing principle of the international 
system and continues to be desirable to much of the world.43 James also edited States in a 
Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis in concert with Robert H. Jackson, wherein 
articles by numerous authors examined the sovereign state and pointed toward change but 
not demise to the concept o f sovereign states,44 which has likely parallels to the impact of 
telecommunications technology.
‘"Robert A. Klein, Sovereign Equality among States: The History o f  an Idea  (Toronto: University 
Press, 1974).
42Francis H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts, 1966).
43Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f  International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1986), 278.
44Robert H. Jackson and Alan James ed., States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 28.
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Maryann K. Cusimano, edited Beyond Sovereignty: Issues fo r  a Global Agenda, in 
which ten chapter authors examined effects of globalization on sovereignty.45 This 
provided new criteria for examining the future relevance of sovereignty.
One often predicted death knell to sovereignty comes from the deepening of 
intergovernmental organization ties which are often enhanced, or even made possible by 
telecommunications technology. Geir Lundestad, “Empire ” By Integration: the United 
States and European Integration, 1945-1997, followed the deepening ties of the 
European Common Market beginning in the 1950s. Americans, generally, encouraged 
Europeans to surrender sovereignty to their integrated program, but the US found no 
sympathy in any arrangement reducing its own sovereignty.46
Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern 
International Relations, asserts that the concept of sovereignty and its associated system 
of states came about as a result of the combined influence of the Protestant Reformation 
and ideas of nationalism and equality which brought an end to colonial empires.47 He 
concluded that sovereignty, in some form, was a natural state. The idea that sovereignty 
occupies a place in humanity’s catalog of natural rights was also explored in Hurst 
Hannum’s, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation o f  
Conflicting Rights.48
45Maryann K. Cusimano, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Issues fo r  a G lobal Agenda  (Bedford, MA: St. 
Martin’s, 2000).
46Geir Lundestad, “Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 
(Oxford: University Press, 1998), 148-149.
47Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2001), 5.
48Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 15.
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Cynthia Weber, in Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic 
Exchange also attempted to reach a new view of sovereignty. She deconstructed the 
concept from its basic tenets, followed its historical development through to the twentieth 
century, and concluded that it is an abstract concept without a concrete antecedent; more 
of a code of state behavior than a theory explaining actions.49
The relevant and dominant literature surrounding sovereignty yields little consensus 
but provides valuable parallel examples. Neither the historical, current, nor the future 
sovereign state commands any agreement among international relations scholars as to its 
origin or evolutionary endpoint.
Technological Revolution
This study concentrates on telecommunications technology and its association with 
sovereignty. However, telecommunications is not the only technology with likely 
impacts on state sovereignty and the work done to consider other technological impact 
deserves attention in pursuit of influence, association, and causality. A century after 
Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution and its associated technological developments 
began to influence the system of sovereign states. The Industrial Revolution’s 
development was constrained, or perhaps even stagnated, by the limited speed of human 
(and therefore, information) movement. A business driven desire for increased speed of 
information exchange among businesses in divergent sovereign states, especially financial 
data, was the “mother” necessity driving its “child” invention. As early as 1776, Adam
49Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1995).
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Smith in The Wealth o f  Nations attempted to evaluate and explain the economic order 
emerging from the fledgling years of the Industrial Revolution. He discussed the duties 
of “the sovereign” in protecting the society from injustice, oppression, violence and 
invasion by other independent societies.50 Smith’s concern focused on sovereign duties 
rather than on the concept of sovereignty. However, his pursuit o f the free market in 
opposition to entrenched mercantilism developed tacit requirements for the economic 
community to expand beyond geographic (and therefore, sovereign) borders. Further 
expansion, placing more distance between centers of commerce, further drove the desire 
for more speed in communications. By advocating an end to national preoccupation with 
amassing precious metals and encouraging reliance on international trade, Smith’s 
philosophy focused on a path toward industrial nations with interdependence surrounding 
export and import of raw materials as well as finished products. States lost control of 
some elements of their economic community. Therefore, domestic political and 
economic decisions required consideration of elements beyond geographic boundaries. 
States’ absolute and unlimited authority within their borders had become, to some degree, 
limited. Domestic economic and political situations and repercussions crossed 
international borders.
Intrusion on national sovereignty by Industrial Revolution technology paled in 
comparison to the results of twentieth century scientific developments. Alvin Toffler 
examined the effects of rapid industrial and technological changes on society in general, 
including both the individual and the family. In particular, he emphasized the
50 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations (1776; repr., Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 301.
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overwhelming nature of technology. While the Future Shock discussion included 
elements of electronic communication, it was primarily addressed in its mass media 
guise.51 Toffler concentrated on generic technology and society’s reaction; he did not, 
specifically, address sovereignty. However, Toffler’s work established an interesting 
foundation from which to launch an investigation of changes to sovereignty as 
specifically induced by telecommunications technology.
In a later volume, The Third Wave, Toffler expanded his investigation of technology- 
society affiliation. He forecasted society’s future based on “waves” o f development. The 
“First Wave” commenced when hunter-gatherer tribes gave way to organized agricultural 
production around B.C. 8000. It was the dominant foundation of society until the last half 
of the seventeenth century. The onset of the Industrial Revolution began the “Second 
Wave” which saw life in Europe and America revolutionized through industrialization. It 
lasted until the mid-twentieth century when white collar and service workers in the US 
outnumbered blue collar workers for the first time. The Second Wave subsequently 
arrived at other industrialized nations at differing times. The contemporary “Third 
Wave” represented the collision of obsolete, encrusted economies and institutions of the 
Second Wave with new technology.52
The term “Information Revolution” emerged in mass media during the 1990s to 
describe the expansive impacts of information on sovereignty, culture, and society in 
general.53 The term describes changes brought on by a synergistic union of
5lAlvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam, 1970), 5.
52Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave: The Classic Study o f  Tomorrow (New York: Bantam, 1980), 13-14.
53Nye, Bound to Lead.
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communications and computing technologies which transmit and process information; the 
two seemingly separate disciplines have actually merged to the point where a dividing 
line between the two becomes indistinguishable.54 Numerous authors, especially in the 
mass market press, have addressed the impact of the Information Revolution on states and 
their sovereignty, but not under the restraints of a structured, focused comparison.55 
Succinct, direct examination of telecommunications technology and sovereignty 
throughout the existence of both, while on the periphery of many discourses, remains 
elusive.
Information theory, as a scientific discipline, actually began with C. E. Shannon’s 
1948 publication of “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.”56 About the same 
time, the transistor and prototypes of the modem computer also came to fruition. 
However, information without the enabling factor of telecommunications had existed and 
influenced history far longer, as discussed by Daniel Headrick in When Information Came 
o f Age: Technologies o f  Knowledge in the Age o f  Reason and Revolution, 1700-1850,57
54Walter. B. Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming 
Our World (Bridgewater, NJ: Replica Books, 1992), 2-3.
55 Anthony Smith, G oodbye Gutenberg: The Newspaper Revolution o f  the 1980's (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980); John B. Thompson, “The Trade in News,” in Communication in History: 
Technology, Culture, Society, ed. David Crowley and Paul Heyer, 118-122 (New York: Longman, 1999); 
Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread o f  U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic, 
1971); Per Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organization  36, no. 3, 
(1982): 511-536; Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty.
56C. E. Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory o f  Communication,” The Bell System Technical Journal 27, 
no. 3 (1948): 379-656.
57Daniel R. Headrick, When Information Came o f  Age: Technologies o f  Knowledge in the Age o f  
Reason and Revolution, 1700-1850  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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Gerald Sussman directly addressed technological impacts on society with 
Communications, Technology, and Politics in the Information Age.58 Although not 
directly evaluating sovereignty, Anthony G. Wilhelm studied the problems of 
“cyberspace” on democratic processes in Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to 
Political Life in Cyberspace.59
Walter B. Wriston looked more closely at telecommunications technology, 
information, and the international system in The Twilight o f  Sovereignty: How the 
Information Revolution is Transforming Our World.69 Although targeted to a mass 
market audience, he made a contribution to the subject’s literature by addressing the 
influence of information and knowledge on society’s development. W. Russell Neuman, 
Lee McKnight, and Richard J. Solomon carried a similar approach with The Gordian 
Knot: Political Gridlock on the Information Highway f  They studied the ever expanding 
access to information created by the Internet and associated technologies and evaluated 
impacts on political society.
In Masters o f  the Wired World: Cyberspace Speaks Out, Anne Leer compiled brief 
articles by notable celebrities on the world stage — Prime Minister Tony Blair, Vice 
President A1 Gore, Arthur C. Clarke, and many more —  mostly praising the new world
58Gerald Sussman, Communication, Technology, and Politics in the Information Age (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, 1997).
59Anthony G. Wilhelm, Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to Political Life in Cyberspace 
(New York: Routledge, 2000).
60Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty.
61W. Russell Neuman, Lee McKnight, and Richard J. Solomon, The Gordian Knot: Political Gridlock 
on the Information Highway (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
order where telecommunications technology permits, and the dependent society often 
demands, nearly universal interconnection among all elements of world society.62
Technology affecting projection of national power develops military interest, of 
course. Under sponsorship of the National Defense University, David C. Gompert 
published Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age.63 He 
developed information and its effective use as an essential element of power.
Carl J. Couch combined the disciplines to evaluate the social context of information 
and associated technologies in Information Technologies and Social Orders.64 Michael 
Dertouzos evaluated similar subjects and made predictions about future effects in What 
Will Be: How the New World o f  Information Will Change Our L ives66 Ithiel de Sola Pool 
went on to challenge the territorial nature of sovereignty and technology which can not be 
geographically confined in Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in 
a Global Age.66 These investigations provide an initial glimpse at alternatives to the 
sovereign state.
62 Anne Leer, ed., Masters o f  the Wired World: Cyberspace Speaks Out (London: Financial Times 
Management, 1999).
63David C. Gompert, Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age  (Washington, 
DC: National Defense University, 1998).
64Carl J. Couch, Information Technologies and Social Orders (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996).
“ Michael Dertouzos, What Will Be: How the New World o f  Information Will Change Our Lives (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1998).
“ Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in a Global Age 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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Alternative Basis fo r  the Sovereign State
If technology, or any other source of influence, “threatens” the existence of the 
sovereign state, possible alternatives must be addressed. Without some means of 
organizing international society — currently met by sovereignty —  the alternative is 
chaos. Theorists predicting an end to the state and its associated sovereignty, generate a 
question: if  not the sovereign state, what? Technological impact, although not 
specifically telecommunications technology, on the sense of community, addressed by 
Toffler in Future Shock, entered the Third Wave discussion as well. Acknowledging the 
synergistic nature of information combined with telecommunications, Toffler developed a 
case for communities which are not based on geographic collocation or cultural affinity 
(the classic “nation” of the “nation-state”). Rather, computer networks, organized on 
functional lines, could give rise to “telecommunities.” His proposition would not 
necessarily depersonalize society, as is often predicted in techno-phobic arguments. 
Rather, he predicted such future possibilities as telecommuting which might diminish 
face-to-face contact among workers, but increase direct family time available due to 
drastic reduction in commuting requirements.67 The 1980 publication of Third Wave, as 
computers were still relatively new, and nearly non-existent in the home market, made 
predictions of such ideas as telecommuting and telecommunities somewhat revolutionary. 
The nation-state could find its national identity in danger if citizens should develop an 
affinity more aligned with the telecommunity than traditional ideas of the cultural nation.
The concept of telecommunities, and the effect on national sovereignty developed 
further after the computer and supporting telecommunications became readily available.
67Toffler, The Third Wave, 372.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
At a 1995 Conference on Communications Technology and National Sovereignty in the 
Global Economy, George Bugliarello presented a paper addressing technological impacts 
on sovereignty. Under classical evaluation, political power and economic power share 
the same boundaries which are normally defined by geographic borders of nation-states. 
Telecommunications give rise to telecommunities, similar to those proposed 15 years 
earlier by Toffler. Bugliarello further suggested that telecommunities are prone to foster 
elements of sovereignty68 which develop at the expense of nation-states.
Telecommunities are not the only possible institutions addressed in the literature 
which augment, complement, or even potentially replace the nation-state. Richard 
Rosecrance, in The Rise o f  the Trading State proposed the impact o f international trade 
on nation-states. Rather than geographically defined nation-states, future, state-like 
international organizations might be expected to emerge based on trade based blocks.69 
While not directly related to telecommunications, Rosecrance acknowledged the 
contribution of generic communications, especially transportation, to the interdependence 
generated by trade. He suggested that the combined capabilities of manufacturing, 
transport, and telecommunications to facilitate complex financial actions allows states to 
project influence which might establish a situation where sovereignty could actually 
expand. As states amplify their influence in the absence of conquest, interdependence is 
a natural outgrowth and indicates a situation germane to the reduction of sovereignty.
Such a situation invites further investigation into the actual, net effects on sovereignty.
68George Bugliarello, “Telecommunications, Politics, Economics, and National Sovereignty: A New  
Game,” Technology in Society 18, no. 4 (1996): 404.
69Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World 
(New York: Basic, 1986), 217.
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An extended analogy to analyze the similar effects of telecommunications requires little 
inventiveness. Modem trade relationships rely on the near instantaneous nature of 
electronic fiscal transactions. Telecommunications’ ability to penetrate the most isolated 
geographic regions o f territorially based sovereignty extend the influence of technology 
beyond conventional definitions of both communications and transportation. Rosecrance 
further developed economics and trade as a focus for the state versus sovereignty in The 
Rise o f  the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century™
Hendrik Spruyt argued in The Sovereign State and Its Competitors that the sovereign 
state was not necessarily an inevitable development following the demise of feudalism 
and contemporary developments may lead to different factors providing organization to 
the international system.71 A particular element likely to influence future development of 
the international system results from requirements for states to cooperate to accomplish 
the tasks required in a technologically complex world. This gives rise to theories of 
functionalism.
Functionalism
Among the international influences of technology are the requirements to cooperate in 
application and use of equipment, programs and systems. If states desire their 
international mail to be delivered, they must agree to mutual mail delivery procedures. If 
they desire interconnection of telegraph, telephone, or computer networks,
70Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New  
York: Basic, 1999).
7lHendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1996).
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interoperability standards must be agreed and implemented. Such functional 
requirements can be construed as agreements by states to surrender of some degree of 
their sovereignty and therefore offer a possible link in the telecommunications and 
sovereignty causality chain under consideration in this study. International requirements 
for states to coordinate and cooperate among numerous functional regimes forms the 
basis of functionalism. Functionalism, and the institutions it fosters, are often seen as a 
means by which states “surrender” sovereign control of some element under their control 
in the interest of international efficiency. The efficiency often relies on the underlying 
foundation of telecommunications infrastructure and the resultant immediate availability 
of information. The related literature is rich and replete with varied approaches. Ernst B. 
Hass evaluated the future of the nation-state from the functional perspective and projected 
the impact of various types of international organizations on sovereignty.72 Written 
before the “revolution” in computers, data, information, and telecommunications, Hass’ 
book developed the case for the synergy resulting from functional cooperation. Similarly, 
Donald A. Schon approached functionalism as the basis for evolution beyond the nation­
state.73 He credited cooperation through international organizations with the logical 
progression from the stability of the Westphalian nation-state to further stability of 
interdependence.
72Emst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 
CA: University Press, 1964), 513.
73Donald A. SchOn, Beyond the Stable State (New York: Random House, 1971), 223.
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Addressing the two longest enduring functional organizations, George Arthur 
Codding, Jr. wrote The Universal Postal Union,14 and with Anthony M. Rutkowski, The 
International Telecommunication Union in a Changing World.15 These two venerable 
functional organizations, to which virtually all states subscribe, require cooperation and 
perhaps, some forfeit of sovereign control, and form the basis for the idea behind 
functionalism —  cooperation in essential areas drives cooperation in other international 
endeavors.
Less well developed, the literature on neo-functionalism accepts the premise of 
international cooperation in functional areas but challenges the “roll-over” benefits to be 
gained in other areas. Here an element o f neorealism also enters the argument. 
Cooperation beyond functional organizations results in a voluntary surrender of 
sovereignty. Nation-states are unlikely to surrender sovereignty unless such a sacrifice 
can be shown to be in their own best interest. The institutional nature of neo­
functionalism leads much of the literature toward study o f the EU. As the European 
Parliament emerged as an institution worthy of serious consideration, the neo­
functionalist nature of the EU presented a “laboratory” opportunity for political theorists. 
Jane P. Sweeney evaluated the initial impacts of extended functional cooperation and the 
benefits thereof.76 However, the applicability of neo-functionalism to high level 
organizations such as the EU is not universally accepted.
74George A. Codding Jr., The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator o f  the International Mails (New  
York: University Press, 1964).
75George A. Codding Jr. and Anthony M. Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union in a 
Changing World (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1982).
76Jane P. Sweeney, The First European Elections: Neo-Functionalism and the European Parliament 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 144.
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Alexander Warleigh77 and Simon Hix78 both challenged neo-functionalism’s power to 
explain the voluntary surrender of nation-state sovereignty. Further, neorealism’s 
influence also fails to add explanatory power; while appropriate for study of integration, it 
do not provide adequate theoretical tools. Cooperative federalism and other emerging 
theoretical concepts provide better instruments for the EU’s special case in international 
institutions.
Institutions
Tied closely to functional requirements for international cooperation, 
intergovernmental institutions and their functional processes and procedures for operation 
depend on telecommunications to interconnect their bureaucracies. States’ participation 
in IGOs potentially provides opportunities for erosion of sovereignty as they agree to act 
according to internationally agreed norms rather than strict self-interest. Some 
institutions exist to augment the use of telecommunications and minimize the chaos of 
electronic interference, but all institutions depend on the technology for smooth operation 
in a complex world. As this can introduce another influence on sovereignty with subtle 
involvement of telecommunications, the associated literature is of interest to this study. 
The international relations literature extensively addresses the specific role of institutions 
in the international environment, but with little consensus. In a 1995 literature debate, 
John Mearsheimer fired the first shot with “The False Promise of International
77Alexander Warleigh, “Better the Devil You Know? Synthetic and Confederal Understandings o f  
European Unification,” West European Politics 21, no. 3 (1998): 1.
78Simon Hix, “The Study o f  the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics,” West 
European Politics 17, no. 1 (1994): 1.
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Institutions” in which he emphasized the inability of international organizations to cause 
peace. He stressed the lack of data and testable hypotheses by which to show any value 
of institutions when they are actually needed. Member nation-states participate only 
when it is in their best interest to do so.79 Mearsheimer’s challenge prompted responses 
from Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin,80 Charles and Clifford Kupchan,81 John Gerard 
Ruggie,82 and Alexander Wendt83 in a diverse and complex theoretical debate. The replies 
centered on the value of institutions and their contribution to peace and prosperity, even if 
they could not meet Mearsheimer’s requirement to cause peace. The surrender, erosion, 
or pooling of sovereignty caused by institutional membership was in exchange for 
benefits which exceeded the cost.
Editing Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union, Andrew Duff, John 
Pinder, and Roy Pryce coordinated several articles contributing to the loss, surrender, or 
“pooling” of sovereignty as a result of EU membership —  the newest, largest “prototype”
79John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f  International Institutions,” in Theories o f  War and 
Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 329-383 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 331.
80Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise o f  Institutionalist Theory,” in Theories o f  War 
and Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot£, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 384-396 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
8lCharles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise o f  Collective Security,” in Theories o f  
War and Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 397-406 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
82John Gerard Ruggie, “The False Premise o f  Realism,” in Theories o f  War and Peace, ed. Michael E. 
Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 407-415 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998).
83 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” in Theories o f  War and Peace, ed. Michael 
E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 416-426 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998).
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intergovernmental organization.84 Complex organizations, such as the EU, have 
expanded into nearly every area of state responsibilities, but they began with, and 
continue to rely on economic foundations.
Telecommunications technology combined with advances in computer systems allows 
entirely new methods of accomplishing economic transactions. Don Tapscott, in Digital 
Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age o f  Networked Intelligence evaluated the 
potential changes and impacts generated by new technology.85 The Borderless World: 
Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy86 and The End o f  the Nation State: The 
Rise o f  Regional Economies,87 by Kenichi Ohmae, looked toward an international system 
defined more by technological connections than by geographic borders. This projected 
easing of the power and influence of states and control over telecommunications 
infrastructure seemed to suggest the possibility of chaos.
Potential Chaos o f  Telecommunications
In the industrialized world, telecommunications technology, in all of its variants, is 
used in ever increasing volume. As a result, the potential for users to interfere 
electronically with one another requires cooperation among states to minimize chaos.
84Andrew Duff, John Pinder, and Roy Pryce, ed., Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European 
Union (London: Routledge, 1994).
85Don Tapscott, The D igital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age o f  Networked Intelligence (New  
York: McGraw-Hill, 1996).
86Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1999).
87Kenichi Ohmae, The End o f  the Nation State: The Rise o f  Regional Economies (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1995).
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The necessity to work together may result in further reductions to sovereignty. Therefore 
the literature surrounding the potential for chaotic telecommunications and states 
avoidance thereof must be evaluated. Mark D. Alleyne investigated the concept of 
international power and the influence of international [tele]communications. He 
concentrated on the functionalist basis for the rise in importance o f telecommunications 
and used long enduring international organizations to establish the foundation. He 
proposed a division of international communications into eight areas: 
Telecommunications, News, Mail, Motion Pictures and Television Programs, Intellectual 
Property, Books and Periodicals, Advertising, and Recorded Music. O f these areas, only 
three have multinational institutions or coherent regimes. The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) were 
established in 1865 and 1874 respectively. The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) was founded in 1967. These institutions provide examples for the success and 
failure of multilateral cooperation as opposed to laborious bilateral agreements. Further, 
they offer specific examples by which to evaluate the associated structure of power.88 
The functional nature o f many international organizations and regimes directs any inquiry 
toward associated theory.
The nature of telecommunications and use of the electromagnetic spectrum would 
hold incredible potential for chaos if unregulated. Consequently, much of the literature 
centers on the many regimes, both tacit and formal, addressing the necessity of regulation, 
and the attempts to stave off chaos. Centering on the ITU, James G. Savage evaluated the
88Mark D. Alleyne, International Power and International Communications (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1995), 21-22.
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politics surrounding the functional and technical requirements involved with 
international, cooperative communications management.89 As the longest enduring of 
functional organizations, the ITU evolved from international coordination in the cable 
telegraph era to contemporary satellite segment management. Communications satellites 
result in national extension of sovereignty into space; nation-states now claim their 
sovereign “share” of available segments of the geo-synchronous orbit, over the equator. 
By extending their sovereignty into orbit, states agree to central ITU management, again, 
to avoid potential chaos. But membership entails acceding to the organization’s rules and 
a resultant loss of sovereignty.
Dan Schiller examined the impacts on international markets with Digital Capitalism: 
Networking the Global Market System.90 Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and 
the Future o f  World Politics evaluated technology’s impact on the international system of 
states.91 In an anthropological approach, Noam Chomsky presented World Orders, New 
and Old taking a new look at a world dominated by technology.92
A rich and well developed body of literature exists surrounding the multiple areas of 
interest which point toward answers to the research question. Despite the profusion of 
publications, a direct and forthright answer remains elusive. Existing literature tends to 
focus on the “institution” or regime of sovereignty, its manifestation or its future. When
89James G. Savage, The Politics o f  International Telecommunications Regulation (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1989), 9.
90Dan Schiller, D igital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1999).
91 Seyom Brown, New Forces, O ld Forces, and the Future o f  World Politics (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1995).
92Noam Chomsky, World Orders, New and O ld  (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
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technology is an element of investigation, investigation focuses on the impact on society 
and culture. Consequently, this research seeks to fill the gap by exploring the ways 
telecommunications technology affects state sovereignty, thereby offering an original 
contribution to the body of literature on international relations.




Two variables dominate the research question: sovereignty, the dependent variable 
and telecommunications technology, the independent variable. Both were introduced and 
discussed in Chapter I but each requires additional discussion before commencing an 
analysis and comparison. As presentation of information and analysis proceeds, a wide 
variety of related subjects, associated topics, and discipline peculiar uses of terms enter 
the discussion. This chapter presents foundational background information on which to 
build the remaining discussion by familiarizing the reader with basic aspects of 
sovereignty and telecommunications technology. First, sovereignty is examined — its 
origins, theoretical foundations, and practical manifestations. A brief introduction to the 
basic history and technical elements of telecommunications follows. An exhaustive body 
of literature surrounds both subjects and this chapter summarizes the information 
necessary for further discussion. Therefore, this chapter establishes a basic foundation on 
which to construct the detailed examination, analysis, and comparison of 
telecommunications and sovereignty.
Sovereignty
The term, sovereignty, appears frequently in political rhetoric, mass media, and 
scholarly publications. External to scholarly venues, the term often invokes an imprecise, 
ill defined, and emotional context. Scholars, conversely, tend to over specify the word’s 
meaning and narrowly define its use to fit the argument under discussion. However, even
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in the most ambiguous of contexts, sovereignty provides the bedrock for the anarchical 
international system of states. Regardless of the specific context, the world consists of 
sovereign states. The state’s role in both internal and external affairs dominates the 
international arena.
The anarchical international system of sovereign states reached maturity, or perhaps, 
achieved adolescence, in the seventeenth century following the Thirty Years War as 
Europe entered its “modem” era in the “Age of Discovery” following the Renaissance. 
Sovereignty, in the guise of a system of sovereign states, did not instantly materialize 
spontaneously. Rather, 1648 marks a point —  a significant point, but just a point — on a 
social evolutionary continuum where society’s organizing determinant evolved away 
from feudalism toward some, as yet, undefined end state. Initially, only states populated 
by Christians with geographical borders within Europe could qualify for admission to the 
“fellowship” of sovereignty. During subsequent centuries, trade, colonization, 
communications, and international exchange caused the concept’s expansion throughout 
the world. By the late twentieth century, virtually all states, and many stateless nations, 
claimed or demanded an inalienable right to sovereignty.
Occupying a place of significance on the social evolutionary continuum for over three 
centuries, sovereignty has received due attention from scholars, but developing a means 
by which to structure study proves elusive. It is both a theoretical concept and a practical 
application thereof. As a theory, various hypotheses associated with sovereignty help to 
explain the actions of states. As a concept, sovereignty provides a framework by which 
to think about and define power. Humanity wields and submits to power, not 
sovereignty. Often discussed as something concrete, sovereignty remains a concept —
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abstract in nature —  applied to political power.1 The concept expresses the idea that 
there is a final and absolute authority in the political community. Yet the sovereign state 
is a concrete manifestation of that power, wielding significant strength over its citizens 
internally, and playing a role as an actor in the international arena.
State versus Nation-State
In any political science discussion, the term nation-state enters the discipline specific 
lexicon. Some clarification, therefore, is required at the onset. The concept of nation, a 
group of people with shared characteristics such as language, culture, or historical 
heritage,2 figures in any discussion of states as the focus of sovereignty. Some political 
theories maintain the nation as the most logical unit of focus for establishment of a state. 
Sovereign states emerged in concert with the development o f national identities.3 It is, 
therefore, logical to connect the two in both theory and practice. During the post-colonial 
era, however, numerous states —  especially in Africa —  emerged based on territorial 
borders drawn by colonial powers for their convenience with little regard to the “nations” 
contained therein and resulted in violent civil wars.
Many nations incorporated into larger states with diverse cultures have later 
demanded sovereignty on the idea of nation-state. The breakup of the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia provides the most telling example. Several nations which shared centuries of
'Hinsley, Sovereignty, 1.
2Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 97.
3Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, The Notion o f  the State: An Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1967), 174.
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open hostility among themselves were forced into a single state’s population. 
Domineering rule by Josip Broz Tito suppressed their cultural hostility, but when 
removed, the individual nations exerted themselves, demanding sovereignty in the guise 
of new states.4 However, “single nation states” —  those with only a single, identifiable 
racial and cultural entity —  are rare in political history; Japan is among the few 
examples. This study pursues the issue of the sovereign state, regardless o f the ethnic or 
cultural makeup of the associated population.
History
Sovereignty’s origins frequently figure in ensuing chapters. Therefore, it will be of 
value to discuss, very briefly, how sovereignty emerged as an organizing principle in 
international society. Political science and history alike generally acknowledge the end of 
the Thirty Years War, marked by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, as the inauguration of 
the modem international system of sovereign states existing in anarchy. However, 
delegates from the warring entities negotiating the Treaties o f Munster and Osnabruk, 
which, synergistically became known as the Peace of Westphalia,5 did not develop a plan 
for a worldwide system of sovereign states. Rather, they reached agreements by which 
each participating state determined its own fate free of direct influence from the others, 
and perhaps most importantly, the Roman Catholic Church.
4M. Wesley Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe: The World Today Series 
(Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post, 1994), 321.
5Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 359.
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Sovereign states actually existed prior to 1648. Greek city-states and the Roman 
Empire certainly qualified as sovereign states by the standards of both internal and 
external sovereignty.6 However, there existed no international system of sovereign states. 
In medieval Europe, the Roman Catholic Church provided the only unifying political and 
social concepts, known at the time by the doctrine of Corpus Christi (Body of Christ).
The spectrum of humanity stretched from peasants at one extreme with the Pope at the 
other. The individuals between peasant and pope had church defined roles which 
provided social cohesiveness and a Christian identity of shared views of laws and 
morals.7 The concept of nation strained the unity provided by Corpus Christi. Distances 
between Rome and many of the components of Christendom, and especially the resultant 
times required for communications caused divergence in allegiance, and led many proto­
nation-states to pursue their own goals without the benefit of the Pope’s guiding hand.
In England, King Henry VIII dismissed the Pope’s claim more than a century prior to 
Westphalia, establishing his state as sovereign by definition. Various German and Swiss 
political entities adopted the religious doctrines of Martin Luther, Huldrych Zwingli, 
Girolamo Savonarola, and John Calvin which renounced papal allegiance. A movement 
toward implementation of a concept of sovereignty was in progress, but these proto­
sovereign entities still did not function within a system of mutual recognition.
The Peace o f Westphalia, more accurately, marked the emergence of an international 
system of sovereign states with mutual recognition. Dominance of a central church 
diminished and states subsequently operated under the principle o f cujus regio, ejus
6Hinsley, Sovereignty, 45.
7Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction," 357.
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religio —  whoever rules determines the religion of the subjects.8 The system no longer 
recognized the monarch’s mandatory allegiance to the Pope’s temporal authority. 
Monarchs, and to some extent individuals, determined the level of ecclesiastic supremacy 
to be exerted by the Roman Catholic Church within territorial borders.
The Pope provided nearly immediate evidence of Westphalia’s success and of the 
concept of sovereignty by condemning and nullifying the agreements;9 participating states 
ignored his edict. As sovereign states, they were no longer bound by his claim of 
ecclesiastic supremacy. The state wielded its power through a government (monarch) and 
recognized the rights of others to do so as well. In seventeenth century Europe, the states 
participating in this very exclusive “club” of sovereignty were monarchies. Wresting the 
power of the state away from the monarch and vesting it in the citizenry took somewhat 
longer. The location, or focus, of sovereignty within the state varied according to the 
peoples’ “social contract” with their rulers and would be the subject of numerous 
revolutions —  both peaceful and violent — throughout the world as ideas of democracy 
grew.
The English commenced the process on a very slow course beginning the creation of a 
parliament to advise the monarch. Possibly, the most significant event marking the 
refocus of British sovereign power was the 1688 “Glorious Revolution” deposing King 
James II and installing Queen Mary II and King William III by act o f Parliament. While 
the Parliament was not a democratically elected body, it represented the state’s population
'Daniel Philpott, “ Ideas and the Evolution o f  Sovereignty,” in State Sovereignty: Change and 
Persistence in International Relations, ed. Shohail H. Hashmi, 14-48 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1997), 29.
9Felix Gilbert, ed., The Norton History o f  Modern Europe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 258.
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(or some element thereof) rather than a ruler under divine right. The slow process of 
democratization continued through the nineteenth century, until Queen Victoria “ruled” 
over a democratically based republic, and into the twentieth century and universal 
suffrage.
In 1776, American colonists took more immediate action by nullifying the social 
contract with the English king and seizing the sovereignty in the name of humanity’s 
inalienable rights. However, inquiry into the specific location or focus of sovereignty 
varies within any given state and quickly becomes a study in social constructs of the 
particular society. This study concentrates on sovereignty’s existence at the state level 
and its theoretical and conceptual basis along with its actual manifestation. Theories and 
concepts o f sovereignty center on the existence o f a sovereign state. As with any 
theoretical situation which finds its way into practical application, reality often differs 
from theory.
Theory
This study deals, in part, with the theory of sovereignty. Therefore, it will be useful to 
see how theoretical debates evolved. This puts the present work into perspective because 
sovereignty, as a social concept, is subject to social evolution. The origins of its 
development through various incarnations and how scholars regarded it may prove useful 
to evaluate its future. Intellectual debate on theories associated with sovereignty actually 
predated Westphalia by nearly a century. In the sixteenth century, the King of France 
consolidated power over rebellious feudal lords bolstered by the writings of Jean Bodin. 
The social evolutionary process from feudalism to national identity and sovereignty took
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a significant step as a result.10 Machiavelli’s contemplation o f his monarch’s power and 
the realities of late fifteenth and early sixteenth century politics considered interests and 
issues which were embraced by the concept of sovereignty when it matured a century 
later.11 Contemporary with Westphalia, Hugo Grotius proposed concepts of equality 
among sovereign states which formed an essential element o f the anarchical international 
system of states.12
Theoretical discussion explores the “ideal” form of sovereignty. As a social 
construct, however, it is open to subjective interpretation and analysis. The theory of 
sovereignty in 1648 described and explained (as theories are wont to do) the international 
circumstance of the era. It involved a small and very exclusive fellowship of states in 
Europe. Other states existed in some degree of sovereignty but did not actively 
participate in the international [European] “system.” Would the same descriptions and 
explanations apply to the twenty-first century international environment? Sovereignty did 
not emerge in any sort of end state. With roots firmly planted in the history of political 
science, it evolved from the Greek city-state era and Thucydides, through the Roman 
Empire, feudalism, Westphalia, Machiavelli, and Grotius, to the modem system of states 
and Morgenthau, Booth, and Krasner.
Contemporary theories of international relations treat the issue of sovereignty with 
varying degrees of significance, but virtually all rely on the sovereign state as an essential
10Encyclopedia Britannica, Multimedia Edition, 1998, s.v. “Sovereignty.”
"R. B. J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept o f  the Political," in International Relations 
Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 306-327 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995), 317-319.
l2Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, ed., Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 222.
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actor and unit o f analysis for study of the international system. “Classic” realists treat the 
sovereign state as the only actor of significance, while liberal theorists include other 
actors as well —  primarily the various international institutions permeating the 
contemporary international environment. Still, the state, and its defining concept of 
sovereignty, dominate.
As with any social theory, the study of sovereignty involves some degree of 
subjectivity. It is a human, social concept. It was thought into existence; it can be 
thought into a different incarnation, or even out of existence.13 The theory of sovereignty, 
as with all theories, represents an abstract representation of reality. It is neither true nor 
false; rather its value lies in the ability to explain why events occurred as they did.14 If 
observed phenomena indicate that the actions of sovereign states differ from theoretical 
norms, consideration must be given to changes in the social construct on which the theory 
was based. The basis of any theory requires that it helps explain observed phenomena. If 
the two do not match, either the theory fails to explain or the observations are inaccurate. 
If the theory was accurately based on archaic observations but no longer explains 
contemporary behavior, the theory is not necessarily defunct or discredited. It could also 
mean that the theory, once accurate, requires modification to maintain validity as societal 
constructs evolve. Differences might indicate erosion, increase, or simply changes to the 
level of sovereignty. Since it does not lend itself to absolute quantification, evaluation 
requires more subtle means of analysis. The most promising means of weighing “levels”
13Klein, Sovereign Equality among States, 14.
l4Tobj0m  L. Knutsen, A History o f  International Relations Theory (Manchester, UK: University Press, 
1997), 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
or “degrees” of sovereignty necessitates a comparison of what “was” (in multiple 
iterations) against what “is.”
Practice Versus Theory
Sovereignty was never absolute. The anarchical, international system existed and 
states functioned therein, free of allegiance to any other entity. The reality o f sovereignty, 
however, often failed to achieve the objective. The Holy Roman Empire remained on the 
European landscape but without many elements of sovereignty. Some princes continued 
to acknowledge allegiance, but also exercised other sovereign rights such as the freedom 
to form alliances strictly in their own self-interest. Outside Europe, other states with 
functioning governments, populations, and territory were actually considered terra 
incognita and available for colonization and domination but not mutual recognition.15
Even in the non-interdependent world (by contemporary, twenty-first century 
standards) of the seventeenth century, state isolation was not an option. Mercantilism and 
its preoccupation with import of gold dominated economies; but bringing precious metal 
into the state treasury required trade. Trade nearly always leads to some degree of 
interdependence.
Erosion, Reductions, and Changes to Sovereignty
Differences appear intuitive between the behavior of states within a small, European 
centered “international system” and the twenty-first century structure with nearly 200
l5Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “The Past as Prelude to the Future: Identities and 
Loyalties in Global Politics,” in The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Y osef Lapid and 
Friedrich Kratochwil, 21-44 (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 38.
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sovereign actors. O f interest to any scholarly inquiry concerning sovereignty are both 
changes over time as well as underlying causes. Did some external variables provide an 
“abrasive” by which to “erode” the sovereignty? Did “erosion” result in reduced levels of 
states’ ability to exercise their exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities 
within their territory? If not by erosion, what changes took place and why? This study, 
of course, delves into the role of telecommunications technology as an external element 
causing changes in sovereignty, but other “abrasives” —  sources or causes of change — 
also exist.
State-centric international relations theories, such as realism in any of its variants, 
assume sovereignty of states as an essential element. Various, liberal, non-state-centric 
theories tend to accept sovereignty as a significant and valid principle in the international 
system, but not necessarily the exclusive or dominant element. Differences between the 
two approaches rest in accepting an evolutionary reduction, erosion, or even the possible 
eventual demise of sovereignty.16
Territory always provided a critical, defining element to sovereignty. States 
occasionally, perhaps often, disagreed about ownership of specific areas under situations 
of irredenta, but tacit if not specific acknowledgment of borders accompanied mutual 
recognition. Little opposition existed to any state’s control o f cross-border movement of 
any commodity and border security became a primary element of state behavior as 
international law developed to codify such norms. Economic evolution, combined with 
technological advances of all types, created situations making state border control ever
16Charles Burton Marshall, The Exercise o f  Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy  (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1965), 3.
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increasingly difficult. Pursuit of favorable international trade situations often required 
states to relax their never complete attempts to control imports and exports to 
accommodate expeditious industrial movement of goods. Where trade took place, 
financial data accompanied it. Telecommunications technology, in particular, provided a 
dilemma; it was the means by which information crossed state borders. The information 
might well contain data of benefit to the state’s international trade transactions, but it 
might just as well carry alien cultural concepts or other ideas considered subversive.17
States had the “right” to attempt to “seal” their borders and inspect all people and 
shipments crossing frontiers. Smuggling always took place, but suppression of illegal 
importation was a domestic police matter and fully within states’ sovereign authority. 
Illicit transport of goods could be accomplished in small quantities carried on the backs of 
people or their pack animals. Larger shipments required carts and roads. Historically, 
states tended to organize their border defenses against invasion rather than smuggling. 
Defense against the illegal movement of goods was a matter for tax laws and enforcement 
tended to be based more on fear of revenue lost to smuggling than security threats.
Concerted efforts toward crossing borders with illicit goods was, in all probability, 
economically beneficial despite the risks. However, the movement of information was 
very likely never difficult. Books hidden within personal baggage, letters on the person 
of a traveler, or most dangerous of all, ideas within the brain of an immigrant were 
indefensible. In later eras, information in quantities comparable to entire libraries could 
be transferred in an instant via the combined capabilities of computer and 
telecommunications networks. International frontiers were, in all likelihood, always
’’Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations,” 215.
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incredibility permeable to small groups moving limited quantities of any commodity, 
even if those borders were well defended against military invasion. Still, many states 
relied upon revenue from imports for their operating funds.
However, as levels of trade increased, draconian inspections would introduce 
unacceptable delays with cumulative effects on business and domestic economy. Letters 
of credit, documents, or other “subversive” information might be smuggled in the form of 
books or letters on the persons of travelers, and some would (and will) always get through 
despite the state’s attempt to exert control. The introduction of electronic transfer of 
information makes detection and interception more difficult by orders of magnitude. 
While border control, and its potential limits, might seem to dominate a loss of 
sovereignty, other more subtle forces influence state pursuit and practice of sovereignty.
International organization membership also contributes to erosion of “traditional” 
sovereignty. States always maintained a nearly unlimited right to go to war when in the 
national interest to do so. The formation of the United Nations (UN) made a significant 
alteration in the application, if not the concept, of sovereignty. Member states accept 
restrictions on the right and endorse punitive sanctions on violators of the organizational 
norm.18 Although free to join or not to join various IGOs such as the UN, states — 
especially smaller states —  often find membership critical to prosperity, if not survival. 
Joining IGOs might be seen as a threat to absolute sovereignty, but sovereignty was never 
absolute. The norms of state actions under anarchy still acknowledge some form of 
universally accepted behavior —  the fundamental basis of international law. Functioning
l8Mihali Simai, The Future o f  Global Governance: Managing Risk and Change in the International 
System (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 1994), 255.
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in the international environment while adhering to norms reduces the practice from the 
absolute, ideal concept to something less.
States might “forfeit” some degree of their sovereignty through other ways as well:
Conventions: agreements (human rights accords, for example) do not require the 
states to behave contingent on the actions of others. Rather, actions should follow some 
internationally accepted norm. Instead of national interest or benefit, actions are expected 
because they represent “the right thing to do.”
Contracting: states voluntarily forfeit some degree of sovereignty in quid pro quo for 
benefits, such as a international loans or benefits of institutional membership. In many 
cases, such as international postal exchanges or radio spectrum utilization, international 
membership and cooperation benefits both domestic and foreign efficiency —  the basis of 
functionalism.
Coercion: rulers of stronger states compel actions through threats.
Imposition: weak states have no option but to agree to the wishes of a stronger state.19
The idea o f sovereignty is so ingrained in the current international environment’s 
collective thinking that it does not allow for open acknowledgment o f any surrender of 
independence and therefore, sovereignty. Still, states make concerted decisions to enter 
into contracts and conventions because it is in their best national interest, and the idea of 
“pooling” versus surrender of sovereignty emerges. Early manifestations of the European 
Union (EU, nee European Economic Community — EEC) were little more than an 
experimental IGO, but it has since evolved into an entity in possession of some elements 
of sovereignty. It has defined territory, a European population, and a functioning
19 Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 117.
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government with some, but by no means all, elements of sovereignty to which members 
pledge fidelity. It would appear to be a combination of contract and convention 
augmented by some degree of subtle tacit coercion in the background. The limited 
sovereignty exercised by the EU over its member states originated at the members’ 
expense. Rather than admit to a loss or surrender o f sovereignty, members view the 
arrangement as “pooling” of sovereignty,20 with hopes that the pool will develop some 
degree of synergy where the cumulative sovereignty will exceed the sum contributed. 
While the concept of pooling sovereignty might provide a face saving means to placate 
residual nationalism, it still constitutes member states ceding some finite degree of their 
inherent sovereignty to a “higher authority.”
International organizations cause further alterations in state behavior which, in turn, 
might alter theoretical description of observed phenomena. Accepted behavior of states 
— norms — forms one element in the foundations of international law.21 Such behavior 
usually forms the basis of natural law, or simplistically: “the right thing to do.” By 
joining an IGO, a state accepts —  and at least gives “lip service” to —  the norms 
proscribed by the founding treaty or charter. If the norms under which states act have 
changed since Westphalia, sovereignty in the twenty-first century, logically differs as 
well. It begs the question: Is sovereignty eroding away from some original concept? Is 
the sovereign state still a valid organizing feature to the international system, but 
operating under different norms? Are changes necessarily bad?
20Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 364.
2lPeter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law  (London: Routledge, 1997),
57.
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This simplistic approach ignores the social nature of the theory and concept. They 
describe and explain why states act as they do. A better approach might be: If the nature 
of the international system has changed, the theory describing and explaining it requires 
revision. Some theorists postulate that revising the theories explaining state behavior 
indicates the end of sovereignty and the associated sovereign state in the near future.22 
One particular way to emphasize potential sources of change revolves around the 
organization of the state itself. Traditionally a territorial entity, new primary organizing 
foci have been proposed in the form of telecommunications for “telecommunities”23 and 
economic interdependence driving “trading states.”24
As the post-Cold War “world order” continues to evolve, or organize itself around 
new norms, the entire international system has taken on an altered nature. Intervention, 
under the legitimacy of the UN or other IGOs, has been used to suppress horrors such as 
“ethnic cleansing.” A next, possibly logical step might result in stronger states and 
organization intervening before the fact — which might be used as an explanation or 
justification for US intervention in Iraq. Such actions shift foreign policy from actions 
among states to politics within states. Regardless of the humanitarian basis generating 
sovereignty-violating intervention, smaller states are likely to develop suspicions o f more 
drastic motives and reiterate their claims to sovereignty and freedom from international 
interference. If world politics evolve toward the same status as international economics, 
continuous interactions will blur the differences between foreign and domestic affairs.
22Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 8.
23George Bugliarello, “Telecommunities: The Next Civilization,” The Futurist 31, no. 5 (1997): 24.
24Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State, 190.
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States —  governments —  cannot be expected to surrender their sovereignty —  their very 
existence —  lightly. If for no other reason, the process of maintaining domestic order 
will extend the life of sovereignty.25
While these prospects open numerous arguments regarding the future of anarchy, it 
also importunes a discussion of: If not the sovereign state, what? How could the 
international system organize itself without the bedrock sovereign state?
Alternatives to “Traditional" Sovereignty
The sovereign state has always been based on the territorial limits within which the 
state exerted its control. As IGOs begin to exercise some elements of sovereignty, they 
may not reach a realist’s threshold for relevance, but must be take seriously as actors in 
the international system. Territory alone does not limit the extent of a state’s sovereign 
influence.
“Metaterritorial” activities enter the study of sovereignty and necessitate redefining 
the actors participating in the international system. The classic territorial state, firmly 
bounded by its borders, includes many common activities — agriculture, physical 
infrastructure, military, and police organizations. Metaterritorial elements, are far more 
abstract without the confining limits of geographical borders. Scientific knowledge, 
information, electronic transactions, or satellites in orbit can not be contained within 
national boundaries.26 Any consideration of the future of, or alternatives to, sovereignty 
must include metaterritorial considerations.
25John Stremlan, "Antidote to Anarchy," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1995): 43.
26Bugliarello, “Telecommunications, Politics, Economics,” 407.
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The examples provided by the United States, where sovereign entities coalesced into a 
single federal state, and the EU, possibly on a similar course, lead many theorists to 
predict some sort of global governance. A mythological idea belonging to the genre of 
science fiction, it may lie in the far distant evolutionary future of humanity, but it rests far 
beyond the reality of even the most liberal of visions. More likely, redefinition of actors 
in the international system, their roles, and their behavior define more probable 
alternatives.
As developed by Richard Rosecrance, the concept o f “trading states” projects 
industrial production and trade replacing territorial expansion in virtually all states’ 
pursuit o f national interest. Associated blocks of states based on trade could provide a 
central unit o f study to replace absolute focus on the territorial state.27
Similarly, George Bugliarello explored the metaterritorial aspects of 
telecommunications and posited the emergence of “telecommunities” as international 
actors with some elements of sovereignty. The influence of geographically dispersed 
organizations linked primarily by telecommunications technology, particularly fax, 
Internet, and e-mail as dominant media during the 1980s and 1990s, has been 
demonstrated by several precise examples: The Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power in 
Iran while in exile in France; the international influence on public opinion developed by 
insurgents in the Mexican state of Chiapas; and more recently, al Qaeda’s coordinated 
terrorism. Such entities hold potential to evolve into state-like telecommunities.
Although they do not possess inherent military power, they have the ability to empower 
militia or rebel groups through the sharing of information and electronic transfer of funds.
27Rosecrance, The Rise o f  the Trading State, 190.
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Providing fertile ground for new varieties o f crime, telecommunities might be induced to 
develop means by which to regulate access to their valuable data bases and thereby 
creating a type of “police;” further enhancing their own illusion of “sovereignty.”28 
As the EU approaches supra-national status, the “member-state” materializes as a 
possible alternative to the sovereign state. Surrendering some elements o f their 
sovereignty to an IGO, states could be defined less by their territory and populace than by 
the organization of which they are members.
Summary -  Sovereignty
In 1648, all of the actors in the international system were sovereign states, with the 
possible exception of the Roman Catholic Church’s attempts to maintain some vestigial 
degree of sovereignty despite exclusion from the “club.” The modem world must include 
some consideration of others. While trading blocks or IGOs might cultivate some 
elements of sovereignty, they would not meet the basic requisites of territory, population, 
and government. Even if the definition of sovereignty were revised to exclude the 
requirements for territorial control, another basic question emerges: Would such non­
territorial entities accept the “housekeeping” duties required o f territorially-based states? 
With sovereignty comes a necessity to respond to demands of the citizenry.
A telecommunity or trading block might wield military or police powers, but would 
they build roads beyond those required for trade or military access? How would they 
respond to citizens’ needs for schools, social justice programs, and other prerogatives of 
citizenship which have come to approach the status of “natural rights?” As
28Bugliarello, “Telecommunities: The Next Civilization,” 24.
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telecommunications enable the easy receipt of information on a worldwide basis and the 
“have-nots” discover how much they do not possess by comparison with the “haves,” 
citizens’ demands may be expected to increase. The sovereign state has a place in the 
future, but telecommunications technology has a role in determining the exact nature of 
that position.
T elecommunications
The foregoing discussion addressed the origins, theoretical basis, and practical 
applications of sovereignty, the dependent variable. Telecommunications technology, the 
independent variable, also requires a foundation on which the reader may rely in pursuit 
o f the analysis in the following chapters. It is a specialized discipline tied closely to 
engineering and mathematics. The following discussion presents a minimal level of 
background information on telecommunications technology which is necessary for 
effective analysis and comparison.
Introduction
The root of telecommunications, is of course, communication. In current usage, the 
addition of tele to the root carries with it the addition of electromagnetic technology. 
However, any investigation into the history and effects must acknowledge a “control era” 
prior to the developments of modem science.
Regardless of a message’s means of transmission, it follows a basic process. The 
“sender” possesses information and wishes to pass it to another. It must be put into forms 
(media) suitable for transfer to another location. It might be spoken directly, but if the
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recipient is not within earshot, the information might be consigned to written words on 
paper in the form of a letter, picture, diagram, chart, or in the case o f fiction, philosophy, 
or scientific advance, result in production of a book. For secrecy, a messenger could be 
required to memorize information —  a process often used in societies without written 
language. In pursuit o f privacy, cryptography was often used to conceal the information 
contained within the written material. Then, the information must be delivered by the 
most appropriate means. Historically, it would be carried by a human being. Today, the 
Internet, facsimile, e-mail and other high-technology means provides nearly instantaneous 
delivery with little regard to the distance between sender and recipient. When received, 
the receiver reads or processes the information appropriately. O f special note, the 
“message” might be a hand-written letter, a book, or a massive computer database. All 
contain information, and much — especially financial information —  can have severe, 
time sensitive implications.
The earliest form of transmission of information over long distances required word- 
of-mouth. Many epic poems, such as the works later codified by Homer, began as ballads 
committed to memory to preserve and extend the range of “historical” and cultural 
legacies. For the purpose of this study, however, the starting point assumes the 
development o f written documents and a desire to transfer the contents over long 
distances.
Length o f  Time Historically Required for Information Transit
The primary benefit to transmission of information via telecommunications 
technology results from the drastic reduction in elapsed time between the sender’s
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dispatch and receiver’s receipt. Therefore, a brief look at the time necessary for delivery 
of information before technology entered the environment would be appropriate. 
Throughout history, senders could consign information to letters and send them via 
courier to recipients elsewhere. Messengers could also commit information to memory, 
but that reduced the flexibility of delivery; only the original courier could deliver the 
information without a laborious effort to have another memorize the same message. 
Where privacy was desired or required, various means were often employed to hide the 
existence or contents of the communications. Letters hidden on the person or among 
innocuous possessions of the courier disappear to the casual observer. Messengers with 
memorized information could easily conceal their true intentions with viable cover 
stories. Cryptography could conceal the contents of a documents. However, the speed of 
transport still relied on existent means of ground or sea transport.
Methods o f  Transmission Prior to Telecommunications
Several examples exist where various civilizations developed means to transmit 
information to critical decision-makers via more “rapid” means. Greek signal fires 
relayed brief messages from hilltop to hilltop. Native Americans, similarly, are credited 
with the use of “smoke signals.”29 Some historical evidence, dating to the twelfth 
century and Genghis Kahn, points to use of carrier pigeons to transport written messages 
tied to the bird’s leg. The “throughput” (to use modem vernacular) —  the amount of 
information transferred —  was unreliable, extremely limited, and time consuming.
29Laszlo Solymar, Getting the Message: A History o f  Communications (Oxford: University Press, 
1999), 19.
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In eighteenth century Europe, semaphore stations relayed information around the 
continent using “mechanical telegraphy.” Hilltop towers were equipped with “arms” 
which could “wave” to a visible, distant hilltop. A code of arm positions permitted 
transmission of text messages. While these “communications systems” represented a 
drastic improvement to the speed of information distribution, they were still very slow; 
transmission speeds could be measured in single-digit words per minute, at best. Further, 
reliability was often dubious All relied on visual observation which limited the length of 
any individual “leg” of the relay chain. Weather conditions or operator inattention might 
restrict accurate observation and every relay point in the long chain of the network 
increased the likelihood of introducing errors. Alexandre Dumas exploited this 
possibility in The Count o f  Monte Cristo by arranging for a “misinterpretation” in 
semaphore signals to report a “revolution in Spain” to Paris, resulting in banking chaos 
for the Count’s adversaries. A fictional example, of course, but it demonstrated the 
potential impact of information —  albeit misinformation due to technology — on 
international financial transactions.30
Distribution o f  Received Information
Distribution o f information, once received, must also be considered. In the case of 
semaphore, at the hilltop nearest the person receiving the transmitted information, the 
message had to be either written down or committed to memory and physically delivered. 
In the case of general information such as news, philosophical discourse, or scientific 
breakthrough, wide-spread dissemination after physical delivery to the recipient, required
30Alexandre Dumas, The Count o f  Monte Cristo, Vol. II (1845; repr., N ew  York: Collier, 1910), 108.
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publication. For uncounted centuries, “publication” necessitated laborious hand-copying 
of texts. Introduction of moveable-type printing made drastic increases in levels of 
distribution, but still did nothing for the speed of transfer.
The Telegraph
Except for the few attempts at visual signaling, which by their nature could not cross 
extended expanses of water, the first quantum leap in transmission of information 
emerged in the nineteenth century with electric telegraphy. The telegraph, well known 
for its inventor, Samuel Morse, and his associated Morse Code, introduced rapid 
transmission of information. “Processing” of the information required the originator to 
write it down (and if necessary for protection of the contents, introducing cryptographic 
privacy) and delivering it to “Point A” of the telegraphy system. The telegraph operator 
then transmitted the data to “Point B” at a maximum speed of 20 to 30 words per minute. 
An operator at Point B wrote the message and initiated the process of delivering it to its 
intended recipient(s).
Telegraphic transmission over longer distances developed rapidly through the 
introduction of relays. Relays involved operators at the extremis of telegraph line who 
copied the message and turned to the origin of another line and resent the message. The 
effective distance increased, but so did the concomitant likelihood o f errors. That 
problem, as a technological issue, was reduced by improved cables and potential 
distances expanded through the extensive technological developments taking place 
throughout the nineteenth century. The telegraph was introduced for practical use in
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1845; by 1866, North America and Great Britain were linked by an undersea telegraph 
cable.
Technology did not remove all requirements for relays, and state sovereignty entered 
the domain of “modem” telecommunications. When information transport involved 
crossing international frontiers, states often exercised a right to restrict or supervise its 
entry into or departure from sovereign territory much as they might for “physical” goods 
and merchandise. The reasons might be based on national security, economic viability, or 
some less defined purpose such as cultural purity or even blatant censorship. During non­
electronic eras of information transfer, states’ control of borders included attempts to 
intercept information of interest and prevent passage of data which might represent 
potential danger or undesired influence. States always pursued such information. 
Decision makers require knowledge of actions and intentions —  actual or expected — by 
an enemy, adversary, competitor, or even “friend,” in normal pursuit of diplomacy, 
statecraft, and economic transactions. In 1324, King Edward II of England ordered the 
interception and review of all letters coming from or going to “parts beyond the seas.” By 
the sixteenth century, the British were famous for their interception of all diplomatic 
dispatches.31 Spies, informants, and agents, throughout history, provided their leaders 
with information, but transport of the data unearthed by them still depended on available 
means of surface transportation. Many and variable methods of conveyance existed, but 
their speed depended primarily on surface transportation. Basically, information moved 
only as fast as human beings could carry it.
3lMichael Smith, Station X: Decoding Nazi Secrets (London: Channel 4 Books, 1999), 8.
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Searching shipments or possessions of travelers crossing borders poses many 
problems, but when the target is information in electronic form, the task becomes more 
difficult. In the mid-nineteenth century, technology allowed direct telegraphic 
transmission of messages from Paris to Berlin. However, when initially installed, both 
France and Prussia refused to allow messages to cross their borders without national 
supervision. Telegraph operators at the border transcribed messages and passed them to 
national agents for review. The paper copies of the examined and approved messages 
were then passed “across the border” — which was actually accomplished by passing 
them across a desk within the same room — to the other state’s operators.32
The content of messages frequently involved time-sensitive economic data. As 
business and industry began to realize and exploit the benefits of rapidly transmitted (and 
received) data, the delay and backlog introduced by state supervision became untenable. 
States were faced with a choice between sovereign rights of border supervision and 
benefits to their economy gained by efficient communications. In the above example, 
state control over all traffic between Paris and Berlin was removed in the interest of 
international and economic efficiency. As a result of telecommunications technology, 
states had exchanged some degree of sovereignty in response to demands by international 
business concerns and economic benefits.
Availability of “instant” communications expanded, but loss of privacy was often 
included in the cost. Few, if any, of the people desiring the telegraphic transmission of 
information possessed the skill necessary to use Morse Code. The nature of the telegraph 
involved numerous people with access to the information contained within messages. The
32Solymar, Getting the Message, 5.
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“sender” committed information to paper and passed to a series of clerks and operators 
for processing, billing, and transmission. At the “distant end,” the process was reversed. 
Numerous “pairs of eyes” —  normally, but not always, disinterested —  had the 
opportunity to view and make note of information of interest. Agents of states, business 
rivals, or other interested parties could develop numerous opportunities to intercept and 
read any and all messages passing through the telegraph system —  especially in states 
where the communications systems were government-owned.
Telegraph operators sending “plain text” (words in coherent sentences) were far more 
efficient and accurate than when sending a series of nonsensical letters and numbers.
They had to transmit at a slower speeds to ensure accuracy which tied-up the circuit 
longer. In the nineteenth century, US Secretary of State William Seward fully 
acknowledged the need for cryptographic protection of diplomatic messages. However, 
the increased cost —  which could approach ten times the charge for “plain text” 
transmission —  proved to be prohibitive. As a result, decisions to risk possible 
“compromise” of diplomatic information by sending messages “in the clear” tended to be 
made based on cost rather than the security threat. The increased cost o f transmitting 
encrypted messages proved to be prohibitive and Seward’s budget could not withstand 
the strain.33 Little privacy existed in nineteenth century US Department of State 
communications.
Well into the twentieth century, diplomatic messages were carried by public telegraph 
networks. Telegraph systems in the United States were commercial enterprises except for
“ Ralph E. Weber, “Seward’s Other Folly: The Fight Over America’s First Encrypted Cable,” 
Cryptologia  19, no. 4 (1995): 326.
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a few private or dedicated military systems. Throughout much of the world, however, 
national postal systems owned and operated every aspect of the telegraph network. 
Senders (whether they were state agencies, commercial enterprises, or individuals) who 
desired “privacy” for their information exchanges over public telegraph could “cover” the 
message with cryptography — cipher systems. This resulted in transmission of a 
message which, rather than a sensible combination of words and phrases, contained 
[apparently] nonsensical, pattern-less letters and numbers. The lack of “plain text” made 
transmission and reception far more difficult for operators, and therefore, slower. 
Telegraph companies charged a high premium for transmission of encrypted messages.
Originators and receiving operators still consigned the messages to paper. States — 
especially those whose telegraph networks were government-owned — could easily 
intercept the content of transmission. During World War I, United States government 
code breaking operations had agreements with telegraph stations for daily receipt of 
copies of all international diplomatic message traffic. Although protected by 
cryptography, copies were obtained and subjected to intensive code-breaking efforts to 
investigate the information leaving and entering sovereign territory.34
Although the US required special agreements, and often court orders, to obtain copies 
of messages from the commercial telegraph operators, many other states had few such 
restrictions. Since the communication system was government owned, government 
interception was assumed by all involved. Some state sovereignty had been surrendered 
in exchange for international efficiency —  largely in the business arena. However, 
sovereign actions still attempted to investigate the information crossing borders.
34Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Laguna Hills, CA, Aegean Park Press, 1931).
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Enter the Telephone
Telephone communications entered the communications arena in the final quarter of 
the nineteenth century. Once again, states could —  technically —  supervise 
conversations crossing their borders. However, where telegraphic messages required 
consignment to paper, telephone conversations were transient and left no residual trail. 
Supervision of cross-border telephone conversations would require an operator to listen 
to every international call —  one government agent per call. As with early attempts to 
control telegraphic messages, the sheer enormity of the task required that states forego 
universal supervision in the interest of communications efficiency. States could still 
selectively or randomly eavesdrop on telephone calls but control —  short of severely 
restricting or not allowing international telephone connections —  was lost.
Wire Versus Wireless
Both telegraph and early telephone networks required physical connection between 
points by wire. Early in the twentieth century, nearly worldwide “wireless” connections 
via radio became feasible. Telegraph and telephone systems required physical 
construction of cable systems between points. Radio, on the other hand, operated with 
transmitters at one location and receivers at another. Laws of physics with further 
dependency on atmospheric phenomena determined maximum distances. Initially, radio 
could only support the transmission of telegraphic messages, but later advances allowed 
for voice, and later, much more rapid transfer of data. Where Morse Code (whether by 
wire or radio) allowed transmission at rates of approximately 30 words per minute, early 
radio teletypewriters more than doubled that speed.
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The possible distances traversed by radio waves made it attractive to many long­
distance applications. Terrestrial telegraph wires presented a physical presence over 
which states had some control. Installation of the wires could always be forbidden or 
severed at the border if  they became undesirable. Radio waves, however, fall where they 
are directed. A state has no ability to prevent a radio wave from crossing its borders and 
must invest in appropriate technology in order to learn that waves have crossed its 
frontiers.
Laws of physics determine how radio waves travel. Depending on electromagnetic 
characteristics of the transmitter and its associated antenna, waves might “hug” the earth 
for maximum “line-of-sight” distances of around 30 miles, bounce off of the ionosphere 
for possible, but sporadic, communications worldwide, or travel in straight lines from 
point-to-point in terrestrial applications or into outer space. In the latter case, orbiting 
satellites receive the signals and relay them back to earth. But states are powerless to stop 
the radio waves (and the information carried thereon) from entering their sovereign 
territory. The signals are present and require only the appropriate equipment to detect 
their presence and extract the information component. The state’s only option to prevent 
the reception of these unwanted signals requires the generation and transmission of 
technically similar, but more powerful signals —  normally referred to as “jamming.”
Copper, Glass, and Gutta-Percha
Both “wireless” radio and cable have evolved technologically. The telegraph cable of 
the nineteenth century consisted of a copper wire protected from the elements by rubber 
or gutta-percha —  a rubber-like substance, more durable and less flexible, particularly
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well-suited for underwater electric insulation. One wire allowed the transmission of one 
message at maximum speeds of approximately 30 five-letter words per minute (five-letter 
words were used as a quantified measure of transmission speed; shorter and longer words 
were, of course, routinely used in actual message texts). Early telephone connections 
suffered from the same limitations —  one wire (or pair of wires) for each conversation. 
Contemporary cables contain various configurations of metal or minuscule strands of 
glass — fiber optics —  which can simultaneously accommodate the equivalent of 
thousands o f single-wire circuits. Similarly, modem radio systems, often reliant on 
satellites to relay signals back to earth, carry thousands of telephone calls simultaneously 
in concert with the transfer of television signals and huge quantities of computer data. 
Rather than telegraphic or electronic communications, these technologies are best 
described by the term telecommunications: The science and technology of transmitting 
information, as words, sounds, or images, over great distances, in the form of 
electromagnetic signals, as by telegraph, telephone, radio, or television.
Satellites and Sovereignty
Telecommunications technology also introduced a “vertical” element to sovereignty 
far beyond the altitude of aircraft entering or traversing a state’s territory. 
Communications relay satellites generated the question: How far “up” into the 
atmosphere, stratosphere, ionosphere, and beyond, does a state’s sovereignty extend? 
While this might appear, at first, to rank in importance with the number of dancing angels 
accommodated on the head of a pin, the question actually has significant import to the 
joint and interrelated issues of telecommunications and sovereignty.
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Development of aircraft first introduced the vertical element to sovereignty. States 
claimed and continue to maintain sovereign rights to control air traffic above their 
territory. But at what altitude does sovereignty attenuate?
In the late 1950s and until 1960, the US flew recurring U-2 aircraft reconnaissance 
missions over the Soviet Union. Operating altitudes in excess of 80,000 feet, they were 
considered “safe” since Soviet air defense capability could not extend higher than 60,000 
feet. No international law precedent existed or developed as a result, but a de facto 
interpretation limited vertical sovereignty to the operational limits of air defense 
technology. As that technology developed, the operational “reach” extended, 
theoretically, into the range of satellite orbits. Contemporary satellites o f all types, space 
stations, and shuttles continuously pass over the “sovereign” territory of many of the 
world’s states, some of which could conceivably develop an anti-satellite capability 
(although such development has been limited by treaty). No outcry ensues claiming 
sovereignty violations. However, satellites dedicated to telecommunications (as opposed 
to those intended for espionage, weather, or scientific exploration) provided a forum for 
the world’s states to determine the status of sovereignty and orbiting platforms.
In practical application, long distance, high-capacity telecommunications technology 
requires satellites to act as a relay for electromagnetic communications beyond “line-of- 
site.”35 Satellites in “low earth orbit” rotate around the planet at a rate dependent on their
35High frequency communications in the 3 to 30 hertz range also provide over-the-horizon 
electromagnetic communications. However, the information carrying capacity is severely limited to the 
vicinity o f  1.2 kilobytes per second where “high capacity” requirements are measured in the megabyte (and 
higher) range. Cables, especially those based on fiber-optic technology also provide high capacity 
information transfer, but the cable has a clearly identifiable physical presence, unlike electromagnetic waves 
which require equipment to detect their presence.
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altitude above the surface. Typically, a satellite in a low-earth orbit of approximately 100 
miles completes circle of the earth in about 90 minutes.
Antennas for use in satellite communications are highly directional and must be 
“aimed” at the satellite within a tolerance of a few degrees. Consequently, a low-orbit 
satellite is “visible” for only a short time, and further, must be “tracked” as it passes 
across the sky from horizon to horizon.
The orbiting satellite’s orbital “period” increases in direct proportion to its distance 
from the earth. Again, dependent upon of laws of physics, a platform placed in orbit, 
directly over the equator, at 22,300 miles above the earth’s surface has a period of 24 
hours. As the earth beneath it rotates at the same rate, the satellite appears to remain 
permanently in the same spot in the sky. Antennas may, therefore, be aimed at a satellite 
and remain virtually fixed, except for minor “fine tuning.”
Relay satellites’ positions over the equator are critical to the telecommunications- 
dependent government, business, and industrial operations of the world. In 1978, several 
equatorial states presented the World Radio Conference (WRC), under the auspices of the 
ITU, with demands for sovereignty over the satellite “slots” 22,300 miles above their 
territory. The situation was resolved not by acknowledging equatorial states’ sovereignty 
over spots in space 22,300 miles above their territory. Rather, the various “slots” were 
allocated to all of the world’s states participating in the WRC.
The specific vertical limit of sovereignty remains unresolved under international law. 
However, platforms in orbit have been limited by treaty (the Outer Space Treaty, 1972) 
and other agreements within the WRC.
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The Internet — Synergistic Amalgamation o f  All Transmission Media
The Internet uses pieces of virtually every type of telecommunications. The “user” at 
a home or office computer connects to an Internet server via telephone, television cable, 
or special dedicated circuit over a pair of wires or strand of fiber optics. Connections 
between the servers and Internet nodes might be accomplished by terrestrial based cable 
and radio, or by satellite radio systems, or any combination thereof. The volume of 
information transferred, when compared to early telegraph capabilities, becomes 
staggering. No longer measured in “words per minute,” “bits per second” (bps) now 
quantity information transfer. Manual, 30 words-per-minute telegraph might be expected 
to transfer information at a few bps. The typical home computer with a dial-up Internet 
connection operates at 56,000 bps. Fiber optic cables and high capacity radio systems 
measure information transfer in the millions (mega) and billions (giga) bps range, with 
much higher rates on the technological horizon.
Radio Waves Without Respect fo r  Territorial Borders
The contemporary result of a century and a half of technological evolution in 
telecommunications since the introduction of the telegraph is that information-carrying 
telecommunications media cross international borders with near-impunity. States can, 
through parallel technical development, attempt to monitor communications and decipher 
the contents, but any ability to influence or control the content o f information reaching 
their citizens is negligible, at best, without draconian measures. China, for example, 
attempts to control all Internet traffic entering and leaving the country by requiring all 
exchanges to transit government-controlled servers. However, satellite telephones, which
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connect directly to worldwide telephone systems, allow Internet connections which 
circumvent state-sponsored supervision. The only sure means of preventing Internet data 
from reaching Chinese users would require a ban on all computers and non-state 
controlled telephones. Such measures might virtually eliminate the state’s much sought 
after foreign investment.
North Korea pursues even more extreme measures to isolate itself from the adverse 
effects of information. The state strictly controls television and radio transmissions, the 
Internet is virtually non-existent and where it does exist, its use is closely monitored, and 
international telephone calls are priced by state-owned utilities beyond the means of most 
citizens. However, refugees frequently brave the borders to cross into China where they 
purchase and often return with cellular telephones. Near borders, the smuggled 
equipment can make use of Chinese cellular service which allows information exchange 
far beyond that desired by the state.36
Summary: Telecommunications, Information, and Sovereignty
In the modem telecommunications environment, states find that their sovereign 
control over cross-border data flows are severely limited. That data may contain cultural 
material (radio, television, motion pictures, music or any imaginable type of 
entertainment media), include large or small financial transactions, or disguise 
multifarious exchanges among dispersed people. The alternative, withdrawal from 
participation in the international economic environment, causes states to accept a 
surrender, reduction, or change in the nature of sovereignty.
36Young Howard, “The Real Threat to Kim,” International H erald Tribune, February 25, 2005.
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The discussion thus far, leads back to the original research question: In what ways 
does telecommunications technology affect state sovereignty? In pursuit o f answers, a 
series of hypotheses were proposed in Chapter I:
The more telecommunications technology developed, the less states could:
a. Control the passage of information across their borders.
b. Influence the inflow and outflow of funds.
c. Limit cultural penetration through foreign influence.
After more detailed discussion of both sovereignty and telecommunications, it 
appears that further analysis will result in rejection of the null hypothesis. However, an 
arbitrary decision about acceptance or rejection of hypotheses requires structured 
consideration as proposed in the methodology section. The subsequent four chapters each 
address sovereignty during historical eras dominated by particular telecommunications 
technology.
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CHAPTER III 
AGE OF [NEWS] PAPER —  1648-1844
The previous two chapters developed the process and provided background on 
sovereignty (the dependent variable) and telecommunications (the independent variable). 
This chapter begins analysis of the two variables at a time when the value of the 
independent variable was, effectively, zero. Sovereignty, and the associated system of 
sovereign states existed; telecommunications did not. This chapter, therefore, serves as a 
“control era” to investigate sovereignty when information transfer existed in its peculiar 
“state-of-nature” and moved only at the speed humans could carry it. Establishing and 
evaluating a baseline situation also lays the groundwork for a foundation and format for 
follow-on eras when new elements of telecommunications technology dominated 
information transfer.
This era commences with the emergence of an international system of sovereign states 
in the seventeenth century when no telecommunications technology could accelerate the 
speed of information transfer. Three and a half centuries later, as a result of 
telecommunications technology, information routinely shifted throughout the world at the 
speed of light. To restate the research question: In what ways does telecommunications 
technology affect state sovereignty? This and subsequent chapters explore how sovereign 
states differ across the time included in the four eras and what role telecommunications 
technology played in creating those differences.
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Introduction
The methodology presented in Chapter I stipulates a structure consisting of four 
chronological eras, each of which was dominated by a characteristic technology for 
transfer and distribution of information. The eras provide a framework for analysis of 
effects on sovereignty as telecommunications technology developed and the speed of 
information transfer escalated. This chapter begins at a time when the international 
system of sovereign states was a new phenomenon and information transfer was in its 
“state-of-nature” and not accelerated or augmented by any electronic means. Historically, 
information moved by cumbersome processes. Data, facts, ideas, or any other form of 
knowledge or intelligence was consigned to the written word on papyrus, paper, 
parchment, or some similar substrate. (Paper was a relatively late development in the 
history of humanity, but it is used here as a generic term for any of the lightweight 
substrates to which the written word was consigned. Heavier material such as pottery or 
stone was also used but more for preservation and presentation of information than 
transfer.1) Of course, information could also be memorized and transported “in the brain” 
of a messenger, but quantity, and perhaps quality, of the delivered information might be 
in question. Transport o f the paper was the most viable means of information transfer for 
multiple millennia subsequent to the development of writing and until the development of 
the telegraph. In research methods terms, the Age of [News] Paper, therefore, serves as a 
“control” era for subsequent comparison. Ensuing chapters explore sovereignty under the
'Dard Hunter, Papermaking: The History and Technique o f  an Ancient Craft (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1947), 8.
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influence of technology which accelerated information transfer and permitted wider 
distribution and availability.
The mid-seventeenth century provides a particularly appropriate time to begin a study 
of sovereignty. Political scientists and historians generally agree that the first 
international system of sovereign states reached fruition in 1648 following the Peace of 
Westphalia at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War.2 The manifestation of sovereign 
states alone marks a pertinent point at which to begin discussion and analysis. However, 
other events during the same era also emphasize the appropriateness of beginning 
evaluation at that point. In particular, banking and monetary transactions made 
evolutionary surges and newspapers entered the public domain as the first incarnation of 
“mass media.”
During the seventeenth century, the fledgling international monetary system 
approached a level of sophistication permitting various forms of paper notes to be 
exchanged in lieu of long enduring processes requiring the physical transfer o f precious 
metal coin. This development depended upon sophisticated merchants who saw the 
advantage of storing their money in locations other than their homes. Growth and success 
in monetary systems required trust in the stability of both governments and the banking.3 
Additionally, moveable type printing matured to a point where increased literacy and 
concomitant public hunger for news resulted in the emergence o f periodic broadsheets, 
pamphlets, and written propaganda of all types. Spurred on by public demand for
2Bull, The Anarchical Society, 9.
3Steven Horwitz, Monetary Evolution, Free Banking, and Economic Order (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1992), 115.
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information about the Thirty Years War, the newspaper entered European society where it 
became the first “mass media.”4 Post-Renaissance European society and culture were 
poised for transformation and very susceptible to change. Society was in a state of flux 
and even the newly acknowledged sovereignty of states, despite the immaturity of their 
“system” as primary international organizing factor, were among the targets for change. 
Trade among sovereign states necessitated international financial transactions and the 
ease of funds transfer made possible by the emergence of international banking 
cooperation. States were moving toward mercantilism with its inherent emphasis on 
maximizing exports while minimizing imports. Easing border restraints encouraged trade 
and related activities but came at the cost of some sovereign control.5 Cultural interaction 
and exchange, as it had taken place throughout history, continued. Where borders are 
opened for one purpose, they become permeable; the easing o f migration or trade 
restrictions allowed the passage of ideas as well.
This process continued with little change until the nineteenth century when the steam 
engine increased the speed of human movement over water and land, and in 1845,
Samuel Morse opened his first telegraph line. For the first time, the information transfer 
exceeded the speed at which humans could carry it. Therefore, 18454marks the 
appropriate point at which to end the Age of [News] Paper.
4R. A. Houston, Literacy in Early M odem  Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800  (London: 
Longman, 1988), 167.
sHenri Pirenne, Economic and Social History o f  M edieval Europe (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1937),
217.
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Role o f  Information
As introduced and discussed in Chapter I, any relationship between state sovereignty 
and telecommunications appears superficially esoteric, at best. With the introduction of 
an intervening variable — information — the association begins to solidify and become 
somewhat more intuitive. Still, information’s role, its speed of transfer and distribution, 
and any resultant effect on sovereignty remains elusive. The very basis of the sovereign 
state establishes the foundations for analysis. Theories of international relations, 
developed in pursuit of explanations for the international system, differ as to the exact 
role of states. However, regardless of the theoretical platform on which behavioral 
explanations are based, states, in the exercise and pursuit of their sovereignty, are most 
likely to act in their own best interest. In doing so, timely knowledge about the actions of 
competitors, adversaries, enemies, or even friends across the international system 
influence a state’s decision making processes and development of responses to other 
states’ actions. In straight forward terms, the rapidity of information transfer often 
determines its impact on states and their actions. “Rapidity,” in this context falls into a 
particularly pertinent trap of relativity. Routine news historically traveled across the 
breadth of Europe in terms of months as travelers, traders, or migrants moved. However, 
a dedicated dispatch rider might complete the journey in a matter of weeks, but at great 
expense. In the sixteenth century, for example, letters containing “news” traveled faster 
than any other commodity. Mail at its most efficient employed private postal firms which 
promised, but rarely accomplished, mail delivery from Rome to Madrid in 24 days — 26
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days during winter.6 More typically, during the same era, the Venetian ambassador in 
Madrid was known to complain of two months passing without news and instructions 
from his home government.7 Timely letters were the purview only of the very rich who 
could purchase rapid transport; maximum speed and minimum time eluded most 
correspondents. In this case, the best possible time lapse between event and receipt of 
news resulted in aging of “new” information. Often, the latest “news” received was not 
far separated from “history.”
The role of information deserves additional discussion with particular attention to its 
working definition. As noted in Chapter I, information is a collection o f facts, data, 
numbers, and symbols that have meaning. Information can also assume complex 
meanings. The field of information theory delves into mathematical optimization of 
transfer o f data over electronic channels.8 In a social science environment, the 
mathematics of data transfer plays virtually no role as information simply represents the 
application of knowledge to work in pursuit of “wealth.” For example, facts about the 
existence of game running free in a forest provide little value. Adding information to the 
facts about game increases its worth. The hunter has information about where to find 
game, how to stalk it, how to kill it, and how to dress and cook the meat.9 Beginning with 
the simplistic nature of basic information, the path toward an information based society
6Femand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age o f  Philip II, Vol. I 
(New York: William Collins, 1972), 368.
’Ibid., 357.
8Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory o f  Communication,” 380.
9Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty, 3.
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seems long and somewhat esoteric. In simple steps, the importance of information rose 
steadily, if  somewhat slowly, throughout history.
As society evolved from hunter-gatherers to become more complex, the information 
of value to society also increased in volume and complexity. Facts and the application of 
information continued to include practical applications necessary for day to day life and 
continued survival, but expanded into philosophical and esoteric areas. The Romans 
introduced the manufacturing “high technology” of the era, the potters’ wheel, throughout 
its European domain along with their Latin language, distinctive ways of dress, housing, 
and governance. The synergistic influence of technology, culture, and knowledge — all 
based on information —  influenced future development of European society long after 
Roman withdrawal. However, without continued “real time” influence, potters’ wheels 
disappeared throughout the middle ages and reappeared only as the continent awakened 
and embarked into the renaissance.10 Types and categories of information could be 
dissected and subjected to infinite levels of scrutiny, but for purposes of this study, 
information is best approached using a more subtle, even simplistic definition:
Knowledge communicated or received concerning a particular fact or circumstance;11 in 
modem vernacular, it is little different from news.
In this context, information represents a “commodity.” It exists as a result of the 
occurrence of an event, creation of an idea, or virtually anything happening.
Information’s value particularly materializes after transfer to another location and
10J. D. Van der Waals, “Early Ceramics in the Netherlands: Two Problems,” in Ceramics and Man, ed. 
Frederick R. Matson, 124-139 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1965), 124.
11 Random House W ebster’s Electronic Dictionary and Thesaurus, College Edition, s.v. “Information.”
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distribution to “consumers.” Throughout history, information traveled in concert with 
human movement. Eventual introduction of telecommunications technology would 
propel information at previously unimagined speeds, allowing it to be received [nearly] 
instantaneously at great distances and rendering distance irrelevant; as a result, it is 
telecommunications technology that provides a basis for the trite adage about “the world 
growing smaller.”
Remaining, for the moment, with that trite idea, if  the world grew “smaller,” how big 
had it been? In other words, what was the nature of information transfer before 
telecommunications? Ergo, the reason for a “control era;” the Age o f [News] Paper 
establishes the “state-of-nature” for information transfer.
State-of-Nature
Social scientists and political philosophers postulated on the basic makeup of 
humanity throughout history (and continue to do so). The concept of “state-of-nature,” 
provides an analytical tool for imaginative projection of humanity and interpersonal 
relations before the creation of organized political society.12 A liberal interpretation of 
the political science term, with only slight expansion to its classic definition, offers a 
similar analytical tool for the study of telecommunications development and concomitant 
influence of information. Prior to the development and introduction of 
telecommunications, information existed and traveled in its peculiar state-of-nature. In 
its “natural” state, information travels at the speed of human movement.
l2David Robertson, ed., Dictionary o f  Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1993), s.v. “State o f  Nature.”
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Similarly, intercultural influence and other natural processes of social evolution — to 
include evolution of sovereignty — occurred at their peculiar state-of-nature, dependent 
on migration, trade, or conquest and general human interaction where they cross­
pollinated through exchange of food, music, language, religion, and ideas. “Dominant” 
cultures sometimes engulfed and subsumed others throughout history, but at a velocity 
appropriate to the speed at which cultural influence spread. The faster information moves 
across state or cultural boundaries, the faster social evolutionary changes might be 
expected. In the end, over extended periods, anything approaching “cultural purity” has, 
probably, always been something of a myth. In the early twentieth century, Ralph Linton, 
in The Study o f  Man: An Introduction, suggested: “There is probably no culture extant 
to-day (sic) which owes more than 10 percent of its total elements to inventions made by 
members of its own society.”13
Information, in any of its forms, at some point loses its vitality as news and precedes 
through an esoteric metamorphosis to become history. In the seventeenth century, by the 
time news of a financial crisis, invasion of one state by another, or even natural disasters, 
traversed Europe, states’ reactions would likely be to a fa it accompli rather than a 
situation in progress. By comparison (and to set the stage for an eventual end point in 
later chapters) in the modem world, events unfold under the watchful eyes of the world. 
The worldwide telephone network with its inherent facsimile machines, computers, video 
phones, and a plethora o f other devices; massive electronic data bases; and nearly 
ubiquitous broadcast news teams linked by satellite provided instant access to the world’s 
financial specialists and government decision makers. The participants in this cornucopia
nRalph Linton, The Study o f  Man: An Introduction (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936), 325.
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of interpersonal communications spent money and voted. Potentially, ideas leading to 
democracy, free markets, and free expression transfer among cultures as well as 
traditional exchanges of music, food, language, and sports competition. A remark, 
attributed to Indira Gandhi, once speculated that a revolution could result from a peasant 
seeing a modem refrigerator while watching a foreign television sitcom.14 Faced with a 
constant barrage of information which reaches the populace as readily as it reaches state 
decision makers, states had to deal with their exclusive authority within their territory as 
well as their participation in the international system. Not only do they have access to 
global actions of MNCs, individuals, and other states, the rest of the world has access to 
their domestic actions. Secrets, state or other, prove difficult to keep. In the information 
transfer state-of-nature, sovereign states need have little concern for drastic and 
immediate influence of “alien” concepts. Information moved slower. It was subject to 
some (but never absolute) control or even censorship. Ideas might be exchanged, but at a 
slower pace.
Some interaction between state sovereignty and telecommunications technology 
appears to exists. Of course, scholarly analysis requires a structured comparison allowing 
valid conclusions rather than intuitive or anecdotal inference. The nature of the situation 
suggests comparison across time beginning with a “control” or state-of-nature period 
when transfer o f information, in the form of words, sounds, or images, over great 
distances did not exist, and concluding with the early twenty-first century, where 
ubiquitous communications have made distance nearly irrelevant to the immediate 
transfer of information. Electromagnetic means of information transfer (telegraph,
l4Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty, 46-47.
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telephone, radio, television, computer networks, and all the associated means of 
communications) first entered the equation in the nineteenth century and expanded 
steadily thereafter. The existence, availability, and use telecommunications and 
concomitant changes to sovereignty indicate a covariant relationship. However, an 
indication does not constitute empirical evidence.
This study particularly lends itself to analysis based on a structured, focused 
comparison. The nature of telecommunications development suggests a study thereof in 
four “eras,” each defined by a dominant means of information transfer. The first era — 
the focus of this chapter —  establishes a period for “control” when information transfer in 
its state-of-nature lacked any enabling factor of telecommunications technology and 
transfer and distribution was at the “state-of-nature.” The telegraph dominated the next 
era, followed by another where continued use of cable connected telegraph was 
augmented by “wireless” radio. The final era examines a time when communications 
approach truly ubiquitous.
Sovereignty, as the dependent variable, provides an essential element of this 
investigation. However, sovereignty did not materialize in 1648 out of proverbial thin 
air. It was the product of extended social evolution which did not then abruptly halt at its 
inception. Gradually, states, their leaders (princes), and political systems flexed their 
cognitive wings, freed themselves of feudalism’s fetters, and set their sights on the 
freedom of state actions which manifested in sovereignty.
This and each of the succeeding chapters focuses on one of the eras under study.
Each analysis begins with an examination of how sovereignty manifested itself during 
that time frame and how it met the needs of the era’s society. The dominant means of
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telecommunications technology and how it affects the sovereignty of the era provide a 
framework under which to identify the mass media present as the most prevalent means 
of information distribution; telecommunications infrastructure, territorial control, cultural 
cross-pollination, and international finance.
Sovereignty and Society in the Age of [News] Paper
Seventeenth century European society was poised for an Hegelian synthesis like 
sovereignty. The Renaissance neared its terminus, the Age of Discovery approached its 
zenith, and the Industrial Revolution balanced in waiting on the event horizon of the 
space-time continuum. Society had evolved to a point where proto-industrialization and 
the business infrastructure provided organization to society. Residual elements of 
feudalism no longer offered any structural stability to communities.15 The Middle Ages 
had been socially and technically stagnant; spanning nearly a millennium beginning with 
the fifth century fall of the Roman Empire, neither sovereignty nor communications saw 
any development. Feudalism dominated society and information distribution continued 
as it had since conception of the written word.16 Scribes laboriously hand copied text 
which then moved, if  at all, only as fast as humans carried it. Distribution of information, 
at best, happened when a town crier or other official read “news” or other announcements 
to an assembled, and largely illiterate, populace.
The Eurocentric nature of the origins of sovereignty bear repeating at this point. 
Although sovereign states dominated the entire world’s international system in the
l5Philpott, “Ideas and the Evolution o f  Sovereignty,” 29.
l6Bartleson, A Genealogy o f  Sovereignty, 244-245.
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twentieth and into twenty-first centuries, sovereignty was originally a phenomenon 
peculiar to Europe. It was a “closed club” of Christian, Caucasian, European states which 
extended “membership” very begrudgingly. Not until the aftermath of the twentieth 
century and its two world wars did the “system” expand to encompass the entire planet.17
As Europe crept out of the Middle ages, the release of restraints on thinking combined 
with the maturity o f movable type printing to spark an increase in the texts available for 
distribution. As logic and reason crawled into cognitive processes previously 
overpowered by religious dogma, the social and economic environment was set to exploit 
non-religious use of the printing press. Gutenberg’s initial success was based on 
production of sacred books, but entrepreneurial developments soon saturated the market 
for religious texts and the new printing industry expanded into the secular domain.
The church dominated feudal world allowed no conception of secular based states. 
Governments owing no allegiance to the Pope were unthinkable. Free thinking 
encouraged by the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation combined with 
widespread distribution of printed material and allowed the “Princes” of Europe (and 
their sycophantic court philosophers) enough freedom of thought to conceive of an 
international system without church restraint. The causes of the Thirty Years War, 1618 
-  1648, included a prince’s right to determine his state’s religion free of external (as in 
“papal”) influence. The war’s conclusion, marked by the Peace of Westphalia (see 
Chapter II) and emergence of the sovereign state, acknowledged the princes’ rights to 
determine how their citizenry would worship.18 Freedom from the pope’s influence left
l7Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13.
18Philpott, “Ideas and the Evolution o f  Sovereignty,” 29.
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state governments as the ultimate authority within their territory. The international 
system of sovereign states was in existence despite the pope’s “nullification” of the 
Westphalia agreements. The states involved exploited the validity, strength, and vitality 
of their sovereignty.19
This was the [European] “world”of the seventeenth century. States had been to war 
over how their realms would worship. Philosophers thought and wrote without church 
imposed, dogmatic restraints on their range of ideas —  or at least, far fewer restraints 
than suffered by previous generations of thinkers. States might attempt to exert influence 
on appropriate subjects for intellectual investigation, but foreign church influence had 
been removed. Books emerged from presses and the literate public’s thirst for 
information gave rise to the first newspapers as the prototype mass media.20
The very ground so fertile to the germination of the sovereign state, at the same time, 
also contained the sown seeds of threats to the states’ unlimited domestic power. 
Sovereignty rested with the princes. The sovereign state was a product of free thinking 
and the wide distribution of information about “other” ways to live, govern, and be 
governed. Free thinking would eventually lead to demands in many states for a shift in 
the focus o f sovereignty from the prince to a governing legislature and eventually to the 
populace. Absolute and unlimited power were always theoretical; state sovereignty was 
neither absolute nor static. It always had limits and as a social concept, it was subject to 
changes brought about by social evolution.
19Gilbert, The Norton History o f  Modern Europe, 258.
20Harold Herd, The March o f  Journalism: The Story o f  the British Press from  1622 to the Present Day 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), 12.
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Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age of [News] Paper
The “Age of [News] Paper” sets the stage for diachronic comparison of the ensuing 
three “ages.” It establishes the “norm,” as it were, when mass media, state control of 
territory, cultural development, international finance, and sovereignty as a whole 
functioned in their “state-of-nature” without the external influence of telecommunications 
technology. Although some mechanical means existed for “long distance” 
communications such as Europe’s mechanical telegraph or semaphore system,21 their 
information throughput was so low that they played little role in technologically 
stimulated social evolution. Not until the introduction of the electro mechanical telegraph 
in 1845 did an effective means of information transfer evolve.
Dominant Mass Media
As the chapter title implies, the newspaper monopolized mass media during this era. 
For uncounted generations, news had passed among the worlds’ populations via word of 
mouth, or in formal procedures, by public criers or assemblies. With increased literacy
—  even if largely confined to middle and upper classes —  the public demanded more 
information. Periodic (daily and weekly) broadsides arose during the Thirty Years War
— the same war that gave rise to sovereignty.
Newspapers were printed in massive quantity and distributed in the same manner as 
all other information of the era, at the speed humans could carry it. Items for inclusion 
within the printed material (information) had to travel to press at the same speed at which 
the end product printed material was distributed.
21Solymar, Getting the Message, 23.
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[Tele]-Communications
Throughout the Control Era, no means existed for the transmission of words, sounds, 
or images over great distances except physical transport. Movable type printing 
technology evolved to a point where the first “mass media” emerged in the form of 
newspapers early in the seventeenth century. The readily available printed news provided 
extensive distribution to large numbers of people. The movement of information, its 
transfer, however many copies might have been quickly and easily printed, still relied on 
the speed of the era’s contemporary ground transport. No telecommunications existed to 
provide augmentation to information transfer.
Territorial Control
The sovereign state was bom a territorial entity.22 Classic political science definitions 
of the state require a functioning government capable of external recognition and 
negotiation, a population identified with the state, and defined territory. In its early days, 
the sovereign state met that definition better than it ever would again. The borders of the 
first European states also encompassed ill defined “nations” (people with a shared 
cultural heritage) giving rise to the idea of “nation-state.”
The nature o f transportation required the use of paths or roads as most people or 
goods crossed state frontiers. Smugglers, of course, could avail themselves of less 
traveled (and less guarded) border crossings. Piracy, smuggling, and other criminal 
activities sought to circumvent border controls. Still, states were able to exert positive 
supervision over much of what crossed their borders. In an age o f mercantilism, states
22Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 20.
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tried to minimize the export of precious metals and supervise any funds entering or 
leaving their territory. Information, however, was another matter. The state might try to 
intercept books, letters, or other media, but ideas can be committed to memory and 
regurgitated once through border control points; books are relatively small and easily 
concealed; letters, more so. Borders might be guarded but where information was 
concerned, they were always somewhat permeable. In later eras, as money became less 
possession of specie and more inseparable from information, its control became more 
difficult.
Cultural Cross-Pollination
As long as human beings clustered together and formed something approaching a 
“culture,” they interacted with other, similar groupings. It was a slow process. Contact 
with other cultures resulted from trade, migration, and warfare often leading to conquest. 
Travel between cultures was on foot (either human or animal) and cross-pollination 
between and among cultures was an active but belated response. Intercultural contact left 
its mark on affected societies, but it took time.
The existence of books, newspapers, pamphlets, and other printed material emerging 
from the new technology of moveable type printing, perhaps, exerted some degree of 
acceleration to the state-of-nature level of cultural exchange. Literate elements of the 
populace had more information than ever before about other cultures, but censorship was 
nearly universal. “Illegal” books and other material could be obtained, however, state 
restrictions put severe limits on many classes of literature.23
23Houston, Literacy in Early Modern Europe, 167.
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The territory defining early states tended to surround a “nation.” Difficult to define 
precisely, a nation simply describes a group of people with a shared or common cultural 
heritage including identity and language.24 Therefore, the territorial states tended toward 
the concept of nation-states. The nation element of the nation-state, was constantly under 
“attack” as the recipients of cultural cross-pollination. No culture remains static unless it 
is totally isolated from any outside contact. It is difficult to imagine any culture 
prevailing in total isolation; even remote Pacific Island tribes have been shown to have 
experienced some cross-fertilization via ocean migration.
Throughout history, people moved among population centers for purposes of 
migration, trade, or conquest and as they did, their cultural heritage traveled with them 
and some of it shed influence on other societies.25 This represents the “state-of-nature” 
under which cultural development takes place; intermingling, cross-fertilization, and 
transcultural assimilation takes place as an entirely “natural” element o f social evolution.
This state-of-nature, without the influence of telecommunications technology, 
becomes another essential starting point for evaluation. As speed of travel and 
information transfer developed, it was not a direct influence on social and cultural 
evolution, but rather, a catalyst which accelerated the natural processes. Cross­
pollination of cultures, intermingling of heritage, or any other descriptive term, was a 
natural process in the development of humanity.
24Iain McLean, ed., Oxford Concise Dictionary o f  Politics (Oxford: University Press, 1996), s.v. 
“Nation-state.”
“ “Cultures: Millennium in Maps,” National Geographic, August, 1999, Map Supplement.
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International Finance
Yet another “revolution” in social evolution was taking place and coming into its 
own during this era. A banking system supporting the use of paper money in lieu of 
classic cash, approached maturity.26 The history of money includes the use of many 
substances of value including foodstuffs, salt, gems, and most well known, precious 
metals -  predominantly gold and sliver. The use of precious metal coins emerged in Asia 
Minor, specifically Lydia, during the sixth century B.C. at which time it replaced 
exchange of commodities as a means of trade.27 By the seventeenth century and the era 
under study, gold and silver dominated national coin. Trade, even at the prevailing speed 
of ground transport, was a fact of life and required payment for goods received and 
services rendered. Valuations of trade using various precious metal coin remained the 
dominant means of exchange until banking systems emerged with the adequate public 
trust to permit the use of paper abstractions of the specie. The need to make payments 
across borders gave birth to international banking and exchange of paper instruments in 
lieu of payment in gold or silver, but without the physical movement o f metal by the 
trader.
States’ rights to determine their “coin of the realm” predated the manifestation of 
sovereignty. As an essential element of state function, it remained unchanged. If far off 
bankers in Amsterdam analyzed and assessed their coin and determined its value to be
26Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (New York: 
Basic, 2001), 109.
27Jack Weatherford, The History o f  Money: From Sandstone to Cyberspace (New York: Three Rivers 
Press, 1997), 31.
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less than the state’s declared worth, news of the transaction was so slow in arriving that 
challenges might well have been moot.
In a world economy dominated by mercantilism, states’ ability to exert positive 
control over their borders, and the time delay in learning of distant transactions all 
merged to give the state essential control over its domestic finances relatively free of 
external influence. Funds crossing borders either had to be in specie or letters of credit. 
Letters of credit were of primary value when redeemed through banks which were, 
further, under state scrutiny if not control. The international use of generic “money” 
reached a degree of maturity in this era as the associated development of banks and 
“paper money” entered the world’s markets.28
Sovereignty as a Whole
Sovereign states, as the “Control Era” commenced, were as independent of other 
states as they would ever be. A century and a half later, but still within the control era, at 
the 1815 Congress of Vienna and the through the resultant Concert o f Europe, the 
sovereign state reached genuine maturity.29 Still a European, Christian, Caucasian 
phenomenon, the states approached (but never reached) absolute sovereignty. However, 
as soon as they were established, “threats” to sovereignty began as well. Within half a 
century of Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution eased its way into existence with
28Ibid„ 132.
29Beatrice Heuser, “Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Security: New World Orders in the Twentieth 
Century,” in State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi, 
81-104 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 83.
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explosive results. Bloodless —  with the exception of many “expendable” workers — the 
Industrial Revolution began to chip away at the solidity o f state borders.
No state, however diverse, had the natural resources to support industrial 
development and production without international trade. Little argument challenged a 
state’s absolute right to guard its borders. Every shipment across international frontiers 
could — legally — be inspected by the agents of the affected governments on both sides 
of any border, but shipping time had already been limited by the contemporary speed of 
transport. Imposition of additional delay in delivery due to government bureaucracy 
would very likely result in increased costs leading to the true bottom line of lower profits. 
Lower profits would result in lower taxes paid to the state, so it could be said that 
“surrender” of some element of sovereignty was actually self-preservation. The same 
situation would emerge in later eras under the influence of technology when states had to 
make decisions as to the “free” or unrestricted passage of electronic messages, first 
through telegraph wires and later via more sophisticated information transfer means.
For strictly economic reasons, governments relaxed border oversight. Information 
might well fall into the category of “goods” when in the form of books, newspapers, or 
other printed material. In the Industrial Revolution, the seeds of the Information 
Revolution were, perhaps, sown more than two centuries before the name was applied to 
the process.
Markets in various cities which were centers of economic commerce operated in 
independent isolation. By the time news was received in reaction to occurrences in one 
market, so many other transactions had taken place that any reaction would be attenuated. 
Markets could only react long after the fact to news of actions by other markets. Stimulus
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and response financial transactions were limited by the intervening variable of 
information and the time it took to reach its consumer. State influence beyond its borders 
was also subject to the speed of ground transport. News of domestic decisions to tax 
imports, which might have serious implications to other states’ economy, could take days 
or weeks, by the fastest horse mounted courier, to reach other affected governments.
Summary
The sovereign state existed in the international system of the Control Era it its 
peculiar state-of-nature. Information of all types concerned the state —  as it had and 
would continue to do throughout history. New ideas might cross borders in the form of 
books, newspapers, or intellectual correspondence, but they did so at a pace 
commensurate with the speed at which the rest of society moved. News took days, 
weeks, or months to circulate among various world capitals, seats of government, and 
market centers.
The international system of sovereign states reached a functional level of fruition in 
1648. States’ power approached absolute. Sovereign states existed in a mutually 
nurturing environment where the strength of one increased the strength of all. Little 
challenged the sovereignty of a state and its absolute and unlimited power within 
geographic borders.
Between 1648 and 1844 (the inclusive dates of this era), the [relative] efficiency of 
international trade, maturity of banking, and increasing literacy of the middle class 
presented an ideal environment for revolution. The population o f Britain’s American 
colonies and the people of France wrested sovereignty away from the monarch to bestow
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it on the people. At the same time, the Industrial Revolution emerged and capitalism 
dislodged mercantilism; its continued expansion required new markets. New markets, in 
turn, required new and faster means of transport. If the old adage is true, and necessity is 
the mother of invention, then capitalism’s necessities gave birth to railroad technology to 
transport goods, and telecommunications to transport the information necessary for 
business operations.
As business and the associated financial transactions began to dominate the 
international environment, states provided the financial and legal systems under which 
commerce took place. Logic would dictate that the sovereignty o f states of 1648, when 
virtually everything in the world moved no faster than the speed of human travel, must be 
different when information moved at the speed of light. Subsequent chapters examine the 
differences.
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CHAPTER IV 
AGE OF TELEGRAPH — 1845-1916
This chapter examines sovereignty in an era when the telegraph enhanced the speed of 
information transfer. Chapter III established a “Control Era” by presenting the “state-of- 
nature” for sovereignty where telecommunications did not exist and information traveled 
at the speed humans could carry it. Physical distance provided states with a degree of 
separation and independence. It required time for news of their actions to reach distant 
states and as a result, markets operated as independent national entities. Introduction of 
the telegraph, however, provided rapid and reliable transfer of information across 
extended distances and allowed governments and businesses to react quickly to actions of 
others as well as to coordinate activities among widely dispersed locations. At the same 
time, advances in other technologies, especially ground and sea transport utilizing steam, 
increased the speed at which humans travel — the original and long standing standard for 
movement of information.
The Industrial Revolution was in full force along with associated benefits, 
disadvantages, and technological developments. At the same time, the sovereign state 
was a strong organizing element throughout Europe and beginning to expand to other 
continents as well. Business and governments alike incorporated the new developments 
in telecommunications technology — beginning with the telegraph and expanding to 
include telephone and radio in turn — into their normal operating procedures. Initial 
effects on sovereignty resulted from the loss of practical means by which a state could 
supervise the content of information crossing its borders. As the era neared its close early
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in the twentieth century, the synergistic union of telegraph, telephone, and radio would 
see telecommunications technology approach maturity and begin to require states to 
function in an environment where the world begins to know of events nearly as they 
happen.
Introduction
Any means of communications, to include postal systems, books, trade, and 
international banking allow people to reach beyond state frontiers for political or 
economic activities. That has an impact on state sovereignty by enabling citizens to 
extend reach and influence beyond their own and into foreign territorial boundaries.
When telecommunications enter the equation, that impact becomes more dramatic due to 
the speed of information transfer.1 Introduction of the telegraph allowed information to 
travel across vast distances at previously unheard of speeds. Although available to 
individual members of society, it was expensive and became a tool primarily used by 
governments and large businesses. Later in this era, the telephone became the first 
instrument of telecommunications technology directly available to, and used by the 
generic consumer. However, “long distance” transfer of voices over wire, versus the 
transmission of Morse code’s dots and dashes, required amplification which did not reach 
fruition until near the end of the era. Similarly, “wireless” radio also made its debut 
during this era, but as an effective means of information transfer, its impact did not 
approach inherent potential until later eras. In terms of telecommunications, this was the 
Age of Telegraph; therefore, the 1845 introduction of telegraph provides an apt point to
‘Bugliarello, "Telecommunications, Politics, Economics,” 407.
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end an Age of [News] Paper and begin analysis of impacts on sovereignty as the 
movement of information drastically increased.
Since the mid-eighteenth century, scientists and experimenters pursued a practical 
application for electricity as the means of rapid information transfer.2 A viable 
manifestation did not appear until 1845 when Samuel Morse introduced the telegraph. 
Prior to this time, some primitive “mechanical” or non-electrical (as opposed to 
“electromagnetic” means as included in the definition of telecommunications) systems 
achieved some success in passing information across extended distances; signal fires date 
to antiquity; pigeons may have been used as early as the twelfth century, and mechanical 
semaphore stations relayed messages around eighteenth century Europe in a few hours 
versus the multiple days actual travel might require. The amount of information actually 
passed, throughput in postmodern vernacular, was very low and subject to a high degree 
of inaccuracy (see Chapter II).
Early nineteenth century civilization, in general, developed a desire to move faster as 
the Industrial Revolution grew in intensity to dominate the “civilized” world. An 
international system of sovereign states, advances in science and technology, and the 
introduction of steam power synergistically conjoined to drive requirements for rapid 
exchange of information. Raw material had to reach production facilities. Growth of a 
middle class created consumers who desired and had cash to spend on manufactured 
goods. International commerce needed to exchange funds. In response to the quest for 
speed, steam powered ships and railroads materialized as the first major changes to 
surface transport speed since the wheel. Information transfer also increased as a result of
2Solymar, Getting the M essage, 51.
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accelerated ground travel; information, especially in the form of printed material, still 
traveled at the speed at which humans could carry it but steam provided humans with a 
means of carrying the information faster and farther.
Samuel Morse’s telegraph, combined with his associated Morse Code for adapting 
information to facilitate electronic transmission, set the stage for a new era. For the first 
time, information could be transferred from one point to another far distant point in 
minutes. The “vastness” of the distance increased rapidly. Samuel Morse’s first 
telegraph line, opened in 1845,3 extended only from Baltimore to Washington, D.C. By 
1866, just 22 years later, a single, unbroken telegraph line extended from North America 
to Great Britain. (See Chapter II).
Steam power decreased Atlantic crossing time by ship to only a few days as 
opposed to a few weeks under sail, but the telegraph passed information in minutes. 
Various markets’ traditional independence and isolation virtually dissolved. Trades in 
London, Paris, or Berlin could be known in New York only moments after they occurred. 
Notwithstanding the advance in telecommunications, the nineteenth century still moved 
much slower than later epochs. Despite railroads, steam powered ships, and the 
telegraph, actions in New York or San Francisco might not be known or acted upon 
immediately upon receipt o f information by European markets and associated decision 
makers. Time zone differences could still delay influence until at least the next business 
day. Further, information normally traveled in the form of telegrams which were 
committed to paper and entered the bureaucratic paperwork process. Information of vital 
importance might reside in a queue waiting to be read.
3Ibid., 54.
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To extend any distance approaching “vast,” telegraph lines required the crossing of 
state frontiers, especially in Europe where territorially defined states were relatively 
small. Technology allowed states to intercept all telegraph messages transiting their 
borders, but at the cost of time and investment in personnel. A bureaucratic delay in 
information might be acceptable to the states’ interest in security, but unacceptable to 
both domestic and international business interests. Telecommunications now presented a 
high technology version of border inspection dilemma. In the control era (Chapter III), 
states might have wished for a border control situation where every shipment of goods 
could be off loaded from the transporting wagon or cart and thoroughly inspected. 
Concerned about the information crossing into foreign hands, states might like to inspect 
the contents of every telegram entering and leaving its sovereign territory.4 But at what 
cost? The delay to an already slow delivery, the commitment o f personnel, and the 
logistics of the operations would combine to make full inspections of all shipments 
prohibitive. Inspecting all contents of horse-drawn wagons proved difficult. The 
increased cargo capacity of railroads made it more so. In the twenty-first century, states 
face the same dilemma, inflated by orders of magnitude, when trying to manage 
containerized cargo.
Sovereignty and Society in the Age of Telegraph
The nineteenth century saw the system of sovereign states, still centered in Europe but 
expanding, come of age. The European states, with their system of colonialism, attempted
4William J. Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility: Trans Border Data Flows and National 
Sovereignty," in Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communications in the 1990s, ed. Kaarle 
Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, 259-313 (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1993), 266.
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to maintain the “closed club” attitude toward sovereignty while holding out the distant 
goal of independence for colonial peoples “when they are ready.”5 Further, the 
intellectual exercises of the Renaissance’s cultural success gave rise to the scientific 
developments which were transformed into practical applications for the Industrial 
Revolution. American and French independence movements interjected new elements to 
the sovereignty club by redefining the legitimacy upon which statehood existed; divine or 
dynastic rights still existed but popular and voluntary consent was forced into the 
equation as well.6 By mid-nineteenth century, the sovereign state, and the international 
system in which it subsisted, was changing.
Raw materials and natural resources fed the insatiable appetite of Industrial 
Revolution production and every state had to import some portion of the required 
material. The colonial system, strongly rooted in the same arrogant Western Christianity 
that tried to maintain the closed club of sovereignty, provided some satisfaction to the 
revolution’s hunger. The colonial powers accepted as “given,” their “rights” to extract 
wealth from foreign holdings without regard to the indigenous population. At an 1885 
Conference in Berlin, European powers divided the world into “civilized” (meaning 
European, at best, and industrialized, at the most liberal) states and “barbarians” (all 
others). The so-called barbarian entities would be considered for self-determination when 
they had proven their ability to govern themselves.7 Resource requirements which could
5Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 362.
6Ferguson and Mansbach, “The Past as Prelude to the Future,” 38.
7Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 362.
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not be met by colonies required international trade, which in turn, necessitated both tacit 
and formal trade regimes.
The world was speeding up. Transoceanic movement of people and goods moved at 
steam power’s steady, reliable speeds rather than at nature’s mercy as determined by 
winds and tides. Well traveled ground routes moved goods via rail at speeds unimagined 
in previous eras. The “electric telegraph,” as it was initially named to differentiate it from 
mechanical signaling systems, provided particular value to the scheduling, management, 
and control of railroads carrying supplies, raw materials, and finished goods.
Information moved across telegraph cable in virtual instantaneity. With the increased 
speed came increased necessity to coordinate departures and arrivals, bills and payment, 
and imports and exports. The “high technology” means of communications such as the 
telegraph, followed by telephone, required coordination of technical and interconnection 
standards. The “absoluteness” of the sovereign state, which was always somewhat less 
than absolute, had to give way in the name of international efficiency. Pursuit of 
international efficiency contributed to the compromise of sovereignty as states abrogated 
their “right” to inspect commodities crossing their frontiers. In this case, the commodity 
was the information contained in electronic exchanges. The alternative required an 
investment in personnel to do the inspections and inserted a time delay into the otherwise 
rapid transfer of information provided by the telegraphs.
Customers of the various domestic telegraph systems desired the speed of 
international service and were willing to pay for it. Therefore, telegraph lines crossed 
borders. Each side of the border had to agree to mutually acceptable technical and 
operational standards, and required bilateral agreement to facilitate the installation and
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continued operation of the telegraph and to determine the level of sovereign control over 
information entering and leaving state territory. In an area such as Europe where multiple 
states existed in close geographic proximity, each entity became involved in a 
hodgepodge of arrangements resulting in an inefficient and confusing international 
telegraph service.8
During the 1850s, Austria and various German states formed a loosely knit group to 
attempt standardization of international service with the Austro-German Telegraph 
Union. Concurrently, other states formed the West European Telegraph Union. Although 
some inter-organization contact was attempted, little uniformity resulted. In 1865, 
Napoleon III sponsored a conference in Paris to attempt international standardization.
The resulting convention established Morse Code as the standard for transmitting 
messages and codified the obligations for message delivery service. The conference also 
established a functional organization, the International Telegraph Union to continue to 
organize the anarchy of the various domestic telegraph systems.9 States found it 
necessary, once again, to alter their domestic systems to accommodate international 
connections. Further, growing commercial dependence on the speed of telegraph 
messages would not tolerate any state intervention which might interpose delays. States 
accepted rapid movement of information in the form of messages as more beneficial than 
exercise of sovereign supervision. Effective transfer o f business data improved the 
efficiency, and hopefully the profitability, of industry. Profitable industry resulted in
8Codding and Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union, 5.
9Ibid„ 6.
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benefits to economic activity which states, in turn, could regard as sources for the 
taxation revenue necessary for governmental survival.
Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age of Telegraph
Railroads and steamship technology increased the speed at which humans could travel 
and carry information, but the telegraph allowed nearly immediate transfer of information 
over vast distances. States always had to deal with “things” crossing borders, but now 
they were forced to consider invisible pulses of electricity contained entirely within wires. 
Later, totally invisible electromagnetic (radio) waves crossing borders with impunity 
brought an end to the era. Telecommunications had become an essential element of the 
international environment.
As the speed of human activity in the world increased, states had to develop means of 
reacting to the new velocity. If news of a domestic action, when it reached distant shores, 
would have international ramifications, then states must consider the speed at which the 
news would travel. Does that affect sovereignty? If the absolute and unlimited power of 
the state must be used in a way that considers reactions by others, then limits have been 
put on both the “absolute” and “unlimited” elem ents.10
Dominant Mass Media
Basic mass media changed little between the Age of [News] Paper and the Age of 
Telegraph. Passing information to the masses was still best accomplished via the
l0Cees J. Hamelink, "Globalism and National Sovereignty," in Beyond National Sovereignty: 
International Communication in the 1990s, ed. Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, 371-393 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1993), 385.
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newspaper. The telegraph allowed news to be transferred across long distances far faster 
than humans could carry it, and modem presses permitted mass print runs of newspapers 
serving ever larger metropolitan areas. Once printed, they could travel at the steam 
enhanced speeds of ship and rail.
Both transfer and distribution were enhanced by technology o f the era, especially 
advances in ground transport. Telecommunications technology, however, affected only 
the transfer elements of news production —  getting information about newsworthy events 
from the point of occurrence to press locations. Still, the development of a worldwide 
telegraph and telephone networks was neither instantaneous nor even particularly rapid. 
Lines were installed between locations where projected commercial earnings justified the 
expense. Markets with potential received attention, but developing a “complete,” 
worldwide network would await future and less expensive technical developments.
Telecommunications
Information traveled through telegraph cable at very near the speed of light, but the 
throughput combined with the processes necessary to prepare the data for transmission 
was time consuming. The specific process of telegraph transmission was discussed in 
Chapter II, but with apologies to the physics regime and Albert Einstein in particular, all 
things are relative. The time involved in drafting a message, transporting it to the nearest 
telegraph office, time in a queue awaiting operator action, a few minutes of actual 
transmission, and delivery following similar procedures at the distant end were minuscule 
when compared to ground (or sea) transport.
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Diplomats who traditionally operated in relative independence based on infrequent 
dispatches from home now could request and receive specific guidance in hours rather 
than weeks or months. Telecommunications actually assisted governments in exerting 
sovereignty where the early telegraph capability existed. Where telegraph lines crossed 
frontiers, states faced a dilemma.
Especially during times of conflict or hostility, states would desire to supervise all 
messages crossing borders. Early attempts at close supervision o f telegraph messages 
entering and leaving European countries proved debilitating to the business environment 
that grew and prospered in exploiting the benefits of rapid communications. This is not 
to say, however, that states gave up their sovereign rights to supervise cross-border 
communications. The last few years of this era were dominated by World War I. 
Government interception of telegraph messages played a role in the war’s outcome.
In many cases, especially in Europe, telegraph and telephone systems were 
government owned and operated, usually by their respective postal authorities. Where 
governments controlled the telegraph offices, all users assumed that their messages were 
subject to government review. For that reason, diplomats using the telegraph services of 
their host government would encrypt their messages so that they appeared to be 
indecipherable. In the US, the telegraph system was privately owned. Intelligence 
operatives from both the State and War Departments appealed to the telegraph 
companies’ patriotism and arranged to receive carbon copies" of international message 
traffic.12 Early uses of long distance radio transmissions to pass international messages
"“Carbon Copy:” the low-tech version o f  Xerox. A technology now lost to antiquity.
12Yardley, The American Black Chamber, 37.
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were also subject to interception. Obtaining messages for review, especially those 
requiring “decryption,” was always done in secret.
Businesses as well as states assumed that their messages were subject to interception 
by others, but the area of intelligence gathering which became know as signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) operated covertly. Part of the value of information obtained 
through SIGINT was ignorance on the part of the sender and receiver that their 
communications were monitored by a third party.
Issues of privacy versus sovereignty had entered the telecommunications 
environment. How much state supervision was acceptable before rights were violated? 
The question has yet to be adequately answered. The US only resolved the issue in 1976 
with the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As a result, the National 
Security Agency was restricted to interception of data in the international arena and only 
in the interest of national security.13
Territorial Control
The importance of territorial borders to sovereign states changed little during the Age 
of Telegraph. Initial attempts to control telegraph messages crossing frontiers proved 
manpower, time, and resource intensive, and generally hampered both state and non-state 
businesses conducted over the new means of communications.
Introduction o f the telegraph had no direct effect on states’ ability to control their 
borders. A case could even be made that the telegraph, as a command and control adjunct
l3James Bamford, Body o f  Secrets: Anatomy o f  the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency from  the 
Cold War through the Dawn o f  a New Century (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 440.
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to weapons, allowed more positive defense of borders. Military commanders in the 
capital or at other headquarters had unprecedented control of border security personnel.
The Industrial Revolution was at its height and market forces had replaced 
mercantilism. A state with draconian border control measures would suffer in the 
effectiveness of its participation in the international trade regime. Sovereign enforcement 
of borders could be relaxed in the interest of trade and development, or attempts could be 
made to hold on to elusive sovereign rights to states’ economic peril.
Migration brought with it economic and territorial issues as well as a significant 
influence on cultural development. Craftsmen crossed borders in search of work. 
Economic refugees left Europe (especially Ireland) to escape from famine and pursue 
opportunities in America. The size and speed of steam powered ships allowed 
transatlantic migration, while railroads empowered migration between and among land 
joined states.
The sovereign state could still control borders, open them —  in either direction — to 
migrants, defend them, and determine how commerce would transit them. Electrons in 
telegraph cable and radio’s electromagnetic waves, however, offered the state little 
opportunity to prevent cross-border passage of information.
Cultural Cross-Pollination
In terms of cultural cross-pollination, the telegraph and early uses of the telephone did 
not cause any quantum leaps beyond the “state-of-nature” for cultural development. 
Cultural expansion was more likely the result of extensive development in the speed of 
ground transportation. Humanity still interacted via trade and migration; conquest played
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less of a role as the nineteenth century experienced a relatively peaceful era compared to 
previous centuries, especially in Europe. Printed news generally appeals to local 
populations and the increasing presence of mass media did not accelerate cultural 
exchange. Rates o f migration and magnitude of trade grew by phenomenal extent with 
equally exceptional effects on cultural evolution. The enabling technology, however, was 
more likely steam powered presses and transport than telecommunication.
International Finance
The world’s major markets, particularly those located in financial capitals such as 
London, Berlin, and New York, had traditionally operated independently. With the 
arrival of news from another, transactions were completed and any reactions were after 
the fact, at best. The fledgling telegraph network found its metaphorical wings in 
providing more or less immediate information among world markets and a telegraphic 
scion emerged in 1867 in the form of the stock market ticker tape.14
The ticker tape used telegraph technology dedicated to satisfying a long standing 
hunger in the business community for accurate and reliable, local and distant stock 
market information. As a case in point, one of the first stock-peculiar uses of telegraph 
resulted from a telegram delivery clerk who accepted payment from New York businesses 
to keep them informed about the content of messages which might affect their dealings. 
The same clerk, John J. Kieman, formed a news agency (eventually to become the Wall
14Encyclopedia Britannica, Multimedia Edition, 1998, s.v. “Ticker.”
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Street Journal)15 dedicated to providing up to the minute news to subscribers. More than 
thirty years prior to the completion of the first Transatlantic cable in 1869, he routinely 
rowed a small boat out to meet incoming vessels to buy foreign newspapers from sailors 
and ask passengers for the latest information they might have picked up before sailing.
The few hours he gained in collecting and distributing information from abroad gave him 
a particular advantage over competitors. In 1867, Kieman began sending out his news via 
the newly invented ticker tape machine introduced by E. A. Calahan.16 Ticker tape 
technology automatically received and printed stock symbol, number of shares, and 
transaction price onto narrow rolls of paper. The machines required a dedicated telegraph 
line which could not be used for other purposes and was impractical for most 
international transactions unless the specific stock trading industry was willing to accept 
the cost of installation and maintenance.
The quest for more and faster information on which to base business and investment 
decisions led to local and short distance international use of ticker tape machines. Less 
immediate, but still comparatively rapid, news via telegraph energized business’ 
collective hunger for faster access to information. Sovereignty over national markets was 
eroding. Seeds for the world’s single, collective market had germinated and were 
growing in the fertility of telecommunications. Markets had, since their inception, 
provided states with commercial means to encourage both domestic and international 
financial exchange. With instantaneous information about market actions, responses
15Jerry M. Rosenberg, Inside the Wall Street Journal: The H istory and the Power o f  Dow Jones & 
Company and Am erica's M ost Influential Newspaper (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 9.
l6Ibid., 3.
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thereto, and international news of all kinds, markets took on a “life of their own.” They 
reflected the international financial system rather than the economy of the states where 
they were located.
As telecommunications began to make distance an irrelevant factor in international 
markets and finance, the banking industry, as well as their customers, started to search for 
ways to exploit the new technology as well. Use of the telegraph allowed banks to speed 
up many transactions, verify existing credit information, and validate availability of 
funds, most specific transactions still had to be accomplished in person. Not until the 
post-World War II systems of routine check and credit card emerged would banks 
manage to take the best advantage of technology.17
With increased use the telegraph to exchange financial data, states faced a dilemma 
which would continue to the present. Successful businesses resulted in positive 
contributions to national economy. Thriving economies could be taxed for the benefit of 
the state. State intervention in the communications processes, even in the interest of 
national security, could introduce business hampering delay or deterrents to the free flow 
of financial data. Sovereign rights to control commodities crossing frontiers which were 
never absolute, were being attenuated by telecommunications technology.
Sovereignty as a Whole
The “absoluteness” of sovereignty began to wane during the Age of Telegraph. The 
“dominant” European states found it increasingly difficult to maintain their “closed club” 
of sovereign states as the world approached World War I. The telegraph became an
l7Weatherford. The History o f  Money, 233.
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essential element in both business and governments. Telecommunications technology 
may be viewed as a threat to sovereignty, but it is not universally so. Throughout history, 
diplomats and military commanders received orders prior to departure or via slow surface 
mail. They were then “trusted” to perform duties in the best interest of their country. 
Consultation with national authorities required too much time to have a direct impact on 
day to day diplomacy or pursuit o f military objectives.
With the availability of international telegraph, consultation could be reduced to a 
manageable length of time. Rather than await ground transport of a letter with details of 
the current situation and a request for instructions followed by a similar time for return 
travel of an answer, the elapsed time might be reduced to a matter o f hours or days by 
transmitting the information electronically. Although the actual international transport of 
the information in a telegram might be accomplished in a matter of minutes, the nature of 
telegraphic systems imposed other time constraints. Receipt of information might 
necessitate a timely reply, but technology could not accelerate the bureaucratic decision 
making process.
Diplomats posted at foreign locations had to rely on telegraph terminals operated by 
the host nation, the majority of which were government owned. International telegraph 
wires solely for the use of diplomatic messages might have been theoretically possible, 
but fiscal practicality limited such dedicated systems. Further, use of the international 
telegraph required financial considerations. It was expensive. Therefore, composition of 
a message had to state all necessary information, but in as few words as possible. The 
nature of the telegraphic system required many clerks and operators to view the message 
during its transit from originator to addressee. If the information contained therein were
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deemed “sensitive,” cryptographic “protection” might be applied, but that increased cost. 
Rather than rational words arranged in sentences, the encrypted message sent through the 
telegraph system would often be significantly longer and consist of a series of letters and 
numbers, usually in five letter groups separated by a space.
Telegraph operators sending “plain text” (words in coherent sentences) were far more 
efficient and accurate than when sending a series of nonsensical letters and numbers.
They had to transmit at a slower speeds to ensure accuracy which tied up the circuit 
longer. In the nineteenth century, US Secretary of State William Seward fully 
acknowledged the need for cryptographic protection of diplomatic messages. However, 
the increased cost —  which could approach ten times the charge for “plain text” 
transmission — proved to be prohibitive. As a result, decisions to risk possible 
“compromise” of diplomatic information by sending messages “in the clear” tended to be 
made based on cost rather than the security threat18 and little privacy existed in nineteenth 
century US Department of State communications.
With a “writer to reader” time measured in hours rather than weeks, states developed 
extensive control o f far flung assets. Consultation by foreign posted diplomats and 
deployed military commanders became feasible if not in “real time,” at least in 
“reasonable time.” In such situations, the state, in exercise and pursuit o f sovereignty, 
found an augmentation in the new means of telecommunications rather than a threat.
l8Weber, “Seward’s Other Folly,” 326.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Summary
Introduction of the telegraph created little immediate effect on sovereign states. As 
international telegraph connections expanded, largely in support of commercial 
requirements, states capitalized on the new technology to their advantage. Telegraph 
links, where they existed, could be exploited by states to receive information and provide 
guidance to diplomats or other national agents. As the world’s telegraph network 
interconnected continents toward the end of the nineteenth century, altered means of 
centrally controlled diplomacy became the norm.
Telegraph connections rapidly transferred information to the mass media of the era 
(newspapers); distribution of the resulting printed material, however, continued to move 
at the speed humans could carry it and depended upon contemporary surface 
transportation technology. Effective harnessing of steam created quantum leaps in the 
speed and reliability of transport, and the mass distribution of information as well.
The second half of the nineteenth century represented a period of relative peace which 
virtually eliminated cross-cultural influence by conquest but a variety of social and 
economic developments resulted in extensive migration, especially to the US Advances 
in surface transportation increased trade and migration and their resulting cultural cross­
pollination. While extensive cultural expansion, melding, and synthesis resulted from 
trade and migration, little of it could be attributed to the introduction, existence, and 
growth of the telegraph.
Transfer of funds by wire initiated a process which would eventually culminate in the 
feasibility of “electronic cash transactions” (e-cash, in later vernacular). Letters of credit 
capitalized upon synergistic trust among corporations, governments, and banking
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institutions and had been used for centuries. The telegraph extended their use into the 
limits of available technology. International financial transactions were taking place 
through the invisible movement o f electrons through telegraph cables. While government 
observation might still be expected by the communications system’s users, government 
supervision and control was slipping.
The Age of Telegraph was the era during which many of the Industrial Revolution’s 
benefits, disadvantages, and technological developments came to fruition. The sovereign 
state thrived in the international environment and capitalized on the consequences of 
increased trade, migration, and a multitude of various technologies. Telecommunications 
was in its infancy; it laid foundations for future effects on sovereignty, but its actual 
impact was tertiary, at best. The technology began to come into its own with the 
synergistic union of telegraph, telephone, and especially, radio. Distant points could be 
“connected” without wires stretching across borders.
The Zimmerman Telegram offers a particularly apt point at which to end the Age of 
Telegraph and begin a new era. It also provides an interesting example o f governments 
exerting their sovereignty while interfering with the sovereignty of others, aided by the 
latest incarnation of telecommunications technology. During World War I, Germany’s 
foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, proposed an alliance with Mexico if the US entered 
the war. The “Zimmerman Telegram” — in this case, actually a radio message — was 
intercepted by the British and covertly decrypted. Information contained therein could 
benefit the British by igniting US indignation against Germany, but if  Germans 
discovered that the British or US knew the contents of a sensitive, encrypted diplomatic
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dispatch, it would also tell them that their cipher had been compromised.19 Knowing this, 
they would change their cipher and the British effort to “break” the German codes would 
begin anew.
Britain, Germany, Mexico, and the US, all sovereign states, were communicating and 
exercising their sovereignty through diplomacy using “cutting edge” technology of the 
day — in this case, radio. Two, Germany and Britain, were at war. Mexico and the US 
were officially neutral. Germany attempted to enlist Mexico in an alliance. Britain went 
to extreme elements to prevent development of the alliance and use the information about 
the German proposed alliance to encourage US entry into the war in Europe. It was all 
done in secret and the latest ciphers were employed to keep it secret. The US did enter 
the war in 1918 and the specific role played by the Zimmerman Telegram remains subject 
to historical interpretation. Still, radio signals radiating through the atmosphere were 
intercepted by unintended recipients to extract the information contained therein, and the 
potential existed for international ramifications affecting multiple sovereign states.
Twentieth century states had, by 1917, already come to rely on telecommunications as 
an essential new tool for states to use in diplomacy and exercise of their sovereignty. 
Complexity of the new century’s world required industrialized states, and those aspiring 
thereto, to participate in the new technology. However, it proved to be a vulnerability as 
well.
In peace or in war, the technical requirements to monitor and control every telegram 
and telephone call crossing international frontiers would prove prohibitively time 
consuming and expensive. States would find it necessary to alter their modus operandi to
’’Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram  (New York: Dell, 1963), 184.
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Telegram set the stage for the next era and provides a logical end point to the Age of 
Telegraph.
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CHAPTER V 
AGE OF RADIO AND CABLE —  1917-1964
This chapter continues diachronic analysis by addressing the impact on sovereignty as 
the world’s appetite for immediate information expanded faster than telegraph 
technology could provide it. By 1917, telegraph cables interconnected much of the 
world, electronically linking points where economic requirements dictated profitable 
return on the investment. “Wireless” radio telegraph met other connection requirements 
where distance, technology, or profit potential prevented installation of cable. The 
telephone and radio combined with the telegraph system to make rapid communications 
available to much of the world. Concurrently, the idea of sovereignty and its associated 
state expanded to where it approached the status of “natural right” for all people. The 
rebuilding efforts following World War II resulted in international modernization and 
trade. The world’s collective community grew ever more interdependent while the 
complexity o f international society interconnected by telecommunications pressured 
sovereignty.
Diplomatic actions, business concerns, military operations, and individual activities 
had altered their modus operandi based on newly available ground, sea, and air 
transportation along with the immediate availability of information. Despite “dangers” 
from loss of privacy or sovereign dominance over international borders, collective 
appetites for faster access to information had been whetted to a fine edge and could not be 
dulled. By the end of this era, most (but not all) telephones could be connected to nearly 
any telephone, anywhere, regardless of distance.
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Introduction
The Age of Radio and Cable commences January 17th, 1917 with transmission of the 
Zimmerman Telegram. Clandestine radio intercept of a secret, encrypted diplomatic 
transmission and exploitation of the information contained therein by states for whom it 
was not intended, marks the logical commencement of a new era. The era endured until 
1964 when launch of the first geo-synchronous relay satellite marks another critical 
element in the historical time line.
At the beginning of the new era, information of varying, but often vital, import 
flowed through cables and beamed through the atmosphere in gargantuan magnitude. 
Cable systems, begun during the previous era, continued to expand with augmentation by 
a fledgling radio network filling some of the gaps where telegraph service was either too 
difficult technically or too expensive. A war of violence and lethality inconceivable to 
previous generations had engulfed Europe with the deadliness of weapons enhanced by 
the tactical “combat multiplier” of telecommunications in the form of telephones, 
telegraph, and early radio technology.
Except in support of government or military operations, telegraph connections were 
still economic investments, made with expectations of fiscal gain. Few altruistic 
concerns governed proposed cable routes. Where financial or national interests were 
involved (often indistinguishable in the nineteenth century’s pursuit of wealth by the 
industrialized states), investments in telegraph lines were justified. States were free to 
subsidize investment in telecommunications infrastructure (specifically, telephone wires
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and telegraph cables), but some economic return was expected.1 A true worldwide 
network would require less expensive and more convenient means of establishing 
connections to locations which did not hold potential for significant economic return on 
the investment.
Still, information traveled throughout many portions of the world in minutes.
Regional markets, no longer isolated by distance, responded to economic stimuli as 
functional elements of “the whole” rather than distinct and independent components of 
the world’s economy. The content of mass media — still represented by the “printed 
word” of newspapers, and to some degree, periodicals such as magazines —  could 
traverse vast distances from “event” to point of publication via the international cable 
network. However, distribution of the media itself—  the printed word —  continued to 
depend on the speed of human transport. The speed by which humans could travel had 
increased dramatically from long standing rate of about five miles per hour to rail’s 40 to 
50 miles per hour.2
Numerous technological advances as the previous era neared its close caused the 
speed of information transfer to increase dramatically. The airplane soon evolved into a 
means by which information in other than electronic form could move at speeds measured 
in hundreds of miles per hour. The vacuum tube, essential to long distance transmissions
'Clare D. McGillem and William P. McLauchlan, Hermes Bound: The Policy and Technology o f  
Telecommunications (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1978), 87.
2Terhi Rantanen, The Media and Globalization  (London: Sage, 2005), 50.
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of voices over telephones as well as effective use of radio, established a foundation for 
technology3 which later gave rise to the transistor and integrated circuit.
In 1917, the newspaper continued to dominate mass media. However, broadcast radio 
soon challenged its supremacy only to be eclipsed, or perhaps, subsumed by television. 
States began to deal with telecommunications crossing borders, using some elements of 
telecommunications technology to obtain information surreptitiously exchanged by other 
states. Behavior of states as well as their representative diplomats required alteration and 
update to deal with new threats to the security of sensitive information. One US 
Secretary of State, discovering that elements of his department engaged in electronic 
eavesdropping, ordered it stopped because “... gentlemen do not read each others mail.”4 
This attitude typified the dilemma created by the possibilities of technology versus the 
responsible use thereof.5
Sovereignty and Society in the Age of Radio and Cable
The health o f the sovereign state, vital and vibrant a century earlier, began to decline 
by the end of World War I. European states who attempted to maintain the “exclusive 
club” throughout the nineteenth century, despite incursion by various upstarts in the 
Americas, found their exclusivity waning.6 Following World War I, under international
3George P. Oslin, The Story o f  Telecommunications (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1992), 274.
"Louis Kruh, “Stimson, The Black Chamber, and the 'Gentlemen's Mail' Quote,” Cryptologia  12, no. 2 
(1988): 65.
5Bemard Woods, Communication, Technology and the Development o f  People (London: Routledge, 
1993), 34.
6Hinsley, Sovereignty, 206.
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pressure, the European powers “created” states with lesser economic value while 
steadfastly maintaining “ownership” of exploitable colonies. The decision to maintain 
colonial or mandate status of territory versus granting sovereignty in state building 
operations should not be mistaken for altruistic pursuit of self-determination. Rather, 
economic value of continued exploitation played a much larger part.7
Meanwhile, nations throughout the world began to coalesce, demand release from 
colonial, mandate, or protectorate status and insist on state and associated self- 
determination. Sovereignty and self-determination approached a natural right of 
populations everywhere.8 Exclusivity of Europe’s “club” was on life support if it still had 
any life at all.
Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age of Radio and Cable
As demonstrated by the incident of the Zimmerman Telegram, new technology under 
which states conducted diplomacy, brought danger of compromise through unintended 
receipt by enemies, competitors, or even friends. Slow moving, but relatively secure, 
letters between diplomats and their home governments had always been the target of 
interception but protection of the contents was quite feasible. Electronic transmission 
brought international diplomatic actions into near real time in their communications with 
their home governments, but it also increased the danger of interception and access by 
unintended recipients. The human nature involved, however, was unlikely to suggest any
7F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), 90.
8Jorge M. Valadez, Deliberative Democracy: Political Legitimacy and Self-Determination in 
Multicultural Societies (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 13.
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return to the inherent delays of more secure but slower couriers9 and states incorporated 
the telegraph into their modus operandi. Post-World War I advances increased 
dependence on the associated telecommunications technology especially and expanded 
use of cables and development of radio.
Telephones remained expensive prior to World War II and were primarily a tool of 
business, especially as an international tool.10 In the US, where the system was privately 
owned, the installation of central switching offices, lines, and consumer instruments 
resulted in potential profit. In Europe, government ownership and resultant rules and 
regulations provided no such incentive and probably crippled growth. Further, cultural 
inhibitions hampered full use of the telephone’s potential. The British considered it an 
inadequate substitute for face to face conversation and people in Latin countries did not 
find the device complementary to their temperament. The German government monopoly 
provided no profit incentive for expansion or improvement o f service.11
Advances in radio, however, expanded coverage to include, virtually, any point on 
earth where communications was required but economics prevented installation of 
telephone or telegraph cable. With immediate connection available to the rest of the 
world, states began to lose their “absolute” control (real or imagined) over their own 
economies. In a fledgling process which would, in a following era, grow into the 
designation o f “globalism,” the corporate world began to ignore or circumvent state
9David Pauli Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplom acy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 80.
'“Brian Winston, M edia Technology and Society (London: Routledge, 1998). 52.
"Oslin, The Story o f  Telecommunications, 231.
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influences and supervision.12 Another world war interrupted the “natural” social 
evolution of sovereignty, international political economy, and world society in general. 
After the war, technological advances also contributed to military control and protection 
of territory. The same advances, however, also allowed the growth of MNCs in pursuit of 
foreign direct investment.
Dominant Mass Media
Mass media first emerged in the seventeenth century in the form of newspapers which 
capitalized on high technology of the era —  moveable type printing. Newspapers 
continued to dominate mass media until the 1920s when broadcast radio offered an 
alternative, or perhaps supplement, followed by television in the 1950s. At era’s end, 
public reliance on radio and television as mass media was enhanced by the 
geosynchronous satellites which heralded an era of ubiquitous communications. By 
1963, in the US, 90 percent of households had at least one television and nearly 100 
percent had radios. Throughout the world, 245 million radios existed, 111 million of 
which were in US homes.13
Telecommunications
As this era commenced, long distance communications still heavily relied on the 
telegraph. Construction of cable networks required significant capital investments, but 
offered a substantial potential return. Telephones allowed consumers to access
l2Rantanen, The M edia and Globalization, 50.
13 Almanac Book o f  Facts (New York: Press Publishing Company, 1964), 765.
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telecommunications technology directly. While the telephone provided phenomenal local 
service, any distance necessitated signal amplification which required further advances.
Those advances materialized in the inter-war years. Technology took telegrams 
beyond labor intensive single operators transmitting a single message at 20 to 30 words 
per minute. Teleprinters —  perhaps best described as interconnected typewriters — 
moved messages closer to 60 words per minute with less manual operator relay and 
reduced errors. Vacuum tube technology permitted signal amplification to the benefit of 
both long distance telephone and expansion of radio service from a wireless means of 
sending telegraphic messages to a new voice medium.
By the outbreak of World War II, information transfer had become wide spread and 
nearly instantaneous. Available “throughput” appeared to be massive when compared to 
early telegraph but it was still limited to information transfer. Distribution of large 
“volumes” of written data still relied on available means of transport, but that now 
included air service. Technological development is synergistic. Developments in the 
speed of information transfer still depend on physical movement of associated equipment 
or might be required for security; the speed of human movement remained an element in 
the all encompassing information transfer regime.
Broadcast radio, and its associated news services, provided for a previously 
unavailable means of widespread distribution. Initially, information which had been 
transferred across long distances, but with limited distribution, reached radio stations. 
News “readers” then read the information into a microphone which reached wide 
audiences. By World War II, foreign correspondents’ reports were received via radio and
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broadcast over commercial stations in the US. Telecommunications technology now 
provided both instantaneous transfer and distribution of information.
Early advances in consumer oriented television technology had been accomplished in 
the 1920s and 30s but were put into abeyance during war years. When war time national 
security restrictions eased and released research and development to support the 
consumer market, the wide data distribution pioneered by radio evolved to include 
pictures as well.14
By their nature, governed by laws of physics, radio and television signals have limited 
range. (“Shortwave” radio, used for international broadcasts by many states have much 
longer, but often intermittent servicing distance.) Various countries solved the restricted 
range of radio and television by combining transfer and distribution in networks. Radio 
programs were initiated and broadcast from a central location. Concurrently, the signal 
was transferred to other, distant locations via terrestrial cable where the same program 
was broadcast, thus reaching extensive audiences at far reaching locations. The same 
process was exploited and expanded when television began to supplant radio.
Transfer of signals across extensive distances required special technical consideration. 
Complex transoceanic cables installed for use by telephone and telegraph systems had 
some utility for television but at very high cost. The physics involved require television 
signals to occupy the “space” or bandwidth of hundreds of telephone connections. While 
a television signal transited an undersea cable, transoceanic telephone service became 
severely restricted.
l4David E. Fisher and Marshal Jon Fisher, Tube: The Invention o f  Television (Washington, DC: 
Counterpoint, 1996). 296.
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In the US, broadcast radio and television industries developed under private 
ownership. Throughout much of the world, however, the electronic media were 
government owned, often by the postal services. Under some theories of government, 
state owned broadcast media have a public interest requirement to protect the nation’s 
culture and traditions.15 Where this was (and in some cases, remains) the case, the state 
maintains predominant control of the most dynamic cultural influence.
Territorial Control
This era saw significant change to the state’s control of its borders. The airplane 
introduced a vertical element to sovereignty and begged the resulting question: How high 
does state control over its territory extend? Has an airplane, flying so high that it is not 
visible from the ground, violated a state’s territory? The answer was, initially tacitly, 
later specifically agreed to be yes; state territory extends into the vertical plane. The 
specific answer to “How high?” remained in the foggy ether of international law. The 
issue would reemerge late in this and into the next era; aircraft flight, measured in 
thousands of feet, might be one issue. When the USSR shot down a US U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft “violating” its sovereign airspace in 1960, little defense could be 
mounted to deny the violation beyond blustery insistence on sovereign rights to fly, 
uninhibited, as a matter of national security.16 However, a “device” (specifically, a 
satellite) “crossing” over state territory in earth orbit at an elevation of hundreds or
ls“The Last o f  the Old Guard,” The Economist, November 2, 2002.
16Phillip Knightley. The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (New  
York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 325.
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thousands of miles appeared to be quite different. It would not be until the 1970s that the 
issue of state sovereignty over a satellite would be addressed by the World Radio 
Conference under the guise of the ITU (see Chapter II, Satellites and Sovereignty).
Telecommunications technology continued to erode a state’s ability to control 
information crossing its borders due to a combination of the sheer volume circuits and an 
inability of states to develop hard evidence as to what information might be damaging to 
their national interests. Cross-border data flows were, by their very nature intangible, 
functionally integrative, and difficult to interpret. As a result, a “transnational 
cyberspace” was emerging over which states had no control.17 Early in the era, the 
telegraph (both via cable and radio) continued to dominate international communications 
but the telephone soon entered the equation as an expensive but viable tool in business 
and government operations. As with early electronic means, supervision of information 
entering and leaving state territory might be theoretically possible. The manpower 
requirements necessary to read, listen to, and control every telegram, telephone call, and 
radio transmission would vastly exceed the fiscal abilities of even the most prosperous 
states. Further, the delays and loss of privacy resulting from state control would constrain 
business. Business generates taxes. Attempts to limit the free flow of information would, 
therefore, hinder business, reduce the state’s income, and hurt the state’s health.
Cultural Cross-Pollination
Broadcast radio, followed by the enhancement provided by the synergistic addition of 
images to create television provided an entirely new means o f cultural influence. Where
l7Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility," 261.
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traditional intercultural influence took place through migration, trade, and conquest — all 
activities with inherent contact among populations —  radio and television had the 
capability to “insert” one culture directly amid the core of another.18
Various states, especially in post-World War II Europe, employed “world service” 
radio as an element of blatant propaganda. Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Moscow, and British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, to name only a few, 
actively sought to “export” their domestic “way of life.” The shortwave radios necessary 
for reception of long range broadcasts were far more likely to be found in the homes of 
citizens of states “targeted” by “world service” broadcasts. In the US, the extensive size 
of the country and near saturation of markets with commercial [short range] broadcast 
stations did not give rise to an extensive audience for international shortwave 
broadcasts.19 As television entered the world market, production costs o f both news and 
entertainment shows far exceeded those of radio broadcast. Consequently, a few Western 
countries, most notably the US, came to dominate production and dissemination of 
information and entertainment media for world audiences. Even the requirement to dub 
or subtitle English language productions was far cheaper than local production. By the 
early 1960s, at least 60 percent of broadcast television hours in countries such as Nigeria, 
New Zealand, Iceland, Malaysia, and Guatemala were imported. The result was labeled
l8Rantanen, The M edia and Globalization, 24.
19Winston, Media Technology and Society, 271.
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“cultural imperialism” and resulted in far more successful export of culture and political 
propaganda than world service radio.20
The geographic distance between the location of a program’s production and 
broadcast became irrelevant. Opponents or those concerned about developing mutual 
dependency and sensitivity among states, later to be labeled interdependence and 
globalism, accused the larger, more dynamic cultures o f subsuming others much like 
tenaciously procreating weeds take over a garden. The end result, however, had not 
changed. Cultural subsumption had occurred throughout history. Telecommunications 
technology introduced an accelerant.
International Finance
International monetary systems existed during the first half of this era in turmoil as a 
result of post-war chaos followed by the Great Depression. As World War II neared its 
inevitable terminus, the soon to be victorious states convened an international conference 
to establish a post-war international monetary system. It became known as the Bretton 
Woods system, after the conference’s location at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The 
resultant system established fixed currency exchange rates, aligned with the value of gold 
which assured currency convertibility. The agreements acknowledged autonomy of 
national policies, but free pursuit of macroeconomic policies always incurs some 
consequences since foreign trade involves foreign currency exchange.21 The state might
20John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1991), 36.
21Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International Relations (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 
1987), 132.
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have one philosophy as to the value of its currency; trading partners might have other 
reasons to accept different values. Rapid advances in telecommunications technology 
supported the expansion and efficiency of foreign direct investment programs and laid 
foundations for future transfer of funds from one international banking institution to 
another with virtual impunity. The first vestiges appeared in what would evolve into 
electronic cash and financial transactions; they later approached a complexity where 
national identity dissolved into complex obscurity often transparent to the transaction’s 
nation of origin. Little, if  any actual “money” crossed borders. Rather, the electrical 
transmission of transactions involving dollars, pounds, or other currencies provided a 
means of “keeping score” and providing quantification to transactions.
Sovereignty as a Whole
Colonial empires reached their whimpering terminus as this era approached its 
conclusion. The concept of sovereignty and self-rule as the natural right of all people 
extended throughout the international system. Sovereignty remained a territorial centric 
entity but the Cold War exerted artificial social evolutionary influences which suppressed 
many nationalistic movements. Numerous territorial borders had been drawn to match 
colonial frontiers or the needs and desires of European powers. Often, “nations” — in 
their political science identity as cultural entities such as tribes or ethnic minorities — had 
not figured in drawing borders, an omission that resulted in later civil strife.
States rebuilt after the devastation of World War II and looked outward for means of 
expanding markets for their rebuilt and growing industry. By doing so, they surrendered 
some control o f their domestic economies to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the
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market.22 The steady (and perhaps, inevitable) march toward interdependence and 
globalism had commenced. With each element of interdependence came an incalculable 
increase in sensitivity and vulnerability to the economies of the other states and the world. 
Interdependence was not new. The necessity for Flemish weavers and fullers to purchase 
raw wool from England in the middle ages certainly constituted an early example of 
interdependence.23 However, in the twentieth century, world trade moved at a much 
faster pace. The speed at which humans traveled had increased from a few miles per day 
on foot or horseback to a few hundred miles per hour on aircraft. Final products in the 
manufacturing process were automobiles, television sets, and consumer goods which 
required raw materials available only through trade. Sovereign states, never completely 
independent from others, had to consider availability o f both raw materials and end 
product markets in considering their economic decisions. The difference over time was 
the available telecommunications technology. International sales exploited the 
availability of communications and transportation to ensure on time delivery of 
commodities and payment as well.
At the same time, advances in telecommunications permitted the transfer of news, 
funds, and cultural influence across international borders and states had little ability to 
control the flow. People were able to conduct some portion of their day to day lives in a 
“space” external to the state’s defined territory. Draconian exertion of their sovereignty 
might allow some supervision, if not outright control, but at high cost. Participation in
22Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 194.
23 Alan K. Smith, Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade, 1400- 
1825 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 108.
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the world’s growing reliance on technological advancements often required sacrifice of 
sovereign control for enthusiastic involvement. Foreign direct investment often resulted 
in production facilities located in one state with management in another. 
Telecommunications was in the adolescent stages of making distance irrelevant. The 
source of “cultural imperialism” might be half a world away, but through radio, 
television, and other media supported by its telecommunications infrastructure, the 
resultant influence might have originated from “next door.”
Some elements of sovereignty, however, remained despite modem influences. Many 
functions were not targeted by forces which affected other elements of sovereignty. The 
state remained in complete control of “public goods.” The construction and maintenance 
of costly assets necessary for the efficient functioning of domestic society require a 
sovereign state, through its manifested government to provide for national security, 
police actions, and other mundane functions such as light houses, seldom used roads, and 
even in many cases, unprofitable telecommunications facilities. In these cases, 
telecommunications provided states with tools for use in pursuit o f state duties.
Summary
The Age of Radio and Cable saw phenomenal changes to the world’s culture, 
economy, and the system of sovereign states. Two world wars and the initial stages of a 
Cold War, unique to history, disrupted anything approaching “normal” social evolution. 
States were bound by alliances. States were antagonized by alliances. States joined IGOs 
in pursuit of perpetual peace. States abandoned them as a result of war.
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The era began with one state (Great Britain) “plucking” another state’s (Germany) 
private telegram addressed to another state (Mexico) out of the ether. The resulting 
information was used by Great Britain to attempt to influence the US entry into World 
War I and eventually influence the final outcome and end to hostilities. The era ended 
amid a “smoldering” cold war with telecommunications stimulating development o f a 
single world economy and with television and radio expanding throughout the globe. The 
sovereignty of Westphalia could not traverse the historic continuum from 1648 to 1964 
without change.
Domestic economies were developing interdependent relationships among one 
another which removed, or at least reduced, direct state control. Cultural influences 
accompanied financial data through an ever expanding telecommunications network. 
Finally, on April 6th, 1965 the Early Bird satellite was launched and placed in orbit above 
the equator. The satellite functioned as a relay platform for radio signals between North 
America and Europe. It could simultaneously receive and retransmit 240 telephone 
circuits or one live television broadcast between continents. Early Bird was the harbinger 
of a constellation of satellites which provided the backbone for inexpensive, worldwide 
connections of telephones, computers, facsimile machines and virtually every other 
electronic device imaginable. Instantaneous communications throughout much of the 
world were nearing fruition. Distance was on a path toward total irrelevance in the 
movement of information. The sovereign states of the international system had to deal 
with a different world. Therefore, 1965 and launch of the Early Bird satellite establishes 
a pertinent point at which to end discussion of the Age of Radio and Cable and begin 
analysis of the Age of Ubiquitous Communications.
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CHAPTER VI
AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMMUNICATIONS —  POST-1965
This chapter continues the process established in the previous three chapters. It looks 
at how the society, telecommunications, media, territory, culture, and financial situations 
have changed from previous eras and how those changes affect sovereignty. 
Telecommunications technology allowed both businesses and individuals to carry on 
international commerce and private activities in a “space” where state borders played 
little or no part. A few “dominant” cultures exerted influence on other cultures from afar 
through long distance transmission and delivery of television, radio, music, and film.
State actions became known throughout the world moments after they occurred and even 
in strictly domestic situations, decisions had to be made in light o f international 
ramifications. It had become difficult, if not nearly impossible, for states to operate with 
impunity, even within their sovereign territory. Sovereignty — the absolute and 
unlimited power of the state —  required consideration o f parameters beyond frontiers. 
Sovereignty had changed.
Following World War II, a globe-encircling system of sovereign states emerged.1 By 
1965 as this era began, the vestiges of Europe’s colonial elements had, for the most part, 
achieved independence and joined the now not very exclusive “club” of sovereign states. 
Self-determination through sovereign states had developed into the natural right theorized
'Robert H. Jackson, “Continuity and Change in the States System,” in States in a Changing World: A 
Contemporary Analysis, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, 347-367 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 347.
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by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century.2 However, as the number o f sovereign 
states in the international system approached 200, the complexity of the world’s 
interdependent society also increased. Development of interconnected computer and 
telecommunications networks made a global economy possible. Global pressures on state 
sovereignty and the institutional apparatus necessary to manage and regulate the economy 
often threatened destabilization and transformation.3 The telecommunications systems 
that allowed such institutions to function on the international level continued to grow.
Introduction
Throughout this era, telecommunications technology developed beyond the wildest 
imagination of Samuel Morse, Alexander Graham Bell or Guglielmo Marconi. With 
each new development, the movement of any type of information, transferred into an 
electronic format, could be moved faster and faster. By the end of the twentieth century, 
distance, in the movement of information, became irrelevant. This era begins in 1965; 
the first geostationary satellite, the “Early Bird” was launched. Capable o f handling one 
television channel or 240 two way telephone calls, the satellite effectively doubled 
transatlantic communications capacity4 and set the stage for an ensuing epoch of true 
communications ubiquity. “Live” television could be broadcast from Europe to North 
America with technological “ease.” It was expensive, since the developers of the satellite
2Valadez, D eliberative Democracy, 234.
3Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age o f  Globalization  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), xii.
4Solymar, Getting the Message, 188.
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expected to recoup their costs through charges for its use, but it made the routine 
connection o f the continents feasible.
By the end of the twentieth century, Early Bird’s capacity would be insignificant by 
comparison to the interconnections among a constellation of satellites, undersea fiber 
optics, and terrestrial cable and radio based communications systems. However, as a 
milestone in evolution of worldwide communications, its 1965 launch marks an ideal 
point to begin a final era’s analysis. With increased speed and capacity of 
telecommunications system, the international system’s complexity increased as well.
Instantaneously available information, made possible by telecommunications 
technology, constituted a primary difference between this final era and previous periods. 
Events taking place beneath the glare of television lights in full view of cameras became 
global historic turning points; without the cameras, continental epochs could easily pass 
unnoticed.5 The Peoples Republic of China provided one of the best examples of the 
effects of instantaneous, worldwide distribution of news [information].
China historically limited foreign news journalists’ access to its domestic events. 
Through an ironic quirk in 1989, international news media were onsite in Beijing 
covering a meeting between the world’s two bastions of Communism —  the USSR’s 
Mikhail Gorbachev and China’s Deng Xiaoping. The meeting came to an end with little 
more of significance produced than such meetings ever accomplish, but groups of 
Chinese students in pursuit of greater democracy took advantage of the media conclave. 
The world watched as their protest begem on Tiananmen Square. Foreign observers
5Jay Mathews, “Mending Broken China: Beyond the Grim Television Images, There’s Hope for 
Reform,” Washington Monthly 22, no. 8 (1990): 48.
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expected a government crackdown at any moment; cameras remained focused on the 
protests, and transmitted the images globally via satellite.
Conventional wisdom dictated that Chinese government suppression of the protest 
would be accomplished with violence, but not with foreign satellite links beaming live 
images throughout the world.6 Unique to this situation, CNN had a camera set up at their 
satellite control station and continued a live broadcast as a Chinese official arrived to 
inform them that their license to use Chinese government controlled satellite uplink 
frequencies had been granted for coverage of the Gorbachev-Xiaoping meeting. That 
conference had ended. They must shut down their satellite operation immediately.7 The 
official allowed the reporter to “sign off,” but live, realtime relay of unfolding events 
terminated. The world’s collective interest had been piqued and other media managed 
continued news coverage with some delay and difficulty getting their information (video 
tapes, news text, photographs) out of China. Instantaneity had been lost, but the ubiquity 
of communications provide other means, not the least of which was a fall back to move 
information at the same speed as the humans who were carrying it.
Telecommunications created an environment where purely domestic events such as a 
sovereign state repressing internal challenges to its authority could become events of 
international interest and concern. The case of China’s crackdown on Tiananmen Square 
provided a particularly appropriate example. A decade prior, a strikingly similar event 
occurred and the Chinese government brutally suppressed earlier student demonstrations
6Daniel Benjamin, “State o f  Siege: With Tiananmen Square the Epicenter, a Political Quake Convulses 
in China,” Time 133, no. 22 (1989): 38.
7“CNN Basks in Reaction to Its Beijing Coverage,” New York Times, May 25, 1989.
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on Tiananmen Square. The international press were not, however, present to record that 
event and it went virtually unnoticed.8 The events of 1989 were, and remain, well known 
due to ubiquitous media coverage.
China’s governmental efforts to remove their actions from the collective eyes of the 
world indicated a desire to conceal, or at least obscure their actions. Norms of behavior 
form an essential basis of both natural and international law,9 and the government was 
obfuscating their behavior so as not to be seen exceeding generally accepted norms. The 
state’s absolute and unlimited power was being applied with judicious concern about 
external opinion and reaction. The key was information, its speed of transfer, and breadth 
of distribution. The world learned instantly about far away events; they were 
experiencing “news” not learning about past events. Would sovereign states in the 
control era or later have tailored action based on news media coverage?
Information made universally available via advanced telecommunications technology 
internationalized domestic actions. If states find it necessary to tailor, camouflage, or 
obscure activities within their territory, sovereignty would seem to suffer. It is situations 
like this which instigated and fostered this study in order to arrive at the Age of 
Ubiquitous Communications and examine contemporary effects o f telecommunications 
technology on sovereignty.
Sovereignty and Society in the Age of Ubiquitous Communications
As discussed in Chapter II, sovereignty has never been absolute. As the twenty-first
8Mathews, “Mending Broken China,” 48.
9Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 57.
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century approached and reached fruition, it became less so for many reasons. Sovereignty 
provided an organizing element to society, especially international society. Societies 
continued their evolutionary processes under various stimuli, one o f which was the 
growth of telecommunications technology. If the needs o f society changed (evolved) to 
function in an increasingly complex world, as a supporting concept, sovereignty had to 
change as well.
In a complex, interdependent world, isolation provided no value to states. Self- 
sufficiency escaped the ability of even the largest and most diverse countries. Prosperity, 
and in many cases, survival necessitated interdependence at regional, continental, and 
often, global levels. An isolated and independent state (if such an entity could still exist) 
would be unaffected by the actions or interests of other states. However, interdependent 
states have mutual interests where both domestic and foreign policy interact. When tied 
together through mutual interests, especially in trade, international predatory behavior 
becomes harmful to all the states involved.10
To ease adversarial situations in mutual dependency, avoid predatory behavior, and 
enhance efficiency of common goals which extend beyond international boundaries 
requirements, states form intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs operate on a 
principle of sovereign equality where each state maintains equal status with all others, 
although the Orwellian concept of “some are more equal than others”11 often plays a tacit 
part. The scope of concern and privileges of membership vary according to the
l0Donald J. Puchala, “Western Europe,” in States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis, ed. 
Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, 69-92 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1993), 84.
"George Orwell, Animal Farm. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 123.
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organization’s founding purpose and charter.12 Whatever their purpose, member states 
agree to behave in a stipulated manner which constitutes a limit on their freedom of 
action and therefore, a “limit” to their sovereignty.
State membership in IGOs, especially those organizations with both broad and deep 
involvement among members, could be said to require the voluntary “surrender” of some 
degree of sovereignty. Reacting to members’ fears for the loss of independence of action 
and identity, self-serving explanations or excuses by the organizations’ members and 
leaders usually referred to “pooled” or “on deposit” sovereignty.13 IGOs are not a new 
phenomenon. Any time in history where two or more states agreed to cooperate on trade, 
a tacit IGO existed. More formal agreements, such as the Hanseatic League among 
German principalities, also constituted proto-IGOs. However, in modem form, the IGO 
dates to formation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU —  nee 
International Telegraph Union) in 1865.14 Technical and bureaucratic problems faced by 
the world’s first telecommunications industry — the telegraph —  were discussed in 
Chapter II; solving the problems required states to ease their sovereign rights to supervise 
messages —  information —  entering and leaving their territory. For the first time, the 
best interest of states would be served by international cooperation to ease and accelerate 
the passage of telegrams across frontiers.
Formation o f the ITU did not set any precedent to encourage immediate formation of 
other IGOs. By 1909, there were less than 40 IGOs but nearly 400 operated in the Era of
l2Cusimano, Beyond Sovereignty, 221.
l3Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 358.
l4Codding and Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union, 3.
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Ubiquitous Communications one of which, of course, was the ITU.15 The complex, 
interdependent world of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries led states to 
form IGOs for all the classic reasons: to promote trade, ease international exchanges, 
prevent or discourage predator behavior, etc. The need for telecommunications 
cooperation caused the first true IGO’s formation, but day to day functioning requires 
effective communications systems.
Virtually all actors in the international system —  states, IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs — 
rely on the world’s complex web of telecommunications to operate. The world’s 
communication system starts with each state’s national system (often government owned 
and operated). Various private systems traverse, augment, or run parallel to national 
networks. When the electromagnetic spectrum is involved (radio waves), little, if any, 
argument exists to challenge a state’s right to control its use within territorial borders. In 
many situations, short range or low power use of frequencies is strictly a domestic 
concern. However, many electromagnetic emanations have effective ranges extending far 
beyond the territorial limits of the state of origin. States might be within their sovereign 
rights to allow use of such emitters, but the international implications could be viewed in 
a range from internationally “annoying” to outright hostility. Even legitimate use of 
internationally allocated “long distance” frequencies caused concern as they crossed 
borders.
During the Cold War, the US and its allies in the West generally claimed a right to 
broadcast putatively objective radio programs directly to the populations of various
l5Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies o f  International 
Organizations," International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999), 699.
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Soviet bloc states via shortwave radio and condemned any action taken to “jam”or 
prevent reception. The ITU, to which nearly all states on both sides of the question 
belonged, maintained through its regulations that shortwave radio provided an 
internationally acceptable means by which information could be transmitted across 
national borders. The Soviet Union, however, maintained that such undesirable foreign 
transmissions violated their sovereignty. Therefore, they radiated blocking (known 
commonly as “jamming”) signals on the same frequencies to render the Western 
ideological broadcasts unintelligible.16 Similar situations still remain unresolved, 
especially concerning US sponsorship of Radio Marti broadcasts into Cuba.17
This circumstance provides a point of fact example of telecommunications 
technology’s impact on sovereignty. No foreign military forces crossed an international 
border. No damage was done to any property, weapons, or assets. Nothing affected 
national economies. Only invisible, albeit detectable, electromagnetic waves were 
involved. Yet the targeted states maintained that their sovereignty had been violated and 
they expended considerable effort and expense to counter the broadcasts, an effort which 
was not 100 percent successful.
Modern trade, cultural exchange, international relief efforts to natural disasters, or 
virtually any other multinational operations necessitate extensive consultation and 
coordination, all of which requires telecommunications. Participation in the network that 
allows these communications requires matching or conversion to technical standards,
l6Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility," 267.
l7Monroe Price, M edia and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and Its Challenge to State 
Power (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 202-203.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
coordinated exchange of control data, as well as physical connections among networks. 
The ITU provides a forum to coordinate and control the necessary actions. Does this 
constitute a significant reduction, surrender, or erosion of sovereignty? Perhaps 
“significant” requires some elusive concept of quantification and operationalization, but 
states’ exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within their territory has 
taken on a new dimension. States agree to coercive intervention based not solely on 
domestic law with constitutional limits, but in accordance with international convention 
as well. Pursuit of both internal and external trade relations, cultural exchanges, 
international relief efforts to natural disasters, or virtually any other multinational 
operations requires extensive consultation and coordination, all of which requires 
telecommunications.
Radiation of shortwave propaganda across international frontiers presents a direct link 
between sovereignty and telecommunications. Modem financial transactions are 
somewhat more esoteric. States also have an uncontested right to determine and produce 
“coin of the realm.” However, in the telecommunications dominant world of this era, 
states have little say in the internationally accepted value of their respective currencies.
In the 1960 with much of the world’s economy still linked to a gold standard and fixed 
exchange rates, the French franc was facing devaluation with respect to other states’ 
monetary instruments. President Charles de Gaulle simply stated that he refused to allow 
the devaluation of his nation’s currency. However, release of the link between currency 
and gold, combined with instantaneous exchanges permitted by telecommunications 
prevent any such future proclamation in the name of sovereignty from rising above the 
level of joke. Various currency markets, instantaneously linked together, synergistically
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determine the value o f a state’s currency which is no longer directly based on precious 
metal content or reserves. Rather, the wide variety of elements constituting “news of the 
world” — both domestic and international — unite to influence currency exchange 
transactions. With computer aided decision tools, a minuscule drop (or rise) in exchange 
rates could result in massive electronic exchanges of currency. It takes place in 
“international cyberspace” and sovereign states have little or no control over the 
transactions. The state might join the trading frenzy in attempts to bolster exchange rates 
by purchase of its own currency, but can do little else to influence the value o f its 
currency on the international market. In the end, a state’s currency is valued by what the 
rest of the world will pay for it or sell it for.
Similarly, the evolution of “electronic cash” allows payment in kind to be 
accomplished with electronic transactions rather than exchange of specie. Here states 
might exert influence through severe control of domestic banking with positive 
supervision o f all transactions known to cross its borders. Once again, to do so would 
hamper the market’s free enterprise. Traders would likely move their operations to 
another state with less (or more acceptable) supervision. The trade off distills into a 
simple equation of exerting “absolute” sovereignty in the limited area o f currency transfer 
at the likely cost of prosperity, or “surrendering” an element of sovereign control in return 
for economic gain.
Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age of Ubiquitous Communications
This era, especially as it approaches contemporary points, combines all of the impact 
on sovereignty by telecommunications during previous eras. Sovereignty itself was
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considered “under attack” by many political scientists, but the subject to hand requires 
distillation of the situation to refine the specific effects as a result o f telecommunications.
The ubiquitous nature of telecommunications which developed and expanded 
throughout this era removed physical location from the equation in many private and 
public enterprises. Manufacturing operations could take place in a remote part of the 
world where —  presumably — low wages, low real estate overheads, minimal 
environmental controls, and low taxes produced an optimal business environment. 
Associated fiscal, management, and service activities, linked via telecommunications, 
could just as easily be accomplished a continent, or more, away. Telephone calls from 
corporate management to operational or manufacturing elements do not vary when made 
from across a building, across, a town, or across an ocean. Funds can be moved 
electronically around the world among financial institutions to locations with the most 
favorable tax rate, minimal government influence, or ease of future transfer.
An impact on state sovereignty appears obvious in many areas as a result. If MNCs 
move fiscal assets with impunity to avoid tax liability, the state o f origin has lost control 
over activities taking place within its territory. Harsh measures might attempt to clamp 
down on industries’ free movement of assets in response, but those MNCs would likely 
limit or avoid future operations in that state. Other states create an “MNC friendly” 
environment. The state’s “absoluteness” in taxing and supervision o f business operations 
within its borders dissolves as they compete with other states who willingly forfeit some 
of their “absoluteness” in return for the benefits derived from businesses operating from 
their soil.
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Dominant Mass Media
Newspapers, from their beginnings, provided information to the populace. Some 
versions may have experienced some state attempts at censorship and literacy rates 
limited impact, but newspapers functioned at the speed of civilization they served. Later 
media continued to do so by exploiting technological advances such as the telegraph. 
States found it necessary to suppress (censor) the press or live within the confines of a 
free press. The newspaper dominated mass media throughout the first two eras. During 
the third, the Age of Radio and Cable, broadcast radio materialized as an entertainment 
and news source followed by television, but printed newspapers remained a predominant 
means of news distribution in 1965. As the Age of Ubiquitous Telecommunications 
progressed, even the venerable, “low tech,” printed on paper newspaper exploited 
information transfer technology. Traditionally limited by the requirement to collocate 
news, advertising, and production facilities with press equipment, newspapers had to print 
their product and physically move the resulting paper copies to sales and distribution 
points. Rapidity of transfer and distribution depended upon the speed of cargo transport 
— primarily cars, rail and truck, but in some cases, aircraft.
Telecommunications allowed the layout of pages to be accomplished on computers in 
one location and transmitted quickly to distant points for printing, as distance approached 
irrelevance in information transfer. This became particularly useful in geographically 
large states such as the US where the idea of a “national newspaper” was long limited by 
the time required to transport the printed product. However, by the late twentieth century, 
papers such as USA Today, New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal 
capitalized on telecommunications technology to pursue “national newspaper” status.
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The newspapers were developed in their home cities and prepared for printing. The print 
images were then transferred via computer networks to multiple points throughout the 
country where press runs could ensure rapid delivery throughout the surrounding regions. 
Rapid transfer of the graphic images required for printing of a newspaper would have 
been virtually impossible until the development of integrated computer and 
telecommunications networks.
Of course, newspapers exploited speed of information transfer in basic news 
production, as well. Traditional information transfer in news media had used telegraph, 
telephone, and various variants thereof such as teletype, and stock market ticker tape. 
Modem networks, such as the Internet, allowed news gathering and transfer to printing 
facilities to make use of the irrelevance of distance.
As computers began to permeate modem life, some experts predicted the imminent 
demise of the paper copy of newspapers. While this has not, in fact, happened, other 
means of reading the same information have emerged, most notably via the Internet.
Both local and far distant newspapers are available to anyone with a computer and an 
Internet connection.
The printed word maintained a prominent if no longer dominant role in dissemination 
of information and shared its reliance on telecommunications with other mass media. All 
elements of media rely on telecommunications technology at some point in their 
production and delivery. When it reaches the “consumer,” media of all types presents 
products of the originating culture. It reaches large numbers of people. If it presents a 
desirable picture of different but enviable lifestyle, the populace will likely begin to look 
toward adoption of some elements. The state can try to control access; it can pass laws
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making the use o f equipment allowing direct international connections illegal and 
punishable by harsh penalty. Broadcast media have inherent characteristics, however, 
which evade even the most severe attempts at suppression or control.
Since its inception, broadcast media always had some degree of long distance 
influence. Various national “world service” radio transmissions provided news and 
cultural media beginning in the 1930s. Many continue today. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) World Service, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, and Radio Free 
Europe provided both legitimate news and flagrant propaganda during the Cold War. 
[These long distance broadcasts used the high frequency (HF) portion of the spectrum 
between 3 and 30 MHz, often generically referred to as “shortwave.” Most American 
radios were not designed for reception of HF. Use of shortwave radio was considered the 
purview o f ham radio enthusiasts. Much of the rest o f the world, however, routinely 
maintained the capability to receive the international shortwave portion of the spectrum.] 
Laws of physics and the nature of television transmission required it to be consigned 
to portions o f the frequency spectrum limited to line of sight capability (approximately 30 
miles). Networking —  linking one program production facility to numerous broadcasting 
stations — overcame the need (or desire) to reach dispersed audiences with a single, high 
powered transmitter. Except where transmitters were located near territorial borders, 
cross-border incursion of television signals was not a major issue.
Satellites provided the means by which to extend the reach o f television signals.
Direct broadcast satellite systems provided a capability for “customers” in much of the 
world to receive television originating throughout the world —  but primarily in the 
developed countries —  directly from a satellite. States can outlaw the use of such
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reception equipment, but at what cost? A desire for drastic repression of foreign 
influence would probably be indicative of an already repressive regime controlling the 
state. Police power, inherent in sovereignty, would become intrusive to the citizens in 
denial of equipment availability. Further, should the state wish to extend its own 
influence through use of similar media, equipment availability would be denied to the 
citizenry.
Telecommunications
At the opening o f this era, telecommunications had already reached and exceeded the 
projections for ubiquitous communications made near the end of the Age of Telegraph.
In 1896, the president of the National Electric Light Association predicted a not distant 
future where news from all areas of the world could be gathered in less than a second and 
human voices would be transmitted a thousand leagues.18 It did not happen quite as fast 
as projected, but by 1965, radio, telephone, telegraph, and television girdled the earth. 
Undersea and terrestrial cables dominated the long distance transfer o f data, augmented 
by line of sight and over the horizon radio systems. The environment surrounding 
sovereign states was immersed in telecommunications. Nearly every event in the 
domestic and international arena became known though mass media unless extreme 
efforts were made to suppress transfer and distribution of information surrounding the 
event.
l8James Gleik, What Just Happened: A Chronicle from  the Information Frontier (New York: Pantheon, 
2002), 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
The definitive event to separate eras occurred in 1965. The first geo-synchronous 
communications relay satellite reached orbit. This was the first step toward 
exceptionally long distance exchange of information in all forms of electronic media. By 
the end of the twentieth century, a constellation of satellites orbiting the earth at 22,300 
miles above the equator provided for the gathering of news from all areas of the world far 
beyond the remotest dreams of 1896. If the information could be forced into a format to 
be transmitted via electromagnetic radiation, it could be sent anywhere in an instant.
While the geo-synchronous satellite provided a key element, the ubiquity of 
communications relied, rather, on a synergistic amalgamation of interdependent networks. 
Terrestrial cellular (wireless) telephone systems connect among each other via cables and 
line of sight radios, and cross longer distances via satellite links. Television remote teams 
connect to their home stations via line of sight when locally remote or satellite during 
long distance separation, depending on terrain and availability of equipment. The Internet 
“rides” virtually every type of transmission media.
Ubiquitous communications impose a dilemma of sovereignty on states. They are 
capable of controlling where, within their territory, cables may be laid. Radio 
transmissions originating within their borders used frequencies under their control and 
allocation. States could —  theoretically — exercise careful supervision over all 
transmissions leaving their territory. However, in doing so, they hamper the efficiency of 
the users of telecommunications, many of whom will be involved in international trade 
and finance of benefit to the state. The state can exercise its sovereignty and suffer in the 
international marketplace, or it can back away from sovereignty and participate.
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Territorial Control
The states comprising the international system continued to be territorially defined 
and the development of ubiquitous communications did not change borders. Rather, one 
of the world’s primary commodities in this era — information — routinely and constantly 
crossed frontiers, often without the knowledge of the state whose territory had been 
“violated.” Telecommunications technology provided the means by which state residents, 
MNCs, and NGOs could “operate” within or across borders with virtual impunity, 
removing the significance of the territorial state over such actions. A particularly 
pertinent example comes from “remote sensing.” For those states with the necessary 
technology, powerful sensors attached to orbiting satellites scan territory to map 
geography and obtain all types of resource information without any permission from the 
scanned region’s government. The resulting information can be used to predict weather, 
produce maps, or seek data on another state’s activities for intelligence purposes. 
Technology may produce a counter measure to “protect” against such action, but it is not 
likely in the immediate future.19
North Korea probably attempts the most draconian control o f its territory from the 
influences of telecommunications. The state severely limits its citizenry’s access to 
modem telecommunications technology. Basic telephone service is both limited and 
expensive and international calls are priced beyond the general population’s means. The 
Internet is available only under controlled conditions. Still, people manage to make 
hazardous journeys into China where they purchase cellular telephones and service.
‘’Herbert I. Schiller, Information and the Crisis Economy (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1984), 99-
100 .
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Returning home, the Chinese cellular network signals cross North Korean borders and 
those telephones continue to obtain service, albeit, only in border areas.20
States maintained their responsibilities for those activities which remained purely 
domestic —  common goods, police and law enforcement, and national security — but the 
borders did not exclude or prevent border crossing of other commodities. The 
“information revolution” finally completed the conversion of much o f the world’s 
financial transactions to purely electronic exchanges. Dollars, pounds, and eventually 
euros still provided units of quantification by which to “keep score” but an end point 
occurred in the future — true e-cash which has been predicted to threaten the very basis 
of the territorial state by removing state influence, control, or taxation over financial 
transactions.21 While this prediction might be somewhat harsh, it forms a basis for further 
consideration. If a state has little or no control over currency transactions taking place 
within its domain, has sovereignty been lost? Perhaps, rather than lost, states in the future 
will no longer have domestically peculiar currency. If so it is the nature of sovereignty 
that changed rather than a level which has eroded. While traditional sovereignty included 
issuing coin of the realm, it may become unimportant in postmodern international society. 
The specific impact remains to be determined.
Cultural Cross-Pollination
Throughout history, cultures intermingled through trade, migration and conquest.
20Howard, “The Real Threat to Kim.”
21Stephen J. Kobrin, “Electronic Cash and the End o f National Markets,” Foreign Policy, no. 107
(1997), 65.
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States, especially nation-states, often tried to maintain cultural purity by limiting that 
influence. In antiquity, cultural influence required travel. People —  traders, immigrants, 
soldiers —  had to travel to distant lands leaving some of their culture and returning with 
foreign influence. Telecommunications technology allows influence to be inserted into a 
foreign culture without any travel. States must either adapt to or repress the receipt of 
technical cultural influence. If sovereignty helps explain state behavior and states behave 
differently from past eras, sovereignty has changed as well.
Even before the emergence of mass communication, when influence relied on the 
“natural” forms of cross-pollination, cultural purity was something of a myth. Early in 
the twentieth century, the anthropologist Ralph Linton observed that no extant culture 
owed more than ten percent of its elements to members of its own society.22 Put into 
other words, ninety percent of all cultural peculiarities result from cross-pollination.
Languages dynamically demonstrate cross-cultural influence. Most modem 
languages have adopted words peculiar to modem technology directly from the language 
of origin, usually English (or the American dialect thereof). The French are so concerned 
about the “pollution” of their language due to cultural cross-pollination that they “outlaw” 
the “importation” of foreign words and require new words, as necessary, to be “Franco- 
ified”23 rather than simply adopted from a foreign language of origin. So what? The 
French particularly associate their language and nation (nation = people with a shared 
cultural heritage). Coalescence of society around common languages gave rise to the
22Linton, The Study o f  Man, 325.
23David Hornsby, “Patriotism and Linguistic Purism in France,” Journal o f  European Studies 28, no. 4
(1998), 362.
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original European nation-states. In the modem, telecommunications dominated world, 
dominant culture —  usually the US — wields its influence with near impunity. Linguists 
attribute the “borrowing” of words between and among languages as a legitimate 
evolutionary process by which the lexicon of a language adapts to new phenomena. In 
the postmodern world, however, where the borrowing often takes place from the US 
dialect of English, it is seen as a cultural threat.24 Still, in language chauvinistic France, 
le weekend and le drugstore are universally understood terms.
State rulers —  especially in absolute or authoritarian states —  regard modem 
telecommunications and associated technologies as a mixed blessing. They usually want 
the benefits accompanying automation, telephones, and television. At the same time, they 
do not want the erosion o f cultural integrity often included with “progress,”25 especially 
since the influence is often seen as US based. Cross-cultural influence via commercial 
media is obvious to a modem traveler. Police in Beijing direct traffic beneath umbrellas 
emblazoned with McDonald’s logos. Blue jeans-clad youth are everywhere. “Columbo” 
and “Baywatch” are known to television audiences throughout the world. Where US 
music, motion pictures, and television programs become so dominant, underpinnings of 
political culture ride along like remora. States might deny their populace local broadcasts 
of foreign television, but in many cases, the dam has been broken. Could it be cut off 
after the fact? Sovereign “protection” of national culture was probably always impossible 
due to natural human interface. Attempts to limit access to foreign media of all types, 
once broken, likely would be difficult to reclaim.
24Rebecca Posner, Linguistic Change in French (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 163.
25Pool, Technologies Without Boundaries, 101.
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The mythical nature of true cultural “purity” was always defeated as populations 
interacted by way o f trade, migration, and conquest. Cultures intermingled and 
synthesized —  cross-pollinated. Telecommunications technology accelerated the exact 
same process, taking it from the speed of its “state-of-nature,” where changes appeared 
over generations, to a point where influence occurs in near realtime. The state has little 
ability to stop the rapid influx of cultural influence. Saudi Arabia forbids the import of 
Christian bibles, anything remotely connected to Judaism, and all media depicting nudity. 
Any Saudi citizen with a computer and Internet access (and enough ingenuity or money to 
get around government attempts to limit access) can find all o f the forbidden material. 
Somewhat less blatant cultural influence, although neither as rapid nor as dynamic, finds 
its way through. A full body concealing woman’s abaya purchased in Riyadh carries a 
label, in English, proclaiming the shop’s name: “My Fair Lady.” The western cultural 
influence is obvious, and the involvement of telecommunications and impact on 
sovereignty follows, logically.
International Finance
The world’s markets began to merge as a result of the relative instantaneity provided 
by the telegraph. A century and a half later, deregulation of many domestic financial 
markets combined with liberalization of international capital flows made possible by 
telecommunications technologies linking computer networks results in a single, 
worldwide economy.26 States no longer dominated their domestic economy. The
26Sassen, Losing Control, 40.
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economic system of the world became inseparable from domestic systems. In 1987,
French economist Lionel Stoleru expressed it with complete accuracy:
[N]ational economies turn round the international economy like the earth turns 
round the sun, and not the reverse.. . .  Abandon the illusion of strictly national 
policies modified by international constraints and face today’s reality.
International policies modified by national constraints.27
Economic sanctions, in particular, hold potential for devastating consequences to the 
state excluded from the global market. Telecommunications enable movement of funds 
around the world, with a few strokes of a computer keyboard, the click of a computer 
mouse, or at the “low tech” worst, a phone call. The transactions often involve no state 
control, review, supervision, or taxation. As with other modem implementations, states 
could impose restrictions and review before the electronic transactions cross their 
borders, but the resultant difficulty would limit the states effective participation in the 
world’s economy. Once again, the state must choose between “full” exercise of its 
sovereignty and the gains to be had from both expressed and tacit membership in the 
world’s institutions.
The primary influence of telecommunications on international finance is in the realm 
of “electronic cash” or “e-cash” as the vernacular calls it. Totally reliant on a digitally 
networked global economy, e-cash is often viewed as a direct threat to the existence of 
territorial states.28
Traditional means of payment did not spontaneously erupt when some prehistoric 
financier smote the ground. It was an evolutionary process beginning with exchange of
27Basil Blackwell and Samuel Eilon, The Global Challenge o f  Innovations (Oxford: Butterworth- 
Heinemann, 1991), 156.
28Kobrin, “Electronic Cash and the End o f National Markets,” 65.
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goods. At some point, objects of value became a generic payment until precious metal — 
primarily gold and silver —  settled in as the nearly universal media of exchange.
Problems with movement of precious material gave rise to letters o f credit and paper 
currency and set the stage for the modem evolution of electronic financial transactions. 
Acceptance of paper money required trust in the state responsible for issuing the script, or 
in some early cases, banking establishments. That trust did not automatically shift into 
the electronic world.
Electronic cash had its own metamorphosis through which to pass before larval 
electronic debit and credit systems gave rise to the adult butterfly o f true electronic 
money. Credit and debit cards in routine contemporary use throughout the world are 
based on existing monetary systems. When used, funds are electronically transferred 
from the account of the user to the account of the merchant. Telecommunications 
technology is essential to the cards’ use through nearly instantaneous verification as an 
integral element of the transaction. Next in the evolution of e-cash came the “smart card” 
—  credit cards in which an embedded microchip carries inherent electronic means of 
verification along with available balance. However, credit, debit, and smart cards all 
represent a more convenient means of transacting financial transfers of “traditional” 
money. Banks still process the proceeds at the end of the day, albeit electronically 
without the exchange of actual specie. Banks in all states operate under some degree of 
government charter and supervision so that sovereignty still manifests in national finance. 
True electronic money, existing only in digital form stored in the memory of personal
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computers or next generation smart cards, might not be backed by reserve accounts of 
“real” money.29 Banks might cease to be an element in banking.
True digital money remains in the future of finance, but the foundation exists in 
electronic credit and debit transactions. Trust and verification are critical to any 
electronic financial transaction but once established, the title of the currency merits little 
concern. Rather than dollars, pounds, yen, or euros, “electronic credits” would work as 
well provided their value is known and understood by all concerned. What part do states 
play in this? Perhaps, none. Historically, only states and banks —  and usually, state 
chartered banks — could gamer the trust necessary for faith in currency. Should e-cash 
evolve into a viable alternative to traditional monetary transactions, it would constitute a 
de facto if  not de jure  single, international monetary system. To maintain any degree of 
control or regulation, states would be required to harmonize national monetary 
regulations and means of control.30 Otherwise, independent e-cash issuing concerns 
(probably some variant of MNC) could elude any regulation and take on some elements 
of sovereignty, in this case, determining the coin of the realm to be used within multiple 
sovereign states. It could be argued that interconnected international currency exchange 
markets constitute a single international currency with multiple variants.
If electronic cash should emerge from the world’s interconnected network — 
primarily the Internet — could state currencies survive? The Internet grew from a state 
sponsored program —  the US Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) — into an 
amorphous, international web with little state involvement in its expansion, growth or
29Ibid„ 67.
30Ibid., 76.
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use.31 Some analogies exist between the Internet, the anarchy of the international system 
of states, and the possibilities of an e-cash system free of state control. The Internet 
represents an anarchical international means of communications as a “network of 
networks” which is neither owned nor controlled by any single state, person, or entity. 
Protocols have been agreed to avoid chaos and ensure efficiency within the anarchy, but 
anyone with the technical wherewithal can connect to and exploit the system.32 Many 
users of the Internet transfer money through its circuits. Consumers purchase day to day 
items for small amounts to be applied to their credit cards. Brokers buy and sell stocks 
involving large transactions. Currency traders exchange large amounts of money to buy 
and sell foreign script which never physically exists outside their computer memory. 
Normally, the funds involved are in the home currency of the user, but international 
transactions present few problems to sophisticated users. A purchase in pounds or euros 
appear on credit bills in dollars, in a simplistic example. Little imagination would be 
necessary to picture the eventual emergence of universal exchange of electronic “credits” 
—  probably starting with the deposit of actual, traditional money, but leaving it behind at 
some point and becoming truly digital.
If taxation is a sovereign right of states, how will they determine the domestic value 
of an international electronic currency based solely on trust and verification? Could they 
exert any control over expenditures crossing their borders in pure electronic form? How 
would they fund state operations? Sovereignty might be under attack by weapons no
31Jerry A. Goldstone, “Internet Celebrates Its Past and Forges Its Future,” Business Communications 
Review  24, no. 10 (1994): 4.
32Douglas W. Vick, “Exporting the First Amendment to Cyberspace: The Internet and State 
Sovereignty” in M edia and Globalization: Why the State Matters, ed. Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord, 
3-20 (Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 6.
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more lethal than the electrons and magnetic charges making up electronic financial 
transactions.
In the US, an analogous situation points toward similar problems in the international 
commercial arena. The states and their local jurisdictions comprising the US federal 
system all have different programs for collecting taxes on retail sales. With increased 
sales via the Internet, state and local tax jurisdictions, of which there are nearly 8,000, 
complained about the annual loss of $ 15 billion in uncollected sales tax. A group of 42 
US states formed the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) in attempt to encourage, or 
perhaps coerce, on line retailers to collect sales taxes through simplified procedures. 
While the SSTP has had some success, it is unlikely to achieve full compliance without 
federal legislation for enforcement.33 Taking the analogy to the international 
environment, anarchy still exists. No overarching means of enforcement exists and 
international taxation programs would require cooperation far beyond existing 
intergovernmental organizational structures. As states in the international system see 
their sovereign control over commerce changing, their surrender o f control over taxation 
to an international entity would likely be seen as extreme.
The financial size of some MNCs already exceed the gross national products of many 
sovereign states. Using telecommunications to move fiscal assets, they already often 
avoid tax burdens by relocating the “focus” of their operations to tax friendly states. 
Telecommunications allow them to communicate with a distant “headquarters” across the
33W. David Gardner, "States Line Up for Voluntary Internet Sales Tax Program," Information Week, 
May 19, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=163105744 (accessed 
August 8, 2005).
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world as easily as across a city or state. They seem to take on some elements of 
sovereignty.
Sovereignty as a Whole
As originally actualized, sovereignty existed in a world system where territorial states 
with nation based citizenship were the only actors. The Roman Catholic Church tried to 
participate as it had under the feudal system, but sovereign states controlled the limited 
membership to their exclusive club. As the number of sovereign states increased, the 
differences among them blurred in concert. By the Age of Ubiquitous Communications, 
the club was neither limited nor exclusive. The twentieth century’s growth of a global 
economy, spurred on by the computer networks, telephones, television, and other 
elements of telecommunications technology, caused profound reconfiguration to the 
institutions fundamental to processes of governance.34
States, while still territorially defined, were under constraints from all manner of 
sources. Individuals and non-state actors in the international system made claims on 
states through both tacit and explicit regimes. The human rights regime provides a 
specific example. The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights does not carry the “legally 
binding” status o f an international treaty. However, it is cited so often in international 
law that it has ascended to the status of customary international law and observed as law 
— to the extent that international law can truly be treated as law.35 Sovereign states find 
their exclusive authority to intervene coercively in domestic activities to be constrained
34Sassen, Losing Control, xi.
35Ibid., 90.
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by a tacit regime proscribing norms of behavior. Abuse of citizens, violations of human 
rights, even environmental damage are likely to be announced to the entire world as they 
happen. O f course, states may ignore the percepts of the regime but in doing so, risk the 
wrath of other states. International sanctions might be employed, but large powerful 
states could ignore them and possibly retaliate. Smaller states might find sanctions 
devastating. The norms of international law would not be applied with any consistency.
Much has been made of the effects on state sovereignty by international economic 
activity. Often, this is described as erosion of sovereignty. However, it is not the 
sovereign state that is being eroded. Rather, it is erosion of the central government’s 
control of activities which have international consequences, especially economic activity. 
A synergistic union of sovereign states created an environment where international and 
mutually beneficial activities could flourish. States still impose organizing aspects on the 
international system despite the efforts of many members of the economic system to 
evade state control. Without the structure of states, the [purely theoretical] result would 
be an inconceivable anarchic chaos. States might function in a chaotic international 
system, but purely economic entities require the framework of organized monetary 
systems.
Summary
The Age of Ubiquitous Communications began with communications available to 
much of the world, although in some cases limited to radio, telephone, and a vestigial 
telegraph cable network. At the era’s beginning, the first geo-synchronous relay satellite 
doubled transatlantic telephone and television capacity. By the twentieth century’s end,
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geo-synchronous satellites, undersea fiberoptic cable, and terrestrial communications 
systems provided “connectivity” to most of the world. Concurrent to the development of 
ubiquitous communications, the sovereign state continued its social evolution to keep 
pace with the demands of world society.
States’ various “coins of the realm” based on gold standards gave way to floating 
valuation which became dependent on telecommunications systems to tie them all 
together in one world economy. Independent markets began to merge with the 
introduction of the telegraph in mid-nineteenth century but reached virtual consolidation 
when computers in one hemisphere instantly relayed transactions to the opposite side of 
the world, and all points in between. An increasingly literate, aware, and technologically 
equipped populace found themselves exposed to cultural undercurrent from far away 
places; the residual influence which in the “state-of-nature” might have taken decades or 
centuries now happened in real time.
While this happened, states “absoluteness” waned. The telecommunications 
technology which provided a foundation for expansion of the world’s media, economics, 
and culture also brought information across state frontiers with impunity. States found it 
necessary to relook, reevaluate, and in many cases, reconfigure the fundamental processes 
by which governance was accomplished. Yet states have remained sovereign.
Sovereignty has changed. States can rely on news of their actions being learned 
throughout the world moments after their occurrence. A requirement to consider world 
reaction to purely domestic conduct and events diminishes states’ “ ...exclusive authority 
to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”36 Attenuated or not, sovereignty
36Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations,” 219.
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remains. It is not like energy which can not be created or destroyed. Newly sovereign 
entities emerge such as Croatia. Once sovereign players such as Somalia exist within 
former territorial limits but without any “state” to exercise authority. The sovereignty of 
the USSR transferred seamlessly, if  not painlessly, to the Russian Federation.
Hastened by telecommunications, sovereign states have changed. “Cultural purity,” 
in all probability a myth at best, remains elusive. If populations want modem technology, 
information and ideas about other cultures comes along with it. If states desire the taxes 
and prosperity from a vibrant businesses environment, they must accept the 
telecommunications technology necessary for participation in the global economy which, 
in turn, requires easing of state supervision of funds, information, ideas, and concomitant 
cultural influence crossing borders.
Joining the international community, further, requires state participation in IGOs, all 
of which rely on telecommunications for routine functioning. Agreement to abide by the 
“rules” of IGOs —  in essence, acknowledging the existence and validity of international 
law —  removes some of the anarchy in the international system at the expense of 
“traditional” sovereignty. A circular dialectic continues — the more a state desires to 
participate in the international system, the less “freedom of action” it has. However, 
states remain sovereign.
Despite the erosion of their sovereignty, states still serve a vital function in organizing 
the world’s international system. A true and pure capitalist —  in economic system terms, 
or an equally die hard realist, in international relations theory terms —  might suggest that 
states could confine themselves to maintenance of a domestic economic system to foster 
market forces which, in turn could take on other functions. However, in reality, it falls to
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the state to build infrastructure, protect domestic tranquility, and preserve the “common 
good,” especially where it serves the populace in general, but not specifically business 
interests.
The sovereign state survives.





The original research question asked: In what ways does telecommunications 
technology affect state sovereignty? In answer to the question, the hypotheses set out in 
Chapter I proposed that the more telecommunications technology developed, the less 
states could control the passage of information across their borders, influence the 
international inflow and outflow of funds, and limit cultural penetration through foreign 
influence. A converse null hypothesis suggested that state sovereignty is unaffected by 
telecommunications technology. The methodology for analysis called for comparison of 
variables, across time, beginning with 1648 — the generally accepted date of the 
sovereign state coming into its own —  and continuing to the present.
When the international system of sovereign states emerged in Europe during the 
seventeenth century, no telecommunications technology existed. Three and a half 
centuries later, sovereign states still constituted the primary element of international 
social organization, and ubiquitous telecommunications technology provided the 
infrastructure for worldwide, instantaneous transfer of information without regard to 
distance. Over this period of time, how had emergence and growth of 
telecommunications affected sovereignty? Initial review of the analysis suggests 
rejection of the null hypothesis. This chapter compares the analyses described in 
Chapters III through VI in response to the basic hypotheses set.
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In previous chapters, the evolution of sovereignty was compared to the development 
of the telecommunications technology underpinning the ever increasing speed of 
information transfer over four distinct eras. Some impact between the two appears 
intuitively obvious and diachronic analysis would seem to confirm intuition’s validity. 
This chapter specifically combines and presents the synergy of mutual influence between 
sovereignty and telecommunications technology.
Telecommunications technology (the independent variable) exerts influence on 
sovereignty (the dependent variable) through the intervening variable of information. In 
other terms, states find that their freedom to act with sovereign impunity to be limited by 
the necessity to consider international ramifications of their actions because knowledge of 
those actions will be internationally known rapidly if not instantaneously.
Sovereignty and Society
Sovereignty is first, and foremost, an organizing principle for both domestic and 
international society.1 During the Middle Ages, the era between the fall of the Roman 
Empire until the dawn of the Renaissance, which predates the time frame under study, 
European society organized around feudalism. However, with the Renaissance and 
associated enhanced rates of literacy, early mass media, and the increased availability of 
printed matter, society’s organization evolved away from feudalism toward a system of 
sovereign states. Sovereignty was thought into existence to meet the needs of post-feudal 
society.2 The initial Control Era for this study began with the emergence of an
'Bartleson, A Genealogy o f  Sovereignty, 188.
2Knutsen, A H istory o f  International Relations Theory, 2.
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international system of sovereign states following the Peace of Westphalia when no 
telecommunications existed. Throughout the initial control era, as well as subsequent 
telecommunications technology dominated eras, sovereignty continued to meet a number 
of societal needs. As with other forms of biological and social evolution, the process did 
not reach an endpoint and cease in 1648. Societies’ needs changed, as did sovereignty to 
meet them.3
Initially, little was expected from the sovereign states. They might be expected to 
provide security in the form of freedom from fear of foreign invasion, develop a monetary 
system to support commerce, and in many cases, specify the means of religious practice. 
The absolute and unlimited power of the state, inherent within sovereignty’s basic 
definition, was rarely challenged and the international system approached the nineteenth 
century as a strong and well established element by which the international system was 
organized.
Sovereignty’s internal focus had always been the proverbial prince, but the American 
and French Revolutions wrested the power away and refocused it on the people. Other 
slow and less drastic processes, such as occurred in England, were moves toward 
removing the concentration of sovereign power from the “sovereign” or monarch and 
vesting it in the legislature. As societies evolved away from absolute monarchies and 
approached differing degrees of democracy, the organizing principle —  sovereignty — 
might be expected to change along with it.
As the nineteenth century advanced, the international system of sovereign states 
remained centered on Europe but the walls surrounding the “closed club” were
3Philpott, "Ideas and the Evolution o f  Sovereignty," 17.
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crumbling. The Industrial Revolution was in full swing and demand for raw materials 
necessitated international trade and cooperation. In this environment, the telegraph made 
its debut. Movement of goods still took place at the prevailing speed of ground travel (at 
this point determined by ocean and terrestrial steam engines) but information about 
international transactions or diplomatic decisions could move in minutes or hours rather 
than days or weeks.
Governments, businesses, and individuals altered their modus operandi to incorporate 
telegraphic connections to transfer information over long distances. In a process that 
continues into the twenty-first century, each new advance was incorporated into societal 
functions. In the nineteenth century, the telegraph provided rapid exchange of 
information at ever increasing distance and speed. The telephone provided convenient 
exchange of voices but it would take further, related technical advances for it to reach 
distances comparable with the telegraph.
By the time radio emerged to augment telegraph and telephone at the turn of the 
twentieth century, international society was information dependent and states came to 
expect rapid knowledge of their actions to be available to friends, competitors, and 
enemies. At the same time, the number of states participating in the international system 
increased as well. Former colonies and terra incognita coalesced into defined national 
entities demanding self-determination, and the international system expanded with 
telecommunications technology interwoven with the expansion.
Societies constituting the population element of the sovereign state constantly 
change through a natural process of social evolution, with the process often enhanced or 
accelerated by telecommunications technology; in doing so, their expectations of
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government evolve as well. By the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, 
populations in developed states looked to their own government for social safety nets and 
various social justice programs. In lesser developed countries, populations as well as the 
state looked beyond their own borders to IGOs and NGOs as the only likely sources of 
assistance. What role did information — the intervening variable —  play as enabled 
(made possible) by telecommunications technology?
Much of people’s expectations about the role of their state and its government may be 
attributed to increased awareness of their place in the world, and that is a product of 
information. As discussed throughout the preceding chapters, both distribution and 
transfer o f information contributed to increased availability o f information. State actions 
became known domestically and internationally unless determined efforts were taken to 
prevent it. The state-of-nature of information transfer can only be maintained artificially 
through repressive measures by a state desiring to limit the transfer of information by 
suppressing the use o f telecommunications technology.
Telecommunications and Sovereignty
Entry of telecommunications technology into the international arena caused states to 
alter their way of doing day to day business. Diplomats assigned to work with major 
trading partners, advisories, or potential enemies were no longer sent out on their own 
with a set of instructions and requirements to report via slow mail. Exploiting 
telecommunications technology, changes to diplomatic instructions and replies to them 
could be exchanged quickly. This might actually be considered a positive change to
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sovereignty. States could exert their international influence directly rather than await 
long delayed exchanges of reports and instructions.
However, the interconnected world removed much control of other matters from state 
supervision. A state attempting to exercise sovereignty over telecommunications and 
information it carries has a difficult task. No argument exists over a state’s right to 
manage and control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum emanating from within its 
borders. However, those electromagnetic waves do not stop at the borders. As the waves 
fall on other states’ territory, interference is sure to follow unless spectrum use is 
coordinated. Active participation and membership in IGOs such as the ITU helps 
minimize potential chaos, but states limit their sovereign rights in return for the benefits 
of cooperation. Participation in the world’s postmodern economy requires extensive, 
coordinated use of the spectrum and minimum contribution to the potential chaos. 
Therefore, states agree to the necessary limits on sovereignty in exchange for the 
functional benefits of international participation in actions requiring technical 
cooperation.
Means of information transfer which do not radiate, such as old fashioned cable or 
ultra-modern fiber optics have different characteristics in that the information content can 
neither cause chaotic electromagnetic interference nor can it be as easily extracted by 
unintended recipients. The state can forbid use of the technology, but once put into use, 
little if  any supervision can be exercised over the information transferred. The sheer 
volume of data would require extensive investment in personnel for review which, in 
turn, would introduce unacceptable delays in delivery. The state might exert its 
sovereignty over telecommunications technology in order to limit the information passed
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as is often attempted by North Korea. However, to do so minimizes effective 
communications and severely limits participation in the functioning of the postmodern 
world.
Dominant Mass Media
The dominant mass media within any era merit discussion in the domain of 
telecommunications because it provides the most obvious means for distribution of 
information to the populace. During the control era, mass media consisted of little more 
than local newspapers which were few in number due to increasing but still low literacy 
rates. Like all other information dependent elements of the era, newspapers relied on the 
speed of human travel to receive information to be published.
Newspapers maintained some degree of dominance in mass media throughout all of 
the eras under study and took advantage of each advance in telecommunications to 
increase the speed at which they could obtain data for publications. Still, until late in the 
final era, the newspapers themselves always moved at the speed o f human travel. Of 
course, that speed increased from a few miles an hour —  the proverbial speed of oxcart 
—  to hundreds o f miles per hour when aircraft delivery became available.
The first use of radio was technologically limited to “wireless telegraph” capable only 
of transmitting the same type of Morse Code used over telegraph wires. When voice 
radio developed in the 1920s to the point where broadcast systems were feasible, mass 
media had new elements of speed. With newspapers, rapid and nearly instantaneous 
transfer of information through telephone and telegraph then stagnated to await 
production in print. When received by news organizations, it could be broadcast without
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delay (at the discretion o f editors or station owners). True mass media had emerged — 
with particular emphasis on mass. The information moved at the speed of light and 
reached wide audiences. Advances in telecommunications technology expanded the mass 
media into every element of human activity. The Internet and various other computer and 
communications networks rendered distance irrelevant and distribution approached 
universal. Information could move across a city or across an ocean in microseconds.
The synergistic union of computers and telecommunications technology produced an 
amorphous, worldwide element of infrastructure for massive transfer and distribution of 
information — the Internet. Newspaper, television, and radio continued their traditional 
delivery and broadcast, but often the same information was “posted” on or “streamed” 
through the Internet. News, educational material, cultural information, and entertainment 
from one part of the world were all available, instantly, anywhere else on the globe. The 
dominant mass media were mass media and states had little control over any of them 
unless they attempted to suppress them all.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications have evolved through numerous iterations from rudimentary 
point to point telegraph connections in the nineteenth century to the ubiquitous Internet. 
States have been required to contend with information crossing their borders but they 
have also exploited the capabilities for their own use. The technical difficulty 
surrounding interception and monitoring data crossing borders has not prevented states 
from continuing long established attempts to determine the content of messages. Rarely 
discussed openly, intelligence gathering is generally acknowledged as a state’s sovereign
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right, or even duty. Ubiquity of telecommunications along with countermeasures to 
prevent intercept and monitoring, however, continually make the process more difficult. 
As telecommunications technology develops, so do the attempts to develop technical 
means by which to intercept the information. State attempts to find out what information 
was crossing its borders continue as they had for centuries.
Development of telecommunications has been continuous, as a cursory look at its 
history shows. The next step, perhaps, is more difficult to predict. Early twenty-first 
century telecommunications would truly seem to have earned the title of “ubiquitous.” 
Citizens of nearly all countries have the ability to use a cellular telephone to talk, 
exchange messages, or access the Internet from, and to, anywhere in the world. Again, 
states might make attempts to monitor the cacophony of data in search of any with 
sovereignty damaging potential but the magnitude of such a task limits its potential. The 
next step in the technological evolution may completely remove any potential for the state 
to control information, cultural influence, or exchange of funds across its borders.
Territorial Control
The sovereign state was bom a territorial entity and territory remains an essential 
element of the modem state. States have always defended their borders against military 
incursion, tax evading smugglers, and unwanted immigration. Traditionally, such border 
control is a police or military responsibility limited by little more than a state’s ability to 
deploy adequate forces. In this context, the emergence of telecommunications technology 
likely enhanced a state’s control of its borders. As communications would become a
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“combat multiplier” in warfare, it would provide similar enhancement to the process of 
border control.
However, when telecommunications are used to transfer information across frontiers 
rather than things or people, control becomes more difficult and approaches impossible. 
Early attempts by France and Prussia (Chapter II) to control the content o f telegraph 
messages entering and leaving their territory proved feasible but at the expense of 
unacceptable delay to the messages and high personnel costs. Later technologies have the 
same disadvantages magnified by orders of magnitude. Sovereign “rights” of states might 
permit them to control electronic data but technology does not provide any practicable 
method by which to exercise that right. Rather, states must adapt to the international 
environment where information, as a commodity, circulates throughout the world without 
state supervision. Uncontrolled movement of information does not necessarily threaten 
the territorial nature of the state, but state action must adapt appropriately. Terrorism, 
however, inserts an exception into the situation. Ease o f information transfer facilitates 
all types of potential hostile attacks, but terrorists are particularly capable of capitalizing 
on the technology to pursue their ends.
Because o f the territorial nature of the state and the limits it puts on the exercise of 
state power, their sovereign absolute and unlimited power stops at the border unless 
offensive attack, invasion, or conquest is contemplated. All types of technology, 
especially transportation, combined with the modem nature o f territorial borders, 
however, opens a particular vulnerability to threats from terrorism. It is not, specifically, 
the motivations of terrorists which has an impact on states and their sovereignty. Rather 
it is the limits on the state’s freedom of action in response to terrorism that prevents
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fulfilling sovereign duties to provide security for the population.4 If the state is attacked 
by a non-state terrorist organization, what are the options for response? In the case of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the US responded by 
attacking Afghanistan and Iraq. Subsequent terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK 
provided no “convenient” target for state response, and no obvious path for states to 
follow in pursuit of the perpetrators and to reestablish security.
As with other “transsovereign” problems, terrorism exploits the open society, open 
market and available technology which facilitate the legal cross-border movement of 
goods, people, and especially, information.5 The telecommunications technology 
underpinning the Internet combined with modem society’s reliance on computers also 
provides particular vulnerability to “cyber-terrorism.” Doomsayers have long predicted 
the US or another industrialized society being brought to its metaphorical knees by 
computer virus, worms, or Trojan Horses. While no such catastrophe has yet reached 
international proportions, numerous “lesser” attacks to computer networks have shut 
down municipal communications systems and disrupted business.
A classic definition of “security” suggests that “a state (or its leaders and citizens) 
believes itself secure when it fears that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states or 
by other foreign non-state actors.”6 In a society dependent upon computer networks for 
day to day functions, attacks on those networks surely fall into the category o f “adverse”
4David E. Long, “Countering Terrorism beyond Sovereignty,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues fo r  a 
Global Agenda, ed. Maryann K. Cusimano, 96-108 (Medford, MA: St. Martin’s, 2000), 96-97.
5Ibid., 97.
6Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics o f  the World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993) s.v. “Security.”
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actions. Individuals with no agenda beyond catastrophic mischief have disrupted 
systems. If an organized terrorist group obtains the necessary technical acumen, the 
threat may become as real as a hostile, lethal attack. How does the state protect its 
citizens against such a threat? Conventional sovereign statecraft provides few courses of 
action. Terrorist groups are not participants in the pursuit of security, or o f peace, as 
practiced by states. A focus of sovereignty becomes development of technology for 
protection against non- state threats which might be violent or cyber-based. Terrorism 
drove another change in the nature of sovereignty to emerge.
The state remains a territorial entity. Domestic sovereignty is exercised much as it 
ever was but control of information eludes even the most technologically savvy of states. 
Control of actual crossing of borders by people or cargo can still be attempted. Every 
state has procedures to control immigration, and cargo control becomes limited by sheer 
volume. Smuggling to avoid both immigration restrictions and freight import duty 
remain police and military actions.
Cultural Cross-Pollination
Intercultural influence has existed for as long as human society supported more than 
one culture. The natural process occurred as a result of normal interactions such as trade, 
migration, and conquest. In its “state-of-nature,” intercultural influence took place as 
traders visited other societies and returned with stories about how others lived. In the 
case of migration or conquest, the travelers often remained and attempted to introduce 
their own ways into a distant culture. Intercultural exchange took place as a result of 
human travel at the associated speed of human movement.
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Telecommunications technology, especially in its later, ubiquitous incarnations, 
changed the speed at which the influence could take place between cultures. Cultural 
influence no longer requires any international travel. Extensive availability of direct 
broadcast satellite television, wide distribution of digital video disks, Internet exchange 
of information, and a synergistic union of media accelerated evolutionary processes. 
Impoverished cultures often have access to television which shows them how the rest of 
the world lives (valid or otherwise). It remains to be seen how that will affect cultures of 
the future, but dominant cultures —  especially American in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries — may subsume any number of others. Police in Beijing directing 
traffic under an umbrella with McDonald’s logos, as a case in point, demonstrate the 
concept. This may be a result of aggressive marketing by McDonald’s, but 
telecommunications technology provides Chinese people with their perception (again, 
valid or otherwise) o f US culture, the “desirability” of “all things American,” and 
provides the corporate structure with the ability to maintain its worldwide distribution of 
products.
Without the underlying telecommunications technology, some of the same influences 
might exist but slower in process and lower in intensity. With the technology, the culture 
which most successfully exploits the advantage will appear to dominate, and possibly 
endanger others. How might it affect sovereignty? One of the three key elements of the 
sovereign state, a population identifying itself with that state, might find dissatisfaction 
with their identity. They might see how other people in other societies live and function 
and demand similar benefits (real or perceived). The state may wish to isolate its 
populace from “undesirable” cultural influence but find itself virtually powerless to do so.
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International Finance
Telecommunications technology made “internationalization” o f the world’s finance 
systems possible. Interconnection of geographically separated markets began with the 
introduction of international telegraph. Later, ubiquitous communications throughout the 
world permitted nearly instantaneous transfer of currency transactions based not on any 
preset value by the state, but rather, on the actual rate used by sellers and purchasers.
The sovereign state’s control over domestic monetary systems, as a result, was subjugated 
to the whims of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the international market. States might 
attempt to maintain a high level of their currency exchange rate by offering a higher than 
market price, but in doing so, they were participating in, rather than exerting control over, 
the international trade regime. Similarly, all international trade succumbed to 
instantaneous and universally available information about the cost o f goods, services, 
stock shares, and any other commodity bought or sold on the open market. States had 
little control over international financial transactions which might directly affect them.
When the international system of sovereign states emerged in the seventeenth century, 
mercantilism dominated approaches to finance. State programs focused on extracting the 
maximum possible amount of gold from foreign lands while exporting as little precious 
metal as possible. Subsequently, the Industrial Revolution and Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand of the market suggested removing any goals of self-sufficiency and 
acknowledgment of the necessity for mutually beneficial international trade.
International transfer of funds had been going on for centuries and provided the 
emphasis for many advancements in the development of monetary systems. While not an 
unusual process, it was accomplished on an as needed basis. Feeding the voracious
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appetite for raw materials in support of the Industrial Revolution, however, required a 
steady stream of international transactions. Various industries had always required 
international sources of supply but as it approached “normal” it resulted in degrees of 
interdependence.
As the need to transfer funds internationally evolved in concert with developing 
interdependence, the financial community exploited the benefits o f developments in 
telecommunications technology. As with other “users” of the world’s 
telecommunications infrastructure, the financial community found ways to relegate 
financial data to the realm of information in formats transferable initially by telegraph and 
later by the further developments. At the end of the final era, the international financial 
system allowed for funds to be moved around the world with virtual impunity. Funds 
require quantification; transactions must specify the value of the “money” involved. Any 
of the world’s viable currencies could be specified although most international 
transaction take place using the US dollar, British pound sterling, EU euro, or Japanese 
yen. The actual unit of currency is of little consequence as long as all parties to the 
transaction acknowledge the value.
Globalization —  perhaps euphemistically described as interdependence on steroids — 
became reality as mutual dependency among states grew. As discussed earlier, no state 
can survive in isolation with total self-sufficiency. Import of some raw materials is 
essential to industry and foreign markets are necessary for a dynamic economy. However, 
MNCs existed solely to produce profit and often removed any state loyalty they may have 
had in pursuit of tax advantage and maximum return on investments.
Telecommunications allowed them to move funds from one sovereign jurisdiction to
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another to avoid the taxes on which states rely for their existence. Extraction, purchase, 
and transport of raw materials has been in progress for centuries, but sophisticated 
manufacturing processes rely on timely arrival and predictable prices. International 
distribution of finished products also relies on advances in transportation which are 
enhanced, carefully controlled and made more profitable by close corporate supervision. 
Through telecommunications technology, that supervision often emanates from locations 
with long distance separation from the actual process.
This globalized situation in which MNCs appear to thrive further removes them from 
specific state identity. With corporate headquarters located in a “tax friendly” state, 
production situated across the world among people with low expectation of wages, and 
distribution of final products based on convenient delivery to end users, national identity 
and state loyalty do not figure prominently in profit based decision making. 
Diversification o f assets brings the MNCs into play in the international system not as 
sovereign elements, but entities with which sovereign states must contend.
Without the ability to move money around the world with virtual impunity, global 
pursuit o f profit could not thrive as it has. MNCs with corporate budgets higher than 
gross domestic products o f many sovereign states have begun to impose themselves as 
players in the international system. While they do not posses true elements of 
sovereignty, their financial influence can not be ignored by many states, and in fact, many 
states court them obsessively to gain economic benefits of employment and trade.
Sovereignty as a Whole
Regardless of the presence of influential MNCs or the “pooled sovereignty” of IGOs,
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the sovereign state remains the key player in the international system. The Realist 
theoretical argument might discount the influence of other actors, but in an era of 
globalism, the impact of IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs can not be ignored. The realist school 
of thought has been under assault in recent times.7 Among the lines of attack, its 
detractors argue that states are not as important in world politics as realists would assume; 
that they may in fact be eclipsed in influence by a variety of non-state actors placing the 
future of sovereignty upon which states are built into serious question.8 The study carried 
out in pursuit of the research question shows otherwise. The sovereign state remains a 
player in the international system. Virtually every state has agreed to some limits on 
sovereign rights in return for the benefits of active participation in the world community. 
States agree to control use of the electromagnetic spectrum radiating from within their 
borders to minimize interference with other states through the ITU. Similar functional 
agreements “push back” anarchy in aviation and mail regimes.
Telecommunications technology is necessary for the day to day exchange of 
information required in a complex system of states to organize market functions and 
ensure international cooperation. Technology, and the information reliant thereon, 
particularly permits, enables, or accelerates evolution toward some sort o f “common 
denominator” in currency and culture. Ever increasing use o f charge or debit cards tends 
to make individual currencies irrelevant. The ability to transfer funds electronically 
without ever making physical contact with money further points toward some common
7Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources o f  International Politics," International 
Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 752.
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no.
2 (1999): 7.
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currency —  e cash. American products can be found advertised and for sale in virtually 
any large city in the world in local currency. The telecommunications technology that 
carries the US culture may, or may not, cause it to subsume others, but its influence is 
domineering. However, despite the large industrialized states’ domineering presence in 
the world, the sovereignty of other states remains.
State behavior, and therefore, many elements of sovereignty have changed over the 
proceeding three and a half centuries. Trading blocks, IGO memberships, and functional 
organizations, have caused the voluntary “surrender” of some sovereign control. 
Telecommunications technology may be creating an environment where a single — or a 
few —  currencies will quantify the world’s financial transactions. Mass media require 
that states consider their actions before the fact because the world will know about them 
in a virtual instant.
Yet the sovereign state remains. The basic definition of a state specifies three 
mandatory elements: a sovereign government, a population, and territory. 
Telecommunications may make distance irrelevant in the transfer o f information and 
permit territorial “violation” which may not be favored by the state, but the territory 
remains defined by the state and acknowledged by the system of states. Cultural 
influence may expand the population’s identity from purely national (German, for 
example) to regional (European, to continue with the same example), but some degree of 
national identity remains. The sovereign government controlling the state may have 
different parameters for its exercise of absolute and unlimited power when compared to 
eras long past, but it still has domestic responsibilities to establish and maintain 
infrastructure and provide for security of its citizens, as well as participate in the
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international system. MNCs might establish security forces or build roads, schools, and 
common goods when it serves their profit potential, but they can not be relied upon for 
unprofitable service to the populace’s universal well being. The sovereign state will 
remain until society, and the needs of society, dictate the creation of a viable alternative 
as an organizing structure.
The last time society needed a fundamental change in the organizational nature of the 
international system, feudalism gave way to sovereign states. The economy had changed 
and began the evolution of a vibrant middle class. New organizations, institutions, and 
ways of thinking developed in concert with the changes. The sovereign state won out as 
the primary international organizing factor. In the twenty-first century, similar parallels 
exist. The economy has gone through a metamorphosis away from a focus on “goods” 
and toward information, technology and services, all of which rely far less (if at all) on 
territorial control. The means of production, supporting capital, and labor are no longer 
fixed, as they were in the past and have become quite mobile. States with governmental 
systems spanning a wide variety of philosophies — ranging from democratic republics, to 
theocracies and residual authoritarian regimes — all court foreign direct investment 
which is capitalistic in nature.9 The annual budgets of many MNCs exceed the gross 
domestic products of some sovereign states. The world might seem ripe for another 
cataclysmic change in the international system.
NGOs, IGO, MNCs, and perhaps some additional category of international entity are 
insinuating themselves into the international system as “players,” if not “actors” on an
9Maryann K. Cusimano, “Sovereignty’s Future: The Ship o f  Theseus and Other Conclusions,” in 
Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a G lobal Agenda, ed. Maryann K. Cusimano, 311-331 (Bedford, MA: St. 
Martin’s, 2000): 317.
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equal footing, with states. Transsovereign problems carry the potential to extend beyond 
resolution by states. The states become mediators, facilitators, and persuaders to develop 
solutions to transsovereign problems,10 but often without the means to solve them without 
non-state assistance. State institutions, developed to support historically conventional 
approaches to the international system, may require reorganization and modification to 
accommodate new roles. However, rather than a loss, or reduction of sovereignty, this 
might be classified as an “expansion” of sovereign duties or requirements. The state still 
maintains it place as an international organizing factor. States continue to posess and the 
ability to use hard and soft power. Further, no viable alternative has emerged to replace 
sovereignty and its manifestation in the state. Telecommunities, trading states, or other 
pseudo-state concepts may take on some elements of sovereignty, but they lack the all 
encompassing responsibilities and power of the sovereign state.
Conclusions
Sovereignty is a theoretical concept. As such, it consists o f a series of statements, or 
hypotheses which explain observed phenomena. The archetypical sovereign state, with 
[telecommunications in its peculiar state-of-nature, functioned in an environment where 
news of its actions, both domestic and international, took time to reach other competitors, 
friends, and enemies. As the concept of sovereignty developed to describe observed 
behavior of states, it was based on this state-of-nature.
As the distribution of information broadened through the use of mass media, and 
transfer of data increased due to telecommunication, states’ actions became known more
l0Ibid., 329.
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rapidly across —  and even beyond —  their area of influence. Decision making had to 
include the results of rapid (and eventually immediate) news transfer. The most 
parsimonious of theories of sovereignty have room for states altering their behavior based 
on their pursuit of courses of action in the best interest o f the state. However, the fact that 
a state must alter, adjust, or limit its actions based on external concerns indicates impact 
on sovereignty. If sovereign states no longer “behave” in concert with the theory, it is not 
necessarily sovereignty that is different, reduced, or eroded, it may well be that the theory 
requires revision. As a social construct, sovereignty meets the needs of society — both 
domestic and international. Society has changed since 1648 and states may just as likely 
have changed as well. Sovereignty may still exist but the hypotheses which help explain 
state behavior may require revision to continue to be relevant.
States no longer await days, weeks, or months for news from other parts of the 
international system. In the twenty-first century, distance has little effect on the speed of 
information transfer; it can travel to the farthest comers of the world with virtual 
instantaneity. Although the international system is still in anarchy, telecommunications 
technology and the resultant transfer of information provide new tools for states to use 
within the anarchical system. They have positive, instantaneous control of their 
diplomats and forces under their control throughout the world.
One necessary element of the state is its population. If the state serves the population 
then the culture of the people becomes a sovereign concern. Telecommunications 
technology and information transfer act as a catalyst and accelerate the natural processes 
of social evolution. Various electronic media provide instant exposure to cultural 
influence which, historically, was accomplished through trade, migration, and conquest.
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Is the sovereign state in competition with anything? Telecommunications technology 
allows IGOs and MNCs to take on some sub-elements of sovereignty; they have a 
bureaucratic or organizational structure which performs many of the functions of a 
government; they have employees with a loose identity; and some degree economic 
control over finance which approaches establishing a currency. Such organizations, 
however, exist to pursue the goals of their founding treaty or charter; in the case of IGOs 
and NGOs, or in pursuit of profit with MNCs. Further, they fail to meet the territorial 
control element of the state.
The US dollar, the British pound sterling, the newly emerged euro, and the Japanese 
yen have all been used as a form of international currency because their value is more 
trusted than many other domestic currencies. Does this spell and end to sovereign “coins 
of the realm?” If so, does it affect sovereignty?
As the international movement of money via telecommunications becomes more 
routine and “e-cash” nears reality, state currencies may decrease in importance. If an 
internationally accepted form and quantification of e-cash should gain worldwide 
acceptance, state peculiar currencies may survive for domestic transactions. The 
sovereign state acts in its own best interest. It does not necessarily affect sovereignty if 
the state determines it to be in its own best interest that its coin of the realm should be one 
produced elsewhere.
The sovereign state, defined by territorial limits, will remain a significant player in the 
international environment. While other entities such as MNCs, IGOs, NGOs, trading 
blocks, or even somewhat ethereal telecommunities might begin to take on some 
elements of sovereignty, there is still a place and a necessity for the state. Other
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international actors are driven by self-centered interests, primarily profit. States are 
concerned with security. Will other entities establish security forces to protect all citizens 
and elements of the state, not just profit related entities? Who will build the roads to 
unprofitable areas? Establish an egalitarian school system? Provide the community with 
common goods?
Because of the presence of other actors, the state may see its application o f power 
diminished, or changed, but its significance as the territorially-oriented sovereign entity 
remains. Other participants in the international system such as MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs 
have narrow interests which can not rival the requirements, responsibilities, and power of 
the state. The theory describing the concept may well require revision, but the 
international system will remain in an anarchic situation. Other actors will become more 
influential as ubiquitous telecommunications technology allows virtually instantaneous 
movement of information. As globalization necessitates deeper and deeper cooperation 
in pursuit of prosperity, perhaps the anarchy will be “pushed back” a little as the “norms” 
of cooperative behavior become established and coalesce further a body o f international 
law.
Although the concept of sovereignty represents a mature element in the discipline of 
International Relations, further research is indicated as technology of all types, but 
especially telecommunications, continues to evolve. As citizens’ expectation of the 
governmental element of the state changes, the impact of technology can not be ignored. 
Sovereignty remains an organizing element but it coexists with increasing power and 
significance of MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs.
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This study points to conclusions about effects on sovereignty, but the conclusions 
require differentiation between changes in sovereignty and a serious diminution of 
sovereignty. Returning to the basic definition of sovereignty —  the absolute and 
unlimited power of the state — “reduced” or “diminished” sovereignty would be reflected 
in an inability to exercise state power. In terms of hard power, diminution would reflect 
the state’s inability to use military or economic assets in pursuit o f its best interest in 
either domestic or international roles. This would require restraints on the ability to 
accomplish state functions such as pursuit of national security, engaging in international 
agreements and recognition among the community of sovereign states, or a lack of 
international recognition that it has the exclusive right to intervene coercively in activities 
within its territory. While soft power accounts for a significant element of the state’s 
total national power, diminution would require some means by which a state was 
prevented from using its inherent culture, values, and ideas to convince others of the 
validity of or need for cooperation
Short of outright conquest by another state, or perhaps in some extreme (approaching 
imaginary) situation where a non-state entity, such as an MNC, might exert exceptional 
control over a government, sovereignty will exist in some form until destroyed.
In comparison to diminution of sovereignty are changes in sovereignty caused by 
external stimuli, in the case of this study, of course, by information as enabled by 
telecommunications technology. Here, telecommunications technology enabled the 
movement of information throughout the world at increasing speeds until distance 
became an irrelevant factor. If the state participates in international trade or economic 
activity, its domestic market becomes an integral part of the single, world economy,
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linked by telecommunications with immediate, worldwide transfer of information about 
its decisions and actions. A domestic economic decision may be reflected in the world’s 
market with international ramifications. Cultural influence, transferred across borders via 
various electronic means, could potentially alter some elements of a state’s soft power. A 
change in or subsumation of cultural elements would change the values on which it 
attempts to exert soft influence on others in the international system.
The foregoing study has not identified evidence of impacts on sovereignty resulting in 
diminution. Rather, the effects of information enabled by the evolutionary developments 
of telecommunications technology result in modification of sovereign states’ behavior. 
They are still sovereign by classic definitions. However, as members of the international 
system of sovereign states, and more importantly, as participants in an ever-increasingly 
interdependent world community, states modify their behavior to fit the needs of modem 
society. They still pursue security and self-interests but with information about all states’ 
actions moving throughout the world at the speed of light, state behavior must consider, 
accommodate, and where possible, exploit the information-based environment of the 
future.
Changes to sovereign state behavior do not necessarily indicate a loss of sovereignty. 
They do, however, suggest that the natural social evolutionary process has resulted in a 
necessity for review of some elements of the theories which describe and explain state 
activities. Future developments in telecommunications technology can be expected, even 
relied upon. Consequently, states’ territorial borders may be expected to become 
invisible and inconsequential to information transfer. It does not mean that the borders
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disappear. The sovereign state will survive well into the foreseeable and imaginable 
future.
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